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Digital data increasingly plays a central role in contemporary politics and public 
life. Citizen voices in the so-called public sphere are increasingly mediated by pro-
prietary social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, and are thus shaped 
by algorithmic ranking and re-ordering. ‘Calculated publics’ fashioned by ‘new 
kinds of human and machine interaction’ (Amoore and Piotukh 2016, 2) replace 
communities of interest. Most controversial at the time of writing is what we may 
call the ‘dirty politics’ of data analytics company Cambridge Analytica (Graham-
Harrison, Cadwalladr, and Hilary Osborne 2018), which reportedly played a role in 
a number of electoral campaigns, such as the US presidential election and the 
Brexit referendum: algorithms were used to profile, target and influence voters, on 
the basis of millions of private profiles of Facebook users, unaware of their data 
being collected, sold and used for these purposes. But data informs how states act, 
too: since 2013, the whistleblower Edward Snowden has offered ample evidence of 
the connivance of the data industry with intelligence services, to the detriment of 
citizens’ privacy and political oversight (Greenwald 2014). Cambridge Analytica and 
the Snowden leaks are just two of the many cases showing how data has opened up 
an unregulated arena for new actors that play a role in today’s politics. Data has 
become the new currency for many processes within contemporary democracies—
from the fight for electoral consent to the protection of national security, from 
advertising to the monitoring of citizens. Many aspects of the state and the market 
today have to do with the ‘data economy’ and its rules (or lack thereof). 
 
In this special issue, we are also interested in ‘data politics’, but we want to shift 
the focus of the conversation. Big data corporations and intelligence agencies are 
not the only ones acting on datafication, or the process of turning into monetizable 
and analyzable data many aspects of life that had never been quantified before, such 
as people’s emotions and interpersonal connections. Non-governmental organiza-
tions, hackers, and activists of all kinds provide a myriad of ‘alternative’ interven-
tions, interpretations, and imaginaries of what data stands for and what can be done 
with it.  
 
The idea of the special issue emerged during a two-day workshop on ‘Contentious 
Data’ hosted by the research group DATACTIVE at the University of Amsterdam 
in September 2016 (DATACTIVE). As the organisers argued elsewhere, these 
emerging forms of ‘data activism’, that is to say socio-technical mobilizations and 
tactics taking a critical approach towards datafication and massive data collection, 
offer new epistemologies able to counteract the mainstream positivistic discourse 
of datafication (Milan and van der Velden 2016). Data activism can be understood 
as a contemporary evolution of already existing phenomena like radical tech activ-
ism and hacktivism (Milan 2017). It represents yet another possible manifestation 
of activism in the information society—one that, however, explicitly engages with 
the new forms information and knowledge take today as well as their modes of 
production, challenging dominant understandings of datafication. Because datafi-
cation is such a prominent feature in public life, data activism, as a way of respond-
ing to its challenges, might progressively appeal to more diverse communities of 
concerned citizens, beyond the expert niche of previous incarnations of tech activist 
engagement. We believe that this shifting terrain represents an interesting testing 
ground for contemporary philosophy and theory-building in general. 
 
Like the workshop, this special issue of Krisis aims to present a wide range of 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives on emerging forms of grassroots engage-
ment with datafication. We bring into dialogue scholars and practitioners who 
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critically explore the politics of data from the perspective of grassroots activism, 
organised civil society, and the citizenry at large. Thus, several of the articles illus-
trate or critically engage with the notion of data activism. 
 
Jonathan Gray’s article “Three Aspects of Data Worlds” starts off the special issue 
by introducing and developing the notion of “data worlds”. Exploring several the-
oretical traditions of conceptualising worlds, worlding and world-making, Gray 
suggests ways of looking beyond prominent narratives about data politics – such as 
the liberation of data as a resource and Orwellian visions of data surveillance – to 
consider how data can be involved in providing horizons of intelligibility and or-
ganising social and political life. 
 
In “Living with data: Aligning Data Studies and Data Activism through a Focus 
on Everyday Experiences of Datafication”, Helen Kennedy reflects upon the field 
of ‘data studies’ as it emerges around the phenomenon of datafication. Her contri-
bution rethinks the field of philosophy of technology in light of the data justice 
agenda often propagated by data activists, and advocates for a focus on emotions 
and everyday lived experiences with data. 
 
The third article by Lina Dencik, entitled “Surveillance Realism and the Politics 
of Imagination: Is There No Alternative?” puts forward the notion of ‘surveillance 
realism’. By building on Mark Fisher’s definition of capitalist realism (Fisher 2009), 
Dencik explores the pervasiveness of contemporary surveillance and the emergence 
of alternative imaginaries, looking into how the UK public responded to the Snow-
den revelations. 
 
The following three articles engage with or tackle the notion of data activism by 
delving into paradigmatic case studies. Stefan Baack’s piece on “Civic tech at mySo-
ciety: How the Imagined Affordances of Data Shape Data Activism” investigates 
how data are used to facilitate civic engagement. More specifically, he shows how 
‘civic technologists’ think of themselves as facilitators of civic engagement, and how 
this relates to the agency of these novel publics in relation to state institutions. 
 
In “Data Activism in Light of the Public Sphere”, Miren Gutiérrez explores how 
activists can make use of data infrastructures such as databases, servers, and algo-
rithms. In her analysis, data infrastructures make new forms of activism possible 
by creating spaces for dialogue, consensus and networked action. Her case study, 
namely the Ushahidi software, allows for a reflection on the evolution of the public 
sphere in relation to data activism. 
 
In “Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Activism: Data Organising Inside the Institu-
tion”, Leah Horgan and Paul Dourish critically engage with the notion of data 
activism going beyond some of the assumptions around the distinction between 
grassroots activism and the government. By looking at everyday data work in a local 
administration, they show how activist ideals are pushed forward in a bureaucratic 
setting. Meyerson and Scully’s notion of ‘tempered radicalism’ (Meyerson and 
Scully 1995) serves as a useful lens to describe a particular form of data tactics 
deployed by ‘outsiders within’. 
 
To complement the articles, the special issue features an interview with philoso-
pher and media theorist Boris Groys by Thijs Lijster, whose work Über das Neue 
enjoys its 25th anniversary this year. 
 
Finally, three book reviews enrich this special issue, illuminating three key aspects 
of datafication, namely involuntary disclosure as a radical form of informational 
democracy, the role of platforms, and the evolution of subjectivity. Patricia de Vries 
reviews Metahavens’ Black Transparency; Niels van Doorn writes on Platform Cap-
italism by Nick Srnicek and Jan Overwijk comments on The Entrepeneurial Self by 
Ulrich Bröckling.  
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Introduction: Data Politics Beyond Liberation and Protection? 
 
“Data” has become an important keyword in contemporary life. It features promi-
nently in many different visions of the future, as well as in relation to a wide range 
of practical tasks. Companies see data as a lucrative new asset class and as a resource 
for streamlining their operations and for providing new offerings. Politicians see 
data as an instrument of reform by enabling transparency, accountability, partici-
pation and innovation. Journalists see data as a means to source stories and enrich 
their reportage. Activists see data as both an issue in itself and as a resource for 
intervention concerning everything from corporate and governmental surveillance 
to climate change and migration. Data is envisaged to make money, strengthen 
democracies, aid investigations and enable justice. At the same time it has been 
subjected to numerous critiques. Data is also held to disrupt livelihoods, violate 
privacy, undermine democracies, deepen inequalities, distract from issues, and dis-
place other forms of reasoning, sense-making and experience. 
 
What are we to make of what appears concurrently as an almost magical object of 
attention and concern, as well an integral part of the mundane organisation of daily 
affairs? Data has become an object of study in numerous fields, and has even given 
rise to new fields and sub-fields such as “data studies” and “critical data studies” 
(see, e.g. Kitchin and Lauriault 2014; Iliadis and Russo 2016; Dalton, Taylor and 
Thatcher 2016). This article introduces the notion of “data worlds” and explores 
its relevance for studying, theorising and doing things with data. It draws on pre-
vious research on worlds, worlding and world-making in order to examine three 
aspects of data worlds as: (i) horizons of intelligibility, (ii) collective accomplish-
ments, and (iii) transnational coordination. These three aspects are illustrated with 
examples from ongoing research on the politics of public data. The article con-
cludes by reflecting on how the notion of data worlds might inform not only social 
and cultural research, but also inspire interventions and experimentation around 
the politics of data. 
 
While using the concept of data worlds in my own research, I’ve been reviewing 
how others use it. The term has been mentioned in relation to topics such as “big 
and small data worlds” (Blok and Pedersen 2014), “data art” (Singer 2016), “test 
bed urbanism” (Halpern, LeCavalier, Calvillo and Pietsch 2013) and “thing eth-
nography” (Giaccardi, Cila, Speed and Caldwell 2016). Many of these brief refer-
ences do not dwell on what is meant by the term. This article addresses the gap in 
this literature by unpacking the notion of data worlds and suggesting three closely 
related ways in which it can be understood. Before looking at these in more depth 
I will briefly say a bit more about why and how the concept of data worlds may be 
useful in relation to studying the politics of data, and why I focus on the particular 
set of ideas about worlds, worlding and world-making that informs the discussion 
below. 
 
The notion of data worlds is used in my work in order to look beyond data as a 
“representational resource”, to consider the various forms of epistemic, social and 
political work that it does and which is done to produce it. The representational 
conception is evident in both implicit metaphors and explicit models for talking 
about and doing things with data. While data does indeed designate aspects of 
situations, it could also do other things, such as shape the way we see and think 
about things, serve as a common point of connection across situations, and help to 
conventionalise ways of organising the world. 
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The notion of data worlds is thus partly a response to contemporary “socio-tech-
nical imaginaries” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015) about data. Just as industrial technolo-
gies of the past were accompanied by new social, cultural and political imaginaries, 
so we can trace the ascent of “data imaginaries” and “data speak”: visions and rhet-
oric concerning the role of data in society. As Gillespie notes in relation to plat-
forms, these imaginaries do “discursive work” (2010). For example, data is framed 
as “the new oil”, “the new gold” or “the new soil”, in order to emphasise its value 
as a social or economic resource. We also see the idea of “infrastructures” of data 
being used in order to emphasise different configurations of public-private and 
state-citizen collaboration, as well as to establish information infrastructures as a 
basic good in society alongside infrastructures for water, gas, electricity and so on. 
The platform, the portal, the app, the lab and the hackday give rise to new imagi-
naries and discursive regimes as well as material practices suggesting the role of 
data in public life. 
 
Many of these imaginaries focus on the value to be extracted from data, through 
various mechanisms and arrangements to make data public. The issue is often 
framed as one of access, formats and conventions for encouraging the re-use of 
public data in innovative applications and services. I have found the notion of data 
worlds to be useful in examining what open data initiatives do and do not do, and 
how they might be done differently (Gray 2018). For example, open data projects 
may focus on redistributing access to data about public finances without substantively 
engaging with the epistemic, social and political work of data infrastructures in 
selecting, translating, arranging and articulating certain aspects of fiscal policy 
(such as detailed spending estimates of local councils), but not others (such as the 
economic activities and tax payments of multinational corporations). 
 
The notion of data worlds is intended to gesture beyond two prominent forms of 
data politics which can be broadly characterised as “data liberation” and “data pro-
tection”. Both emphasise dynamics of power related to access. Data liberation is 
widely associated with hacker culture and other forms of information activism: 
setting information free from institutions and corporations as a means to address 
information asymmetries, and to provide a resource for activism and social change. 
This may be considered in terms of a “Promethean” mythology of broadening ac-
cess to a powerful resource or instrument (just as Prometheus stole fire from the 
gods to give to humankind) – an outlook which is shared across the spectrum from 
the “mega-leaks” of Wikileaks and the Panama Papers and the more curated, se-
lective leaks of Edward Snowden, through to “Freedom of Information” (FOI) and 
access to information movements in the 1990s, as well as official and grassroots 
open data initiatives which emphasise making data legally and technically amenable 
to re-use (Gray 2016). 
 
On the flipside, we have “data protection” as a narrative of information politics 
which emphasises the protection of personal information from state, corporate and 
other actors – as is exemplified in the work of civil society groups such as Privacy 
International and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. These narratives place an 
emphasis on the individual ownership and control of personal data, as well as on 
preventing, obstructing, managing, regulating and raising awareness of the collec-
tion of personally identifying information – from artistic projects to make visible 
the personal information different actors have collected, to law and policy (such as 
EU Data Protection rules or US Fair Information Principles). 
 
Whilst these two genres of information policy and information politics are indeed 
vital, data infrastructures do much more than making data public and making data 
private. Raymond Geuss has critiqued what he considers the disproportionate at-
tention accorded to the “public/private distinction” which both reflects and rein-
forces the absence of “any effective general framework for thinking about politics 
apart from liberalism” (Geuss 2003). Dominic Boyer has suggested the phrase “dig-
ital liberalism” as an invitation to attend to how “techno-institutional processes 
such as computerization and digital information and politico-institutional dis-
courses of late liberalism have coevolved, at times reinforcing and naturalizing each 
other, promoting novel bundles of epistemics and ethics” (Boyer 2013). 
 
The notion of data worlds is intended to make space for thinking about data as 
more than simply a representational resource, and the politics of data as more than 
a matter of liberation and protection. It is intended to encourage exploration of 
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the performative capacities of data infrastructures: what they do and could do dif-
ferently, and how they are done and could be done differently. This includes con-
sideration of, as Geoffrey Bowker puts it, “the ways in which our social, cultural 
and political values are braided into the wires, coded into the applications and built 
into the databases which are so much a part of our daily lives” (2014). In doing so 
we may draw on performative analyses of numbers (Espeland and Stevens 2008; 
Verran 2015), models (Mackenzie 2008) and methods (Law, Ruppert and Savage 
2011) to consider how data infrastructures may be involved in not just the repre-
sentation but also the articulation of collective life, while at the same time being 
the products of social and institutional work themselves. 
 
Many accounts of performativity allude to the work of J. L. Austin, who suggests 
“the issuing of an utterance is the performing of an action” (1975: 6). Austin is 
associated with a “linguistic turn” in Anglophone analytic philosophy said to begin 
with Wittgenstein, whose later work reflects on what language does beyond refer-
ring to things. In the following discussion of the performative and world-making 
capacities of data infrastructures, I draw on an earlier linguistic turn that occurred 
in German philosophy in the eighteenth century and which has recently begun to 
receive more attention in English-language scholarship (Lifschitz 2012; Bowie 
2013; Taylor 2016). Thinkers associated with this earlier turn also sought to look 
beyond representational accounts of language towards its other capacities as a sit-
uated set of social practices. Ian Hacking argues this tradition can be viewed as an 
alternative to Wittgenstein’s “depoliticized” philosophy of language (2002). I do 
not argue for the special relevance of this period and these ideas. Rather I suggest 
that it contains conceptual and theoretical resources which may be useful when 
considering different aspects of worlds, worlding and world-making in relation to 
data. 
 
The three aspects of data worlds which I examine below are not intended to be 
comprehensive, but illustrative of what is involved in data infrastructures, what 
they do, and how they are put to work. As I shall return to in the conclusion, this 
outline is intended to open up space for not only thinking about data differently, but 
also doing things with data differently. The test of these three aspects is therefore 
not only their analytical purchase, but also their practical utility. 
 
 
1. Data Worlds as Horizons of Intelligibility 
 
The first aspect of data worlds draws on philosophical ideas about worlds, worlding 
and world-making to look at how things are sayable, knowable, intelligible and ex-
periencable through data. In European philosophy this begins with Kant’s “Coper-
nican revolution” which recognises the active and creative role that human beings 
played in composing the worlds that they experience – including through schemes, 
categories and structures such as space, time, causality and quantity which give 
form to experience. This is an explicit departure from views which saw experience 
as “given” and immediate, and also heralds a broader philosophical shift towards 
looking at how experience is articulated and mediated through language, culture 
and social arrangements. 
 
Subsequent thinkers in this tradition –Hamann and Herder in the eighteenth cen-
tury to thinkers as diverse as Heidegger, Gadamer, Benjamin and Wittgenstein in 
the twentieth century – stripped Kant’s project of its aspiration to clarify universal 
structures, and highlighted the role of socially and historically situated linguistic 
and cultural infrastructures, or what the contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor 
calls “meaningful media” (Taylor 1985), in shaping our apprehension of the worlds 
we inhabit. 
 
Many of these earlier thinkers mainly focused on the role of language as a horizon 
of intelligibility, providing the “conditions of possibility” for our experience. As 
Taylor notes, this also corresponded with an explicit move away from a dominant 
focus on the designative, representational and “information encoding” capacities of 
language and other meaningful media – and a focus on their role in composing and 
co-producing our worlds of experience (2016). As Hacking puts it, in this tradition 
we find the notion that: “language is creative; to it we owe the existences and 
structures that populate our world-versions” (2002, 139). And yet, while there is a 
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focus on language as an important and paradigmatic case of how our experience is 
formed, language is very often construed in a broad sense – including not only 
written and verbal language, but also music, painting, sculpture, and other social 
and cultural conventions for making meaning. 
 
Benjamin draws on Hamann’s “metacritical” challenge towards narrower concep-
tions of experience as “naked, primitive, self-evident” (Benjamin 1996), exploring 
in his work the world-making capacities of architecture, urban planning, fashion, 
advertising and technologies, perhaps most famously in his Arcades Project (Benja-
min 1999). Later in the twentieth century, these kinds of appropriations of Kantian 
ideas about schematism and world-making (minus the transcendental idealist bag-
gage), have broadened out from what Apel calls the “linguistic a priori” of thinkers 
like Hamann, Herder and Heidegger (Apel 1973, 39), to the “historical a priori” of 
Michel Foucault (Foucault 1972) and what has been called the “technological a 
priori” of German media theorists shifting the focus to Kulturtechniken or “cultural 
techniques” (Tuschling 2016; Winthrop-Young, Iurascu and Parikka 2013). 
 
What might this sense of world-making bring to an understanding of the politics 
of data? Taking a cue from this theoretical constellation, we might envisage data 
worlding in terms of a contingent, historically and socially situated, technologically 
mediated “data a priori” which not only designates but also provides the conditions 
of possibility for seeing and engaging with different aspects of collective life – mak-
ing possible particular styles of reasoning and particular forms of knowledge and 
experience. 
 
Data practices might be understood not just in terms of more sophisticated ways 
of picking things out, but as contributing to new ways of making things up, as Hacking 
puts it (1985). Here critical data scholars can benefit from decades of research on 
social practices of quantification (Porter 1996; Espeland and Stevens 2008; Rot-
tenburg, Merry, Park and Mugler 2015; Bruno, Jany-Catrice and Touchelay 2016); 
statistics (Porter 1986; Desrosières 2002); standards (Lampland and Star 2008); 
probability (Hacking 1990); visual reasoning (Halpern 2015); and other studies of 
cultures and practices of knowledge which focus not just on what is said, but on 
the background against which things become sayable. In looking at how data 
worlds provide horizons of intelligibility we can both draw on genealogies of the 
modes of experience and styles of reasoning which are rendered possible through 
data over previous decades and centuries, as well as looking at what is distinctive 
about new and emerging digital technologies. As Nelson Goodman puts it in his 
classic Ways of Worldmaking: “worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds 
already on hand; the making is a remaking” (Goodman 1978, 6). 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of transportation maps from Mapnificent project (mapnificent.net), 
showing which places are accessible in a given amount of time from a given point. 
 
Thus in relation to digital data worlds we may examine how composites of con-
ventions, norms, technologies, practices, methods, pieces of software, graphical 
user interfaces, data standards, data formats and aesthetic approaches are implicated 
in making things up and making things intelligible with data. This might include 
looking at how horizons of intelligibility change from pre-digital to digital data 
worlds. For example, we might look at differences in how the world is conceptually 
organised or “carved up” into categories. In contrast to the classificatory practices 
of statisticians taking measure of economies or populations, “born digital” and big 
data, generated as a result of interactions with online platforms, can give rise to 
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novel practices of semi-automated classification, as well as emerging forms of ine-
quality and discrimination. 
 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot of interactive “animated bubble charts” of Gapminder project (gap-
minder.org), exploring relations between average life expectancy and income per capita 
over time for countries around the world. 
 
There are many historical studies looking at how social categories are articulated 
through statistical practices (Desrosières 2002). In digital data worlds computa-
tional techniques such as machine learning may be used to facilitate “class discov-
ery”. Clusters and orderings of hashtags, links, likes, images and other media can 
be viewed as co-produced by the logic of platforms, algorithms, and the “device 
cultures” of users. For example, Sam Lavigne’s “Taxonomy of Humans According 
to Twitter” at The New Inquiry explores and visually represents the “bizarre rubrics 
Twitter uses to render its users legible” (Lavigne 2017). This project aims to make 
visible the way in which people are classified according to a combination of user 
activity and information from data-brokerage companies, leading to categories such 
as “people who live with three other people”, “buyers of frozen ethnic foods”, and 
“households whose behavior indicates they are spa mavens”. These algorithmically-
mediated data practices around online platforms can be understood, as Annemarie 
Mol puts it, as “new ways of doing reality” (Mol 1999). 
 
We might also look at the forms of experience, styles of reasoning, and genres of 
sociality that arise with novel kinds of cultural objects associated with digital data 
worlds. This includes the world-making capacities of things such as apps, plat-
forms, software packages, code libraries, and data analysis and visualisation tools 
through which people make sense with data, and integrate data into different kinds 
of social processes, practices and institutions. We might consider how space, time, 
relations and categories are articulated and organised through lists, tables, charts, 
timelines, maps and coordinate systems – and inscribed into dashboards, interactive 
data visualisations, word clouds, network graphs, mapping technologies, and com-
putational techniques for filtering, reconciling and analysing data. 
 
Just as Scott talks of “seeing like a state” by reducing “an infinite array of detail to 
a set of categories that will facilitate summary descriptions, comparisons, and ag-
gregation” (1999, 77), and Law talks of “seeing like a survey” by using statistical 
methods to enact “a very particular version of the collective” (2009), so we may 
consider how the performative and world-making capacities of data projects are 
conventionalised into familiar forms such as seeing like an app, a network graph, a 
data portal, an API, an interactive map, a Google Spreadsheet and so on. 
 
 
Figure 3: Detail of dashboard previews from London Datastore (data.london.gov.uk) 
showing trends in relation to performance indicators for the city. 
 
“Time travel” maps articulate novel and interactive relationships between space and 
time by estimating the zones that can be reached from a given point in a given time 
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interval (Figure 1). Global indicators are no longer simply represented through 
tables, charts or line graphs, but through interactive animated graphics dramatizing 
the passage of centuries through the movements of multicoloured bubbles articu-
lating different dimensions of collective life (Figure 2). Interactive dashboards are 
envisaged as the preferred mode to increase transparency and public accountability 
in the city by tracking trends in relation to key performance indicators (Figure 3). 
While these kinds of projects draw on ideals and practices that have much longer 
histories – such as the aspiration for what Theodore Porter characterises as “thin 
descriptions” and an aesthetic of distance – digital technologies are also facilitating 
reconfigurations and redistributions of these data world-making capacities, leading 
to emerging genres of making sense with data. As we shall see in the following 
section, these meaning-making practices should be understood as social conven-
tions. 
 
 
2. Data Worlds as Collective Accomplishments 
 
The second aspect of data worlds draws on a sociological tradition of studying “so-
cial worlds”. Adele Clarke and Susan Leigh Star trace this from the Chicago School 
of Sociology to Science and Technology Studies (Clarke and Star 2008). This ap-
proach encompasses and informs a range of research on social worlds – including 
for example Anselm Strauss, who suggests in the 1970s that we should look at the 
“social worlds” of genetics, high energy physics, computerisation and banking 
(Strauss 1978), to Howard Becker’s renowned work on “art worlds” (Becker 1984), 
as well as the “worlds of classification” and “information worlds” explored in the 
work of Bowker, Star and other scholars of information infrastructures (Bowker 
and Star 2000; Star, Bowker and Neumann 1997). 
 
This view of social world-making is also commensurate with both critics and radical 
interpreters of Kant who suggest that language and meaning-making practices 
should be regarded in fundamentally social and historical terms – a move which 
led Ian Hacking to mark this as a key moment when language “goes public” (2002). 
This tendency to look at language and meaning-making practices in terms of 
contingent and evolving social institutions is also present in Wittgenstein’s work, 
which is a formative influence on subsequent social research agendas from ethno-
methodology, to the “Strong Programme”, to Science and Technology Studies (see, 
e.g. Bloor 1983, 2002; Hacking 1984; Lynch 1992).  
 
Taking a cue from this tradition, we might look at how the information products, 
styles of reasoning, and meaning-making capacities associated with data infrastruc-
tures can be considered as “relational achievements” or “distributed accomplish-
ments” – and how the collectives associated with data infrastructures are changing 
in composition. Data worlds as horizons of intelligibility must thus be understood 
as social and collective. Changes in these collectives can carry significant political 
and political-economic consequences. For example, in the case of the redistribution 
of “data work” from official institutions to actors outside the public sector – as in 
the case of open data initiatives (Gray 2018), to civil society and citizen generated 
data (Gray, Lämmerhirt and Bounegru, 2016), through a shift of emphasis from 
statistical data to “big data” generated by major technology companies (Flyverbom, 
Madsen and Rasche 2017). 
 
In Howard Becker’s terms, we can examine the “conventions” and practices which 
hold these social “data worlds” together – which he characterises as “ways of seeing 
and hearing that were known by everyone involved and thus formed the basis for 
their collective action” (Becker 1984, xv). In the case of open data, this might 
include, for example, such things as open licensing practices, legal arrangements, 
and technical practices which aim to “unlock the potential” of data as a resource, 
and “reduce the barriers” to its re-use by non-state actors – whether in new tech-
nology products such as Google Maps, the stories of data journalists, or the cam-
paigns of NGOs or civil society groups. This concern with legal and technical con-
ventions suggests that the open data community might be understood as what 
Chris Kelty calls a “recursive public”, or “a public that is vitally concerned with the 
material and practical maintenance and modification of the technical, legal, prac-
tical, and conceptual means of its own existence as a public” (Kelty 2005, 3). There 
are also emerging conventions for making sense with data such as those discussed 
in the previous section. 
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Looking at data worlds as collective accomplishments includes recognising the role 
of actors whose contributions may otherwise be under-recognised. In his work on 
the sociology of “art worlds” Becker suggests a shift of emphasis from the formal 
quality of art works to “complex networks through which art happens” (1984, 1). 
In his work he describes a broad range of materials, formats, spaces, instruments, 
distribution networks and art workers which are involved in the production and 
distribution of art works, and the assembly of their publics. Hence we might survey 
not just the formal properties of data projects or practices of prominent data work-
ers (such as data scientists or data journalists), but a much broader cast of characters 
who are involved in the production, circulation and reception of data work. 
 
Similar moves will be familiar from approaches inspired by Science and Technology 
Studies which view data infrastructures as relations of people, machines, software, 
standards, processes, practices, and cultures of knowledge production (e.g. Bowker 
and Star 1998, 2000; Star 1999; Star and Bowker 2002; Star and Ruhleder 1996; 
Jackson, Edwards, Bowker and Knobel 2007). Susan Leigh Star and Geoffrey 
Bowker suggest the notion of “infrastructural inversion” to bring neglected actors 
and processes into the foreground, including the role of non-human actors. In 
other recent work this has been framed in terms of “data assemblages” (see, e.g., 
Kitchin and Lauriault 2014). 
 
One notable feature of many aspects of contemporary data politics is the emphasis 
on redistributing different forms of data work through digital technologies and net-
works. This redistribution comes in many different flavours. The tendency to re-
distribute “data work” from the public sector to the private sector is reflected in 
what Joseph Stiglitz calls the “default position” in information policy in the US, 
which is that states should not attempt what can be more effectively delivered by 
markets. This sentiment is also echoed in an influential paper called “Government 
Data and the Invisible Hand”, suggesting that states cannot “keep pace” with the 
internet. This paper is picked up by Tim O’Reilly with his idea of “government as 
a platform” (which he opposed to “vending machine government”), an idea which 
was institutionalised as part of government policy in the UK (Gray 2014). Since 
the turn of the millennium, public information policy has seen an influx of 
different ideas concerning how and why to redistribute public data work – from 
enabling new kinds of innovation and businesses, reducing public sector costs, to 
crowdsourcing, distributed collaboration or peer production around data (modelled 
on open source software development), to grassroots, bottom up and participatory 
data cultures. 
 
The redistribution of data worlds can be facilitated through a variety of devices and 
conventions, such as open licenses (like Creative Commons licenses); data formats 
such as Google Transit Feed Specification (later renamed General Transit Feed 
Specification); online platforms such as GitHub; data portals (such as data.gov); as 
well as hackathons, fellowships, and other public engagement activities. We may 
consider these not only as “transparency devices” (Barry 2010), but also as “infra-
structuring devices” (Star and Bowker 2002; Pipek and Wulf 2009; Björgvinsson, 
Ehn and Hillgren 2010; Karasti 2014; Le Dantec and DiSalvo 2013), assembling 
different publics around data, whether it is to clean it up, crowdsource quality 
control of bus stop locations, monitor potholes, or make new apps and services. 
How these different forms of publicity, participation and contribution are materi-
ally organised is an important question which can be read in relation to recent 
research on the politics of openness and participation (Tkacz 2014) and of plat-
forms, platformisation and platform capitalism (Helmond 2015; Srnicek 2016). 
 
 
3. Data Worlds as Transnational Coordination 
 
A third aspect of data worlds is world-making as transnational coordination, which 
includes projects of shaping, governing and articulating transnational relations, 
from empires and international institution building, to the networks, circuits and 
tendencies which are often studied by sociologists of globalisation (Sassen 2006). 
 
Through this lens we can look at the world-making ambitions of legal and tech-
nical norms, standardisation, harmonisation and interoperability processes under-
taken by a wide variety of different actors in the service of different projects for 
making things global. For example, UN bodies and EU statistical agencies have 
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undertaken extensive programmes of work to align national forms of quantification 
– to support transnational policy coordination and comparison. Intergovernmental 
actors and international organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
UN, have long supported the creation and alignment of systems and standards for 
the management of public finances in order to support objectives such as “fiscal 
discipline”, the allocation and coordination of development funds, and the compa-
rability of public spending across borders. 
 
It is not only public institutions which share these kinds of world-shaping ambi-
tions by means of data. They are accompanied by a host of researchers, companies, 
statisticians, consultants, analysts, accountants, scientists, activists, technologists, 
managers, journalists, ecologists, librarians, and others who seek to establish trans-
national information systems, practices, norms and standards. This may range from 
professional standards bodies (such as the International Accounting Standards 
Board), to multinational consultancies (such as Deloitte and other “big four” ac-
counting firms), to private technology companies or startups (big tech companies 
such as Google to smaller projects like OpenCorporates), to non-profit and civil 
society initiatives (such as the Open Contracting Partnership’s work on procure-
ment data or Data2X’s work on gender data). 
 
Such initiatives often aim to shape the world through the coordination of data. 
Data worlds can make things amenable to measurement, monitoring, evaluation, 
analysis, and visualisation across space and time in support of diverse political, geo-
political, eco-political or political economic programmes – from neoliberal fiscal 
policy to market creation, gender equality to tax justice, increasing biodiversity to 
strengthening democracy. Civil society interventions to create and shape global 
data can be read in terms of other recent work around the history and sociology of 
quantification, as well as in terms of what some researchers have called “statactiv-
ism”, and, more recently, “data activism” (Bruno, Didier and Vitale, 2014; Milan 
and van der Velden 2016). Longstanding information infrastructure projects, such 
as Amnesty International’s “Urgent Actions” database, can be viewed as a kind of 
transnational “issue work”, in order to render what might otherwise be 
disconnected incidents amenable to classification, measurement, comparison and 
virtual witnessing across borders. 
 
Figure 4. “Urgent Actions Visualised” from Amnesty International’s Decoders project. 
http://decoders.amnesty.org/projects/decode-urgent-actions/results  
 
There are of course many ways in which a given issue or matter of concern may be 
articulated, defined, parameterised, quantified, and given life through data. The 
transnational coordination aspect of data world-making is multivalent and may be 
considered in relation to a wide variety of utopian and dystopian, progressive and 
regressive political and ecological projects, as well as in terms of different histories 
and conceptions of land, territory, empire and earth. Here we may benefit from 
previous research on the colonial aspects of worlding in literary and cultural studies 
(e.g. Spivak 1985; Karagiannis and Wagner 2007; Clark, Finlay, and Kelly 2017); 
post-colonial computing (e.g. Irani, Vertesi, Dourish, Philip and Grinter, 2010); 
“planetary-scale computation” and emerging “technogeographies” (Bratton 2016; 
Gabrys 2016); as well as the surge of interest around “global intellectual history” 
and the making of worlds (e.g. Bell 2013). 
 
We may consider data worlds to facilitate the demarcation and shaping of spaces, 
territories, environments, categories, identities and boundaries, separating interior 
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from exterior, and sorting things, people and places out. They may also direct at-
tention to different kinds of transnational issues, dynamics, concerns or collectives. 
For example, we may look at the role of data worlds in relation to notions of the 
Anthropocene and the Capitalocene, in order to look at the role of human activity 
on a geological scale, as well as in the service of anthropologies of modernity, and 
projects to, as Bruno Latour puts it, “recompose a common world” (Kunkel 2017; 
Haraway 2016; Latour 2013). As well as deploying data worlds in order to better 
understand how human activity shapes the earth, information infrastructures may 
also be used to attempt to take various ecological signals into account in collectively 
redirecting its trajectory. As Goodman puts it: “if there is one world, it embraces 
a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of 
them all is one” (1978, 2). Data infrastructures can be used to establish the material 
character and limits of our one earth which contains such a plurality of social worlds 
and world-versions. 
 
Data worlds can thus be understood as a means to institutionalise different forms 
of transnational coordination by providing the background against which things 
become seeable, sayable and doable with data across borders. Following recent re-
search on neoliberal programmes (Roberts 2011; Davies 2014), data worlds may be 
considered as part of projects for reconfiguring relations between states, markets, 
citizens and civil society by foregrounding rankings, ratings and regimes of valua-
tion in order to reinforce ideas of performance, competition and innovation, at the 
same time as moving tenets of economic and fiscal policy outside the realm of 
public and political deliberation. We can also read the redistributions of various 
forms of data work in terms of these contemporary imaginaries of democracy, mar-
kets and information – including those of competition, accountability, transpar-
ency, innovation, self-optimising systems and specific configurations of centralised 
management and decision-making coupled with decentralised delivery and contri-
bution. 
 
While there are indeed data worlds which may be configured to accelerate market-
isation, bureaucratisation and what Habermas characterises as the “colonisation of 
the lifeworld”; other projects seek to address inequality and injustice, or to hold 
powerful elites accountable (as emphasised by the “statactivism” tradition), and all 
else in between. Data worlds can be malleable and may have unexpected conse-
quences – such as in the cases of reports for investors being used by journalists and 
activists, or data from international development organisations being used by credit 
agencies. 
 
 
Conclusion: Other Data Worlds Are Possible? 
 
The aspects of data worlds described above are intended to gesture beyond two 
prominent narratives of data politics: of Promethean conceptions of liberating data 
as a resource on the one hand, and Orwellian visions of data surveillance, privacy 
and data protection on the other. These are vital parts of contemporary information 
politics, but there are other important aspects of what data is and what data does 
that should not be overlooked. 
 
This article explores how theoretical traditions and literatures about worlds, 
worlding and world-making may be brought to bear to suggest different ways of 
thinking about data politics, highlighting three closely related aspects of data 
worlds. These three aspects are intended to be illustrative not exhaustive, and are 
intended as overlapping rather than distinct lenses through which to consider data 
infrastructures. They give rise to three different but closely related sets of questions 
for researching, theorising and reflecting on different aspects of data worlds. 
 
1. Data worlds as horizons of intelligibility: What are the epistemic world-
making capacities of data infrastructures? How might data infrastructures 
be involved in “making things up”? Can they provide conditions of possi-
bility for different ways of seeing, saying and knowing collective life, and 
if so, how? 
2. Data worlds as collective accomplishments: Who and what is involved 
with making, and making sense with, data? How are data worlds being 
redistributed through digital technologies? Who is (and who isn’t) able to 
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shape data worlds? What kinds of practices of participation and public in-
volvement are emerging around data worlds? 
3. Data worlds as transnational coordination: How might data infrastruc-
tures be implicated in different attempts to “make things global”? What 
kinds of transnational alliances and circuits are being formed and to what 
end? Who advocates which kinds of data worlds, and according to which 
kinds of visions and fields of transnational coordination (from international 
relations to earth science)? 
 
It is worth noting that it remains an empirical question as to how and to what extent 
data infrastructures are involved in world-making in these three senses. Data in-
frastructures can be deployed with certain epistemic, social and political aspirations 
and imaginaries in mind which they do not live up to. Data projects can fail to 
become data worlds in these three senses. 
 
The notion of data worlds is not just intended to advance research on data politics. 
Following recent debates about the performativity of critique (e.g. Latour 2004), 
and calls to integrate critical, theoretical and humanistic reflection into technical 
practice (e.g. Agre 1997; Rieder and Röhle 2012; Berry 2014), I am particularly 
interested in how the notion of data worlds might suggest different kinds of data 
politics. Of course, theory and critique can contribute to doing things differently, 
as critical data studies researchers have pointed out. Dalton, Taylor and Thatcher, 
for example, propose to “develop alternative knowledges that reflect and build on 
our criticisms” (2016). 
 
To this end, I’d like to propose the notion of “critical data practice” as a site for 
pedagogical experimentation, research and intervention around the politics of data. 
This follows Agre’s notion of “critical technical practice” which he uses to charac-
terise his attempts to integrate historical and theoretical reflection around artificial 
intelligence into his work as an AI researcher (Agre 1997). The crucial question 
here is what difference critical studies can make in doing things with data. As well 
as contributing to critical genealogies and sociologies of the politics of “data 
worlds” and “data world-making” projects, researchers and universities might 
contribute to “making space” for such experimentation and intervention around 
public data infrastructures and the role they play in collective life.  
 
The three aspects of data worlds I have examined are intended to assist with the 
task of rethinking the politics of public data, by considering how and for whom it is 
made public. Thus we may examine the organisation of what Evelyn Ruppert calls 
“data publics” (Ruppert 2015) beyond a focus on accessing, liberating and using 
data, and taking a broader look at how different actors engage with, mobilise 
around, shape and are shaped by, public data infrastructures. This includes distrib-
uted collaboration around different kinds of “data work” – from projects inspired 
by free software, free culture and open access movements such as Open Street Map 
or Wikidata, to data journalism and data activism projects for counting police kill-
ings or migrant deaths, to other kinds of civil society interventions for changing 
the socio-technical arrangements by which public institutions account for issues 
by means of data. As well as attending to these arrangements, researchers may also 
consider “experiments in participation” (Lezaun, Marres and Tironi 2016; Marres 
2012) around data worlds, which are also cognisant of patterning and politics of 
these participatory processes. Such experimentation would not just aim to interpret 
data worlds, but also to question them, to re-imagine them, and to change them. 
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Introduction 
 
It is now widely accepted that data are oiling the twenty-first century (Toonders 
2014). Data gathering and tracking are practically universal, and datafication (the 
quantification of aspects of life previously experienced in qualitative, non-numeric 
form, such as communication, relationships, health and fitness, transport and mo-
bility, democratic participation, leisure and consumption) is a transformation dis-
rupting the social world in all its forms (Couldry 2016). Statistics confirm the as-
sertion that the datafication of almost everything is growing relentlessly: in 2012 
it was claimed that 90% of the world’s data had been created in the previous two 
years (IBM 2012), and a future 40% annual rise in data generation has been esti-
mated (Manyika et al. 2011).  
 
Less commonly noted is the place of everyday experience in the machine of data-
fication. The Berliner Gazette (nd) has claimed that 75% of these newly available 
data are by-products of people’s everyday activities, and Michael and Lupton also 
note the centrality of the everyday in the current Big Data moment: 
 
Human actors contribute to big datasets when they engage in activities 
such as making calls and using apps on mobile phones, using online search 
engines such as Google, purchasing goods or services online or taking part 
in customer loyalty programmes, uploading contributions to social media 
platforms, using wearable self-tracking devices or moving around in spaces 
that are equipped with digital sensing or recording devices (Michael and 
Lupton 2015, 104).  
 
Despite the significance of such everyday practices in the production of large-scale 
data, little attention has been paid to people’s thoughts and feelings about these 
data-producing processes. These issues have not, on the whole, been the focus of 
the emerging field of data studies, which seeks to understand the new roles played 
by data in times of datafication. This is a problem for a number of reasons. First, 
if we do not understand whether data condition everyday experiences as it is 
claimed, and our thinking about these matters is not informed by the perspectives 
of the people upon whose data datafication is built, scholarship about data-in-
society will be incomplete. Second, and importantly for this special issue, in the 
absence of such knowledge, data activism, which seeks to challenge existing data 
power relations and to mobilise data in order to enhance social justice, will rely 
upon the judgments of elite technical actors and activists about what would con-
stitute more just data practices. In contrast, I argue that to build a picture of what 
just data arrangements (that is, the practices of organisations that handle and pro-
duce data, the policies that govern these practices, and provisions for the develop-
ment of skills that people need in order to engage with data) might look like, it is 
important to take account of what non-expert citizens themselves say would enable 
them to live better with data, based on their everyday experiences of datafication. 
Greater understanding of everyday living with data can contribute significantly to 
the knowledge base on which data activism is built. A third problem, then, is that 
by not focusing on these issues, the field of data studies is not currently as well 
aligned to the aims of data activism as it might be. This paper explores how we 
might address this gap. 
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The paper proceeds to elaborate the argument that data studies and data activism 
could be better aligned through a focus on everyday experiences of datafication. 
The next section provides a brief sketch of the field of data studies, identifying the 
everyday as a critical absence. Here I discuss how more empirical research into what 
it means to live with datafication could enhance both data studies and data activism. 
In the subsequent section, I outline what the project of researching living with 
data might look like. I explore two possible approaches to this endeavour, the first 
of which I describe as “a phenomenology of datafied agency.” The second focuses 
on data-related capabilities and their emotional dimensions. Both of these ap-
proaches, I argue, suggest the need for a vocabulary of emotions in researching 
everyday living with data.  
 
 
Inserting the Everyday into Data Studies and Data Activism 
 
Within the emerging field of data studies, datafication is said to have all kinds of 
effects, many of them troubling, and to result in an array of new harms. These 
include: increased surveillance; threats to privacy; new forms of algorithmic con-
trol; and the expansion of new and old inequalities and forms of discrimination. 
Surveillance is said to be much more ubiquitous, opaque and speculative in datafied 
times, as social media and other kinds of data mining make it possible to surveil 
aspects of life once private and intimate (Andrejevic and Gates 2014, Dencik and 
Cable 2017, Lehtiniemi 2017) and thus deny people their basic right to privacy 
(Cohen 2013). Privacy itself is a contested issue, with industry figures like Mark 
Zuckerberg claiming that it is no longer a social norm (Johnson 2010), and critical 
researchers pushing back against this view with all kinds of empirically grounded 
(boyd 2014) and philosophical (Nissenbaum 2009) assertions that privacy does, in 
fact, still matter. Elsewhere, significant attention has been paid to the function of 
algorithms in emergent forms of datafied governance and control. In times of da-
tafication, algorithms have power, it is claimed (for example by Gillespie 2014 and 
Striphas 2015). They make and shape data in particular ways, certifying knowledge 
and so shape public, social and cultural life.  
 
Another troubling consequence of datafication is that it reproduces old inequalities 
and creates new ones. One of danah boyd and Kate Crawford’s much-cited “six 
provocations for big data” is that “limited access to big data creates new digital 
divides” (boyd and Crawford 2012, 673). In data mining, who is deemed to have 
expertise determines who controls the process and the “knowledge” about the so-
cial world that results, knowledge which in turn reproduces the social world, as 
scholars writing about the power of algorithms also claim. Relatedly, and emerging 
from these debates, the discriminatory consequences of the rise of big data have 
also been noted. Data mining, analysis and subsequent discrimination result in 
certain groups having better access to all kinds of resources (Andrejevic 2013, Tay-
lor and Richter 2017). Datafication affects citizens differentially, and data-driven 
discrimination can mean that already-disadvantaged populations have their access 
to fundamental human rights further limited (see for example Gangadharan 2012 
and 2015).  
 
To date, studies of the rise of datafication have primarily sought to expose these 
harms, and the field of data studies has therefore been dominated by critical polit-
ical economy and neo-Foucauldian analyses of the problems that accompany wide-
spread datafication and its intricate relationship with neoliberal forms of govern-
ance. Data are seen as powerful and troubling actors in the control of contemporary 
life, playing a role in shaping how we live, what we know and how we know, and 
contributing in new ways to old problems like discrimination and inequality. With-
out doubt, this literature has played a vital role in making visible the serious issues 
that datafication raise in relation to rights, freedoms and justice, and in questioning 
the celebratory rhetoric that has accompanied the spread of big data.  
 
But there are some absences here. Because data studies has primarily focused on 
the operations of data power and their harmful consequences, it has been charac-
terised in large part by a focus on powerful actors. Studies which focus instead on 
attempts to democratise data, such as open data initiatives (Baack 2015), hacka-
thons (Gregg 2015, Irani 2015), the Quantified Self (QS) movement (in which 
participants use apps and mobile devices to collect data about various aspects of 
their bodies and lives, such as the work of Neff and Nafus 2016) or data activism, 
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also often focus on elites, as the initiatives and practices which are the object of 
these studies tend to involve technological and data savvy experts. For example, as 
early researchers of the QS movement have acknowledged, QSers are atypical in 
their data expertise, commitment and enthusiasm, and so cannot be said to be 
representative of “ordinary people.” Indeed, my use of the term “ordinary people” 
in the cultural studies tradition in this paper highlights what is missing from the 
existing literature. Building on the politics of the ordinary, my argument here is 
that “lowering” academic sights (McCarthy 2008) to “activities in the daily round” 
(Silverstone 1994) is a much-needed political gesture in the field of data studies.  
 
Thus data studies has not paid much attention to the everyday experiences of non-
expert citizens of living with data and datafication. Michael and Lupton noted in 
2015 that “there is still little research that has investigated what the public make 
of big data, aside from reports from privacy organizations and government bodies” 
(Michael and Lupton 2015, 110), and that characterisation is still largely true two 
years later. It is because of this absence that, alongside Michael and Lupton, com-
mentators such as Couldry and Powell (2014), Pink et al. (2017) and Ruckenstein 
and Pantzar (2015), have called for more research into everyday engagements with 
data. I join them in this call in this paper, argue that such a turn is important to 
data activism as well as to data studies, and explore how we might enact it. Indeed, 
it is because of these limitations in dominant critical approaches that I propose that 
the term “data studies” is preferable to describe this emergent field, rather than the 
alternative “critical data studies” which is also sometimes used (for example by Ili-
adis and Russo 2016). 
 
It should be noted that there are a small number of exceptions to my claim that 
data studies has not attended to the everyday. These include research into the da-
tafication of health, such as Harris et al’s (2016) work on cybergenetics, and the 
work of Lupton (2018) and Ruckenstein (2016). Another example is Couldry et 
al’s (2016) Storycircle project, which explored how analytics are used by community 
groups for social ends. Research in the field of data-driven discrimination, such as 
Eubanks and Gangadharan’s Our Data Bodies project (http://www.odbpro-
ject.org/), is also an exception, as it grounds concerns about the discriminatory 
effects of datafication in empirical research with those most likely to be discrimi-
nated against. Two small-scale studies have explored how social media platform 
users feel about these technologies and their algorithms (Bucher 2017, Colbjornsen 
forthcoming). Barassi’s Child Data Citizen project (http://childdatacitizen.com/), 
which aims to look at how the lived experience of childhood is being transformed 
by datafication, is also an exception, as is research into the everyday self-monitoring 
practices that have emerged from the more elite QS movement mentioned above 
(especially the work of Pink, such as Pink and Forst 2017, Pink et al 2017 and Pink 
et al 2018; see also Sharon and Zandbergen 2016). These examples notwithstand-
ing, there is limited research which seeks to develop understanding of how ordinary 
people experience and live with data as part of everyday life – these exceptions 
represent only a small handful of projects from across the globe, after all. In short, 
we need more empirical research into everyday living with data.  
 
A further problem with existing data studies literature is that much of it conceives 
of life with data in limited ways, as harmful and oppressive. This is not helpful for 
data activism which, as noted above, seeks to identify and establish more just forms 
of datafication. Data activism is characterised by mobilisations against existing data 
uses and practices, and has been defined as a “series of sociotechnical practices that, 
emerging at the fringes of the contemporary activism ecology, critically interrogate 
datafication and its socio-political consequences” (Milan and Van der Velden 2016, 
np). As such, data activism is premised on the assumption that current “data ar-
rangements” are harmful to non-powerful citizens, and that alternative arrange-
ments are therefore needed to improve people’s experiences of datafication. Data 
activism thus requires the possibility of agency, yet there is little scope for agentic 
engagements with data in the visions of datafication provided in much data studies 
scholarship.  
 
Bringing the sociology of the everyday into data studies can help to resolve this 
problem. In sociological terms, the everyday refers to the habits and practices in 
which we engage and which surround us, what Pink et al describe as the “routines, 
contingencies and accomplishments” of the mundane (Pink et al 2017). Given that 
datafication is now widely considered to be a defining feature of everyday life 
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(Couldry 2016), this approach is clearly helpful for understanding everyday experi-
ences of datafication. Because the everyday is conceived as contingent and situa-
tional within this sociological sub-field, this makes it possible to think of social 
phenomena like datafication as not simply constitutive of social life, as critical po-
litical economy and neo-Foucauldian analyses do, but rather as “made and unmade” 
(Neal and Murji 2015, 812) through everyday practices. (Of course, people’s every-
day lives are not all the same, and it is important to take account of how social 
inequalities lead to different data experiences, as work on data and discrimination 
has begun to do (such as the Our Data Bodies project mentioned above)). Thus 
not only does researching everyday engagements with data fill an empirical gap for 
data activism, its acknowledgement of the agentic actions that constitute social and 
political life mean that it is well aligned with data activism’s interest in the possi-
bilities for agency in datafied times. 
 
There is a third contribution that a focus on the everyday can make to data activ-
ism, in addition to the two already noted (that is, filling an empirical gap and 
focusing on agency). In a talk about data activism which had as its subtitle “the 
conditions of possibility for democratic agency in the datafied society”, Stefania 
Milan (2017) identified three such conditions. The first is critical consciousness, 
or “conscientização”, a Portuguese term coined by Brazilian popular educator Paolo 
Freire to refer to achieving critical understanding of the world and taking action 
against injustices revealed through such consciousness (Freire 1968). The second, 
according to Milan, is grassroots data literacy, which is required in order to com-
prehend existing data practices and processes. The third is critical imagination, or 
the capacity to imagine alternative forms of living with data. Here Milan draws on 
Emirbaye and Mische’s (1998, 970) definition of political agency as constituted 
“through the interplay of habit, imagination and judgement” (my emphasis). But 
what precedes the achievement of these conditions outlined by Milan? What comes 
before them? We need to know the answers to these questions before we can un-
derstand what leads people (or future data activists) to be able to acquire them. 
Here again, understanding of non-expert citizens’ experiences of datafication is 
crucial, because we cannot arrive at the conditions identified by Milan without 
understanding first how people who do not (yet) consider themselves as data 
activists experience datafication, and second how to move from these experiences to 
engagement in data activism. In the next section, I explore two possible approaches 
for arriving at such understanding and some of the issues that might emerge along 
the way.  
 
 
Approaches to Researching “Living with Data”: Two Possibilities, 
and an Emergent Vocabulary of Emotions 
 
One of the main purposes of exploring how ordinary people experience datafication 
in their everyday lives is to develop understanding of their perspectives on how 
they might live better with data, understanding that is useful to the mission of data 
activism and its efforts to improve data arrangements so that they are less harmful 
and more just. Taking account of what people say about these issues is important, 
but so are the conceptual tools with which we develop this knowledge. In this 
section, I explore two possible approaches that put philosophical concepts into 
dialogue with examples from my own research. Taken together, these explorations 
suggest the need for a vocabulary of emotions in researching living with data.  
 
 
A Phenomenology of Datafied Agency 
 
The field of the philosophy of technology, concerned in large part with questions 
about the relationship between technology and well-being, seems a good place to 
start exploring how people live and how they might live better with data. A major 
question for this field is whether technological developments of diverse kinds are 
good or bad for society – as Brey (2012) notes, whether it is possible to lead good 
lives in a world so committed to technology is a pressing question. While some 
philosophy of technology literature focuses on subjective variations of well-being, 
either asking whether technology can make us happy (Spahn 2015), or conflating 
well-being with happiness and using these terms interchangeably (Søraker et al. 
2015), subjective notions like happiness are not helpful to the cause of data activism 
and the data justice it seeks to promote. They are individualistic and do not 
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contribute to thinking about the kinds of data arrangements that might benefit 
communities of people disadvantaged by current conditions.  
 
We need therefore to turn elsewhere in the field, to philosophers of technology 
who ask whether technological ensembles of all kinds can be appropriated as tools 
of democratisation, enablement and activism, despite their origins within the belly 
of the beast. Data activism asks these same questions of datafication, a new kind of 
technological ensemble. This concern is captured nicely in the first words of An-
drew Feenberg’s preface to Transforming Technology: “must human beings submit 
to the harsh logic of machinery, or can technology be fundamentally redesigned to 
better serve its creators?” (2002, v). Through this question about agency, important 
both to data activism and to researching datafied everyday life, Feenberg raises the 
issue of differential technological subject positions that he addresses explicitly else-
where. In another book, Feenberg (1999) argues that the fundamental difference 
“between the dominant and subordinate subject positions with respect to techno-
logical systems” (1999, x) is significant, a distinction which echoes my argument 
that non-expert citizens’ experiences of datafication are differentially socially strat-
ified. “Ordinary people encounter technology as a dimension of their lifeworld” 
(1999, x), he writes, and he continues: 
 
For the most part they merely carry out the plans of others or inhabit 
technologically constructed spaces and environments. As subordinate ac-
tors, they strive to appropriate the technologies with which they are in-
volved and adapt them to the meanings that illuminate their lives. Their 
relation to technology is thus far more complex than that of dominant 
actors (which they too may be on occasion) (1999, x).  
 
Differential subject positions matter, Feenberg argues, because change comes 
“when we recognize the nature of our subordinate position in the technical systems 
that enrol us, and begin to intervene in the design process in the defence of the 
conditions of a meaningful life and a livable environment” (1999, xiv). Likewise, 
my argument here is that moving beyond critical thinking about technology, as 
Feenberg advocates, and exploring technology’s “ambivalence”, or “the availability 
of technology for alternative developments with different social consequences” 
(1999, 7), is an essential component of data activism and an important next step 
for data studies.  
 
Feenberg’s concerns are concerns about agency, as are those of data activism. To 
address these issues of agency and possible change through empirical research into 
everyday experiences of datafication, a phenomenological approach might be help-
ful. Phenomenology focuses on the point of view of actors and their perceptions 
and experiences of the (datafied) world – in this sense it is distinct from ethnog-
raphy which is more commonly dependent on the point of view of the observing 
researcher. This perspective and phenomenology’s excavation of the taken-for-
granted layers of everyday action fit with the project that I am describing here, 
which also prioritises the conscious experiences of datafication of non-expert citi-
zens. As such it enables attention to the differences in people’s experiences of da-
tafication which, as noted above, are significant. Schutz and Luckmann’s (1973, 
105) argument that phenomenology acknowledges that “not only the what but also 
the how of the individual situation in the lifeworld belongs to the fundamental 
elements of the stock of knowledge” (quoted in Couldry et al 2015, 125), further 
confirms its usefulness for producing a more detailed understanding of living with 
data “from the bottom up” (Couldry and Powell 2014). Also arguing for a phe-
nomenology of datafication, Couldry et al (2015) state that we need research “that 
recognises people’s ongoing reflexivity about their conditions of entanglement with 
[the] digital infrastructures” of datafication (2015, 124) – indeed, Couldry et al and 
some of the other researchers turning their attention to living with data who were 
noted above (such as Ruckenstein 2014) describe their own research as phenome-
nological. For many writers, such reflexivity is intricately entangled with agency. 
Couldry, for example, defines agency as “the longer processes of action based on 
reflection, giving an account of what one has done, even more basically, making 
sense of the world so as to act within it” (Couldry 2014, 891). Phenomenology’s 
focus on both of these things, reflexivity and action, make it a useful approach for 
researching living with data. 
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My research into uses of social media data mining, in organisations which I describe 
as the pillars of everyday life (local councils, museums, training organisations, ed-
ucational institutions and shops), illustrates what a phenomenology of datafied 
agency might offer. This research focused on the datafication of working life, not 
on non-experts’ experiences of data in the everyday, but nonetheless it is indicative 
of what might surface through such an approach. In this research, one thing that 
emerged across research sites was a desire for numbers, which, I have argued, en-
gaging in data mining elicits (Kennedy 2016). I give some examples below, after 
which I reflect on what these tell us about reflexivity, agency, and the importance 
of researching living with data.  
 
In research with city councils and museums in which we experimented with social 
media data mining techniques, the data generated through our experiments was 
met with much enthusiasm by participants, especially when presented in visually-
appealing charts and graphs. A sense of amazement was expressed by participants 
who read reports we produced and who attended workshops. Emotional responses 
to data often elicited a desire for more data. One participant said:  
 
I think I had a lot of confidence in the numbers. I think I was amazed by 
how deep a lot of these tools could go. […] I think they’re very clever. It 
was amazing how much you could drill into this. 
 
Some participants said that they were required to report the results of analytics 
exercises “up” to managers and funders, but that there was no discernible action 
taken as a result. Quantitative data, produced through systems like Museum Ana-
lytics (a platform which carries out social media analytics for the museums sector, 
as the name suggests), were desired by managers and funders, with no apparent 
concrete consequence – the “data gathered” box was ticked, the desire for numbers 
was fulfilled, and data were filed away. 
 
In interviews within social media insights companies, some social media analysts 
said that accuracy was not important to their clients. One said:  
 
Whether that data is accurate or not is irrelevant. They just want some 
numbers to put into a PowerPoint that they can show to their boss. If 
anyone asks, “Are you keeping an eye on social media?” You can say, “Yes, 
we’re 36 this week.” And it is a very attractive solution.  
 
Sometimes clients are drawn in by the allure of numbers and just want numbers, 
participants said – inaccuracy is acceptable, as long as the desire for numbers is 
fulfilled. Participants felt that this desire for numbers suppressed discussion be-
tween them and their clients about the limitations of the data that data mining 
produces, and they were frustrated at this. They were alert to the inadequacies of 
the numbers they produced and they would have liked to talk to clients about the 
challenge of obtaining good quality, accurate data, and about what the numbers 
that social media analytics produce do and do not represent.  
 
In an interview in an educational organisation which uses the services of social 
media analytics companies, a digital marketer expressed his frustration with what 
he referred to as “the fetishism of the 1000”. He claimed that within his organisa-
tion there was a perception that the ability to cite numbers of people “reached” 
through a campaign was proof in itself of a campaign’s success. When a project has 
been completed, he said, if numbers can be produced, if it can be claimed “that 
we’ve reached 50,000 and we’ve had 1000 people respond back to us about it, then 
that fulfils some kind of sense of requirement.” He felt that measurement was 
rarely undertaken with a genuine desire to self-evaluate, but rather was motivated 
precisely by a desire to produce numbers, which were uncritically equated with 
success.  
 
The emotions that came to the surface in this research seem troubling, as it seems 
as if there is no escape from the prevalent desire for numbers in the datafied work-
place. However, a phenomenological approach, which excavates the layers of con-
scious experience and is attentive to the judgements, perceptions and emotions of 
key actors, reveals a more nuanced picture. As can be seen in the examples above, 
although a desire for numbers dominated, participants were also reflexive about the 
ways in which such desires limit critical engagement with data amongst their 
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clients or colleagues. There was also some reflection about the ethics of data mining 
amongst participants, about whether data mining methods are acceptable, whether 
the mantra that social media data are public and therefore “fair game” to be mined 
and analysed holds up. All of these reflections, and related ethical decision-making 
and line-drawing, can be seen as nascent acts of agency and point towards possibil-
ities for different data arrangements, as participants did not simply submit to the 
“harsh logic” (Feenberg 2002, v) of datafication and desiring numbers. A phenom-
enological approach to participants’ experiences also highlights the important role 
that emotions play in engagements with data in the workplace. This in turn sug-
gests a need for a vocabulary of emotions in researching everyday experiences of 
datafication.  
 
 
Data-related Capabilities and Their Emotional Dimensions 
 
Another way in which we might bring together data activism’s interest in social 
justice with people’s perspectives on how they live and might live better with data 
is through the capabilities approach. Two of the original proponents of this ap-
proach, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, argue that to think about how people 
might live well, we need to focus on what people need to be capable of doing, 
should they choose to (Nussbaum 2006 and 2011, Sen 1973, 1992 and 2009). For 
Nussbaum, the capabilities approach directs attention to how certain social or in-
stitutional arrangements are more effective than others in enhancing social life and 
social justice. Both Nussbaum and Sen emphasise the role of the external environ-
ment in enabling capabilities; this makes possible a normative assessment of tech-
nological developments like datafication, argues Johnstone (2012). Nussbaum’s 
version of the capabilities approach also involves asking how we might live well 
together, especially in light of the growing value attached to competitive individu-
alism and neo-liberalism. Despite the dominance of these latter ideas, within ca-
pabilities thinking, “the notion of the common good survives as a key ethical prin-
ciple” argues Hesmondhalgh (2012, 84), a notion that is clearly relevant to data 
activism.  
 
For Sen, capabilities are freedoms (freedoms to – for example receive an education, 
earn a living, express oneself, form relationships – and freedoms from – for example 
oppression, violence, censorship, arbitrary arrest) (Johnstone 2012). He defines ca-
pabilities as “the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that a 
person can achieve […] reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or 
another […] to choose from possible livings […]” (Sen 1992, 40). Nussbaum (2006) 
lists ten such capabilities, some of which are physical, such as not dying prema-
turely and having good health and shelter. Others relate more clearly to datafica-
tion: being able to imagine, think and reason; being able to form a conception of 
the good and to engage in critical reflection about planning one’s life; and having 
control over one’s (political or material) environment, can all be influenced in one 
way or another by people’s experiences of data and datafication.  
 
A number of media theorists have applied the capabilities approach to explorations 
of the media practices that can enhance people’s efforts to live good lives (such as 
Coleman and Moss 2016, Hesmondhalgh 2013, Mansell 2002). For example 
Hesmondhalgh’s (2013) Why Music Matters draws on Nussbaum and Sen’s ideas to 
reflect on the communicative practices – in this case, in relation to music – that 
would create conditions under which humans might flourish. Whilst it might be 
easy to understand why cultural goods like music matter in relation to living well 
and flourishing, these questions are equally important in relation to data and data-
fication.  
 
Exploring how ordinary people’s experiences of datafication might be enhanced 
through the lens of the capabilities approach could also be seen as a response to 
Andrew Sayer’s argument that ideas about living well and flourishing are vital for 
attempts to understand how greater social justice might be achieved (Sayer 2011). 
Sayer argues that social science should be more attentive to people’s first-person, 
evaluative relation to the world, to their evaluations of how they live and how they 
might live well, because “Social struggles are not merely struggles for goods and 
power but about how to live, about what is a just, virtuous or good life and a good 
society” (2011, 172). Social science often disregards people’s evaluative relation to 
the world and the force of these evaluations, he claims, but we need to attend to 
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these things; values, feelings and emotions need to be taken more seriously in social 
sciences. Sayer writes that there is a “macho tendency to view the study of values, 
emotions and ethics as less scientific than the study of power, discourse and social 
structure”, whereas he argues that we need to develop our understanding of the 
former which, he argues, constitute “ethical being in everyday life” (Sayer 2011, 
15).  
 
Ideas about capabilities and flourishing might help us to understand what is im-
portant for people to live their lives well with data. In relation to datafication, 
capabilities might include being able to have control over one’s own data, to choose 
to opt out of – or, better still, in to – data gathering, and to make sense of data 
mining processes because they are made transparent to non-expert citizens, or ac-
countable to expert others. The problem is that, whilst these issues are widely 
discussed amongst data activists, ordinary people’s perspectives on whether they 
might result in living better with data are missing from these debates. This is why 
we need to produce the kinds of first-person evaluations of “living well with data” 
that Sayer advocates. 
 
As with the phenomenological approach discussed earlier, a capabilities approach 
also highlights the importance of emotions in relation to living well and flourish-
ing. Through this approach Hesmondhalgh looks at how music communicates 
emotions in particular ways and how emotions thus play a role in good lives. Like-
wise, Sayer highlights the significance of feelings in everyday evaluative relations 
with the world. In other research of mine which explored how people engage with 
visual representations of data which circulate in the everyday, my co-researchers 
and I found that emotions play important roles in such engagements (Kennedy and 
Hill 2017, Kennedy et al 2016). Because a major way that most people access data 
is through their visual representation, as Gitelman and Jackson (2013) argue, visual 
sensibilities are required in order to make sense of data, not just cognitive reason 
and statistical skills. This entanglement of the numeric and the visual, at the heart 
of most people’s engagements with data in their everyday lives, means that data stir 
up emotions. A broad range of emotions emerged in relation to engagements with 
visual representations of data in the research, including pleasure, anger, sadness, 
guilt, shame, relief, worry, love, empathy, excitement, offence. Participants re-
ported emotional responses to visualisations in general, represented data, visual 
style, the subject matter of data visualisations, the source or original location of 
visualisations, and their own skill levels for making sense of visualisations (Kennedy 
and Hill 2017).  
 
Thinking about the relationship between emotions and capabilities can contribute 
to understanding experiences of engaging with visual representations of data. In 
our research, participants expressed strong feelings about their own skills – or ca-
pabilities – for decoding visualisations. Some participants felt a lack of confidence 
in this regard. One said of a visualization: “It was all these circles and colours and 
I thought, that looks like a bit of hard work; don’t know if I understand”. Many 
of our participants expressed similar negative feelings about their lack of skills, and 
this lack of confidence had a profound impact on some participants’ engagement 
with visualisations. One reacted to all of the visualisations that we showed him in 
a focus group with confusion and dislike, as seen in the grid he produced, on which 
we asked all participants to place thumbnail images of visualisations in order to 
identify whether they liked, or had learnt from, the visualisations which we showed 
them. He placed most thumbnails in the “disliked + didn’t learn” quadrant, and 
one outside the grid altogether (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Seeing Data participant’s grid 
 
This participant responded in this way because he doubted his own ability to make 
sense of visualisations. This lack of confidence was echoed by other participants, 
such as this person who wrote in her diary about visualisations in a newspaper 
article on tax: 
 
I felt confused and a bit stupid for not being able to stay the course with 
this article. It’s too maths based for me. Too many numbers and pie charts, 
I get lost in it.  
 
Feeling “stupid” was the result of a perceived lack of skills, such as knowing how 
to read particular chart types. When participants felt more skilled, unfamiliar chart 
types could evoke positive emotions, rather than negative ones: “I didn’t hate it 
because it made me want to try and put a little bit of effort into navigate those 
lines”, said another participant about a visualisation of freshwater consumption 
across the globe.  
 
Educational background was an important factor which influenced whether partic-
ipants felt stupid or felt capable, something which they themselves recognised. 
Some participants identified that higher education contributed to the development 
of relevant skills. One participant who had a Masters degree was more confident 
about how to understand and assess the data visualizations than the participant 
whose grid is shown in Figure 1, because he felt he had the training to do so. 
Alongside education, gender and class, which we might describe as social arrange-
ments, to use Nussbaum’s term, appeared to influence emotions such as feeling 
confident or feeling stupid.  
 
Although these examples are not concerned with reducing data-related inequalities 
and improving data justice as data activism seeks to, the emotional dimensions of 
living with data which they reveal are relevant to this mission. As Sayer notes, it is 
important to take people’s values, emotions and ethics seriously in our quest for 
social justice. Feelings play a role in non-experts’ experiences of data and datafica-
tion processes. Building on this finding, for example in initiatives which aim to 
enhance data literacy (Milan’s second condition for the possibility of datafied 
agency), might result in more people feeling confident about their skills for engag-
ing with data, and greater understanding of datafication and its many consequences 
might result. Thus the approaches I explore in this paper, and the ways in which 
they enable foregrounding the emotional dimensions of living with data, are im-
portant for data activism as well as for data studies. To advance, both fields need 
better understanding of how data and emotions relate to each other in ordinary 
people’s everyday experiences of datafication. 
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In thinking with concepts like capabilities and living well with data, it is important 
to subject them to critical scrutiny, of course. For example, how might data be 
constrained from contributing to people’s flourishing, given their location in une-
qual relations of power? How to account for how injustice, inequality and oppres-
sion inform people’s access to capabilities, to living well and flourishing 
(Hesmondhalgh 2012)? How to avoid homogenising everyday experiences, and in-
stead to recognise that human needs “may take very different forms in different 
societies” (Hesmondhalgh 2012, 18)? Who gets to decide what needs to be sacri-
ficed for the common good? It is important to acknowledge that these notions are 
not without problems – they are abstract and complex and suffer from what John-
stone (2012) describes as “radical empirical underspecification.” Nonetheless, their 
application in data studies and in data activism could open up a vocabulary of the 
emotional, and such a vocabulary could make these issues explicit and open them 
up for debate. Thus these concepts, and the vocabularies they bring with them, are 
potentially useful for understanding datafication’s social consequences. They might 
help our mission to identify the types of data arrangements that can enhance peo-
ple’s efforts to live good lives, reduce data-related inequalities and improve data 
justice. 
 
 
Conclusion: Why This Matters for Data Activism 
 
Datafication is a major social phenomenon which has all kinds of effects, and be-
cause of this, how people experience data in their everyday lives is extremely im-
portant. Yet, in data studies and in data activism, little attention has been paid to 
ordinary people’s thoughts and feelings about their own data production and the 
data practices of others. Understanding such everyday experiences is crucial, be-
cause without such understanding, data studies and data activism are not informed 
by the perspectives of the people with whose lives they are ostensibly concerned. 
In this paper I have argued that we need to look at datafication as it is lived, felt 
and experienced at the level of the everyday. We need to attend to ordinary people’s 
perspectives on how data arrangements can be improved, so that these perspectives 
can play a role in determining improved data arrangements. Through this, I argue, 
an empirical gap in data studies would be filled, knowledge that is useful for data 
activism would be produced, and data studies and data activism would be better 
aligned. Data activism seeks to challenge unjust data arrangements and to mobilise 
data in order to enhance social justice, and taking account of what non-expert 
citizens say would enable them to live better with data will help data activists to 
imagine more just arrangements, the third of Milan’s conditions for data activism. 
 
I have also argued that inserting the everyday into data studies opens up a space in 
which to explore possible conditions for agency in datafied societies, to paraphrase 
the subtitle of Milan’s talk. The topic of agency is a shared concern of scholars of 
the everyday and of data activists, and in this way a focus on the everyday makes 
another contribution to data activism. What’s more, not only does researching eve-
ryday experiences of datafication fill an empirical gap and highlight issues of agency, 
it also enables us to attend to the question of what precedes data activism. How is 
datafication lived, felt and experienced by non-expert citizens before they start to 
develop the conditions or consider the possibility of activism in relation to data? 
Data activists cannot make the three conditions for datafied political agency iden-
tified by Milan possible without first understanding where we need to move from 
in order to get to these conditions.  
 
In this paper, I explored two approaches to researching everyday engagements with 
datafication. The first, “a phenomenology of datafied agency”, mobilises a phenom-
enological excavation of data experiences to explore the possibility of agency in 
datafied conditions. The second is an approach which looks at data-related capa-
bilities and their emotional dimensions, and which highlights the importance of 
identifying what people need to be capable of doing in order to live well in times 
of datafication. Arguably, the “conditions of possibility for political agency in the 
datafied society” identified by Milan are, in fact, capabilities. Thus there is a direct 
link between these approaches and data activism. Both of the approaches I discuss 
highlight the importance of emotions in everyday engagements with data. The ways 
in which these approaches value emotions in relation to acting agentically and liv-
ing well can help us understand the important role that feelings play in everyday 
engagements with data. These approaches thus suggest the need for a vocabulary 
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of emotions within data studies and data activism, something that has been largely 
absent from these fields to date.  
 
At the time of writing, there are many examples of initiatives which aim to improve 
life with data. Attempts to “do good with data”, to paraphrase the strapline of US 
visualisation agency Periscopic, include enterprises like DataKind, which puts data 
experts, working pro bono, together with social groups to address social and hu-
manitarian problems, for example relating to homelessness and child poverty. Data 
visualisation itself is seen by many practitioners as a way of “doing good with data” 
(this is the strapline of a datavis agency after all), as this practice is often motivated 
by a desire to make data transparent and accessible. Efforts to develop alternative, 
human-centric personal data management models, like the MyData movement 
(http://mydata2016.org/) and to enhance data literacy, such as School Of Data 
(https://schoolofdata.org/), can also be included here. What is missing from these 
endeavours is an understanding of non-expert citizens’ perspectives on whether 
they might result in better living with data. We need to listen to the voices of 
ordinary people speaking about the conditions that they say would enable them to 
live better with data and, in so doing, arm ourselves with knowledge which ad-
vances data studies, serves the interests of data activism, and brings both fields into 
closer alignment with each other.  
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Surveillance Realism and the Politics of Imagination: Is There No 
Alternative? 
Lina Dencik 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Someone once said it is easier to imagine the end of the world, than it is to 
imagine the end of capitalism,” wrote Frederic Jameson, in a now famous reflection 
on the stifling parameters of cultural life in late capitalist societies.  
 
Building on this, Mark Fisher advanced the concept of “capitalist realism” in his 
2009 book of the same name as a way to articulate the peculiar persistence of a 
system that has proved itself so full of fallacies, so unjust and inegalitarian in its 
rewards (Fisher 2009). Writing in the wake of the financial crisis, Fisher described 
the contemporary condition of capitalist realism as a ‘‘pervasive atmosphere” that 
comes to regulate thought and action, limiting the possibilities of even imagining 
alternatives: “[it is] the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable 
political and economic system, but also…it is now impossible even to imagine a 
coherent alternative to it.” (Fisher 2009: 6; italics in original). In describing capi-
talism in these terms, his ambition was to stress its contingency and destroy its 
appearance as an inevitable ‘‘natural” order.  
 
The dominance and resilience of contemporary capitalism has been a prominent 
theme in debates on the politics of imagination, and linked to that, the field of 
social and political imaginaries (Adams et al. 2015). In looking at imagination and 
imaginaries, we are invited to consider how we make sense of society, instituting 
and instituted by social practices in their emergence, formation and reproduction. 
As such, a concern with the politics of imagination is as much a concern with the 
way in which social institutions and practices are legitimized and continued as it is 
a concern with the possibilities for the articulation and doing of alternative for-
mations. That is, imagination can both open and close a path to critique (Bottici 
and Challand 2011).  
 
Capitalism, as a political-economic imaginary in the context of modernity (Adams 
et al. 2015), is intimately linked to contemporary forms of surveillance. Today, 
capitalism is said to increasingly progress through an accumulation logic based on 
the ability to monitor and track different forms of social activity with the view to 
predict and modify human behavior as a means to gain revenue and market control. 
An information order Zuboff (2015) has described as ‘‘surveillance capitalism”, ad-
vanced in the form of ‘‘big data”, and underpinned by a digital economy based on 
mass data collection and analysis. Turow et al. (2015) have argued that this infor-
mation order now constitutes what can be described as a ‘‘21st century imaginary” 
in which we see the discursive and institutional normalization of surveillance in-
frastructures pervading more and more aspects of everyday life. Despite prominent 
concerns with how these infrastructures might be inherently unjust, Turow argues 
that ubiquitous and continuous data collection has become ‘‘common sense” – a 
set of practices that people have become widely resigned to.  
 
In this article I engage with this interplay between data-driven surveillance and 
contemporary social imaginaries, using research based on the aftermath of the 
Snowden leaks, first published in June 2013, which revealed unprecedented details 
of contemporary surveillance programs. Drawing on Fisher’s use of the term ‘‘‘re-
alism” in relation to capitalist realism, I advance the argument here that public 
debate and response to the Snowden leaks indicate a similar ‘‘pervasive atmosphere” 
that comes to regulate thought and action, in which the active normalization of 
surveillance infrastructures limits the possibilities of even imagining alternatives – 
a condition I describe as surveillance realism. I also use this to highlight some of 
the opportunities and challenges in articulating and doing resistance, such as the 
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kind that has emerged in the form of ‘‘data activism” (Milan and van der Velden 
2016). Whilst the research is focused on the UK and the Snowden leaks, I also 
draw here on wider debates and studies to illustrate key developments. By analyzing 
activities and public response in this way, the point is, in line with Fisher, to ‘‘reveal 
what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency” as a way of 
advancing an emancipatory politics that can also then ‘‘make what was previously 
deemed to be impossible seem attainable.” (Fisher 2009: 21).  
 
I start by briefly outlining the role of imagination in sustaining and challenging 
social orders before going on to discuss contemporary imaginaries of surveillance 
and datafication, providing examples from post-Snowden developments. Based on 
this, I argue that surveillance realism is useful for understanding the politics of 
imagination in relation to ubiquitous data collection, and I end by considering how 
resistance might be enacted in such a context. 
 
 
The Politics of Imagination  
 
Early inceptions of imagination, such as those articulated by Aristotle and later 
within the Kantian tradition, predominantly viewed imagination in relation to in-
dividual capacity. It is with the emergence of social imaginaries as a field that we 
begin to emphasize the properly social aspect of the imagination, and to grasp it as 
authentically creative rather than as merely reproductive and imitative (Adams et 
al. 2015). In his seminal work on the imaginary institution of society, Castoriadis 
(1987) stresses the collective instituted and instituting forms of meaning and the 
societal dimension of the human condition. Imagination, for Castoriadis therefore, 
is linked more to a social imaginary that comes to be central for the very existence 
of society, in that the instituting social imaginary is always at the same time insti-
tuted. Coming before both the concept of ideology and utopia as presented in the 
related work of Ricoeur (Bottici and Challand 2011, Adams et al. 2015), Castoriadis 
presents a view of imagination as radical, in the double sense that without it there 
could be no reality as such, and that it can always potentially question its objects 
by disclosing possible alternatives. 
In advancing a concept of a social imaginary, ‘‘reality” and ‘‘subject” become inter-
twined. As laid out by Taylor (2004, 2), the social imaginary is, therefore, not a set 
of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a 
society. For Taylor, this is central to understanding the nature of modernity and 
the conception of moral order of society that accompanies it. He describes the 
relationship as a form of ‘‘embeddedness” in that certain self-understandings are 
embedded in certain practices that are both promoted by the spread of these prac-
tices and which shape them and help get them established. It is, as he argues, ‘‘both 
a matter of identity – the contextual limits to the imagination of the self – and of 
the social imaginary: the ways we are able to think or imagine the whole of society.” 
(2004, 63). The focus is on the way ordinary people ‘‘imagine” their social sur-
roundings, shared by large groups of people, if not the whole of society, leading to 
a public understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared 
sense of legitimacy. 
  
In that sense, a focus on imagination in this collective form helps to understand 
how systems come to be legitimized and what comes to be perceived as possible. 
Whilst the concepts of imagination and imaginary have been used much more dif-
ferentially than this (including a prominent discussion on socio-technical imagi-
naries in the field of Science and Technology Studies), my interest in them here is 
in terms of how people come to make sense of social institutions and practices. I 
therefore draw on the field of social imaginaries as outlined by Adams et al. (2015, 
19) as elucidating ‘‘the ways in which cultural configurations of meaning creatively 
configure the human encounter with – and formation (as articulation and doing) 
of – the world, on the one hand, and, articulate their centrality for the emergence, 
formation and reproduction of social institutions and practices, that is, of social 
change and social continuity, on the other.” In particular, I draw on the notion of 
radical imagination, in Castoriadis’ sense, as both the study of what limits our im-
agination and the study of what expands it. Similarly, Ricoeur’s outline of the re-
productive imagination as the core of ideology and utopia situates the ideological 
imagination as that which reproduces an image that society has of itself, whilst the 
utopian imagination produces alternative images of society that puts ideological 
images into question (Ricoeur 1986). This can come to serve an emancipatory 
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politics by approaching the legitimacy of established practices and the accompany-
ing cultural articulations as socially constructed. The way in which we imagine our 
social surroundings is not necessary or inevitable. Emancipatory politics serves to 
reveal the power relations that underpin any perceived natural order as a means to 
simultaneously nurture alternative imaginations of what can be possible.  
 
Although Fisher, in his description of capitalist realism, does not refer explicitly 
to the field of social imaginaries, he is concerned with what he describes as a ‘‘per-
vasive atmosphere”, articulated in the circulation of cultural products and evident 
in work and education, in which capitalism has ‘‘colonized dreams”, lowering our 
expectations into accepting that, in the words of Margaret Thatcher (during the 
miners’ strike) ‘‘there is no alternative’. As Fisher states, ‘‘The “realism” here is 
analogous to the deflationary perspective of a depressive who believes that any pos-
itive state, any hope, is a dangerous illusion.” (2009, 9). This is closely aligned to 
more recent debates on the resilience of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism and 
the relative lack of political imagination as in the articulation of alternatives. There 
has been a closure of the economic imaginary in the form of depoliticization, mean-
ing the active denial of the need for a political, public discussion of the means and 
ends of the market economy (Adams et al. 2015, Straume and Humphrey 2010). 
This also speaks to Foucauldian notions of normalization as the way in which 
norms of conduct are established and enforced through discursive practices backed 
up by institutional sanctions (Foucault 1977). However, Fisher’s take on ‘‘realism” 
pays more explicit attention to the active marginalization of alternatives, and the 
dictation of terms of any resistance. That is, the focus is on the construction of the 
realm of what is considered to be possible. 
 
In thinking about how people make sense of society, and understanding Fisher’s 
use of the term ‘‘realism” to articulate a relative closure of cultural articulations of 
the world as part of an active denial of political debate, I now turn to look at data-
driven surveillance through this lens.  
 
 
 
 
Surveillance Culture and Dataism  
 
In analyzing the changing consumer environment of the twenty-first century, 
Turow et al. (2015) combine Taylor’s notion of social imaginary with Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony to articulate the entrenchment of data-driven surveillance 
within retail. For Gramsci, hegemony is a way to understand how power is exer-
cised without, or in addition to, coercion. It relies on a ‘‘compromised equilib-
rium”, achieved from concessions that subordinate groups gain from the bourgeois 
state, which is then maintained through the concrete coordination of interests by 
civil society. Civil society - the public sphere where ideas and beliefs are shaped - 
in turn comes to reproduce hegemony through the ‘‘organic intellectuals” in the 
media, universities and religious institutions that then enable ‘‘common sense” so-
cietal values and legitimacy (Gramsci 1971, Wood 2015). Whilst hegemony there-
fore emphasizes how common sense becomes institutionalized as part of certain 
social mechanisms and power relations, Taylor’s social imaginary captures the nu-
ances of everyday life and practices. Combining these approaches, Turow et al. 
(2015) argue that, over time, consumers have become institutionalized into accept-
ing a retail environment that has transitioned from broad demographic lenses to 
one based on their monitoring as individuals who give off streams of data, often in 
real time. Consultancies and technology firms assist retailers in reshaping the shop-
per, the store, and the deal so that people (consumers) become institutionalized 
into what Turow et al. understand as taken-for-granted values, habits and expec-
tations of an increasingly data-driven and discriminatory market-place.  
 
In his later book on the topic, Turow (2017) builds on his account of ‘‘common 
sense” data collection by drawing on Jackson’s 1968 notion of the ‘‘hidden curric-
ulum”, used to refer to the social norms and rules in education that become ac-
cepted through repetition and the implicit values laid out in schools that connects 
young people to the structures of power in society and defines their relationships 
to them. This can be broadened to the education that people receive through media 
and culture about all institutions (Gerbner 1972), including, as Turow argues, the 
retail space. There is a prevalence of symbol systems that designate, for example, 
the meaning of trendy clothing, outdoor happiness, and wealth - codes that 
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shoppers have come to take for granted. We are now, Turow states, ‘‘on the cusp 
of a retailing era that is adding an entirely new layer of routine surveillance activities 
and that carries with it the accompanying underlying lesson that it is common 
sense for shoppers to accept individualized profiling and deal making as part of the 
process of buying things.” (2017, 18). 
 
Whilst Turow’s focus is particularly on data-driven surveillance in the retail space, 
his analysis of the normalization of surveillance infrastructures in everyday life finds 
echoes far beyond it and are pertinent in relation to post-Snowden debate more 
broadly. Indeed, when the documents leaked by Snowden were first published in 
June 2013, they both confirmed and surprised prevalent understandings of surveil-
lance practices. The documents detailed a continuation of the development of what 
had previously been described as the “surveillance society” (Rule, 1973; Lyon, 
1994), but they also represent a significant juncture in how surveillance is concep-
tualized and discussed. Classic conceptions such as Foucault’s ‘‘panopticon” or Or-
well’s ‘‘Big Brother” struggle to account for these technological developments and 
later incarnations of surveillance practices (Browne, 2015). Moreover, concepts 
such as the ‘‘surveillance state” and ‘‘surveillance society” are no longer adequate 
for describing the form contemporary surveillance takes. As was made explicit in 
the Snowden leaks, the state is no longer the only, perhaps not even the main, 
arbiter of surveillance. Instead, we are confronted with what Harcourt (2015, 66) 
describes as a new ‘‘oligarkhia” made up of an ‘‘amalgam of the intelligence com-
munity, retailers, Silicon Valley, military interests, social media, the Inner Beltway, 
multinational corporations, midtown Manhattan, and Wall Street.” This ‘‘oli-
garkhia” is the product, in part, of shared interests in security (from foreign cor-
porate espionage, cyber hacking, malevolent actors etc.) among government and 
technology companies, in conjunction with the rise of neoliberalism and the asso-
ciated trend toward deregulation, outsourcing and privatization.  
 
For Lyon, the contemporary nature of surveillance also cannot be sufficiently un-
derstood in terms of ‘‘surveillance society’, which he understands as a concept orig-
inally used to indicate ‘‘ways in which surveillance was spilling over the rims of its 
previous containers – government departments, policing agencies, workplaces – to 
affect many aspects of daily life.” (2017, 826). What is missing from these accounts 
are the active roles played by surveillance subjects, paying more attention to the 
ways in which citizens, consumers, employees etc. experience and engage with sur-
veillance. Rather, Lyon suggests, in line with Turow’s analysis, we need to under-
stand surveillance within everyday practices and in the very fabric of society’s cul-
ture. By advancing the concept ‘‘surveillance culture”, therefore, Lyon is seeking 
to highlight how surveillance is becoming part of a whole way of life: ‘‘From being 
an institutional aspect of modernity or a technologically enhanced mode of social 
discipline or control, it is now internalized and forms part of everyday reflections 
on how things are and of the repertoire of everyday practices.” (Lyon 2017, 825). 
 
In placing emphasis on subjects as active participants in surveillance, Lyon points 
to a more complex power dynamic than have previous discussions of surveillance 
which focused mainly on the ways in which surveillance is exercised from ‘outside’, 
by one actor over another. Rather, we need to consider how different ‘‘surveillance 
mentalities and practices” come to be manifested (Lyon 2017, 828). This speaks to 
the active participation by citizens in how data is generated which marks part of 
the human interaction with digital environments. That is, data is collected based 
on what might be described as ‘voluntary’ activities by ‘ordinary citizens’, who 
‘choose’ to share data about themselves. Or as Harcourt (2015, 19) argues, perhaps 
not so much out of actual choice, but rather ‘‘a feeling of necessity”. Digital infra-
structures lure us into participating in data extraction not just in their ubiquity but 
also in the ‘‘seductive surveillance” that marks their technological manifestations 
(Troullinou 2016). The technologies which end up facilitating surveillance, Har-
court (2015) argues, ‘‘are the very technologies that we crave.” Harcourt goes as far 
as to argue that we now live in a society of exposure and exhibition; an ‘‘expository 
society” that takes the architectural structure of a mirrored glass pavilion in which 
we are not only seen but in which ‘‘we play and explore, take selfies and photograph 
others” (Harcourt 2015, 107).  
 
Entire populations are integrated into systems of tracking and monitoring, contin-
uously and in real-time; what Andrejevic (2017) describes as a shift from panoptic 
modes of surveillance to ‘‘environmental surveillance” – the replacement of selective 
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disciplinary surveillance with total perpetual monitoring and on-going interven-
tion. Power in such a society, Harcourt (2015) argues, circulates by a new form of 
rationality, one that is driven by algorithmic processes based on a ‘‘digital doppel-
gänger logic” in search of our data double. That is, the continuous collection of 
data abstracted from the digital traces left behind as we interact with our digital 
environments is used to identify, classify, assess, sort, or otherwise ‘‘control the 
access to goods and services that define life in modern capitalist society.” (Gandy 
1993, 15). Indeed, as Van Dijck (2014, 198) has outlined, ‘‘metadata appear to have 
become a regular currency for citizens to pay for their communication services and 
security – a trade-off that has nestled into the comfort zone of most people.” We 
are seeing the gradual normalization of this datafication as a new paradigm in sci-
ence and society. Such normalization is driven by the ideology of what Van Dijck 
refers to as ‘‘dataism”. She describes this as showing  
 
characteristics of the widespread belief in the objective quantification and 
potential tracking of all kinds of behavior and sociality through online me-
dia technologies. Besides, dataism also involves trust in the (institutional) 
agents that collect, interpret, and share (meta)data culled from social me-
dia, internet platforms and other communication technologies. (Van Dijck 
2014, 198).  
 
In outlining dataism as the ideological component of the datafication paradigm, 
Van Dijck highlights how this paradigm is being advanced on a set of assumptions 
that are deeply contested. Not only is there an assumption that (objective) data 
flows through neutral technological channels, but also that there is ‘‘a self-evident 
relationship between data and people, subsequently interpreting aggregated data to 
predict individual behavior.” (2014, 199). These assumptions are further embedded 
in society through the active attempts to maintain the integrity of the system via 
government regulation aimed at assuring public trust in (private) data infrastruc-
tures by limiting excesses and harms.  
 
 
 
 
Surveillance Realism Post-Snowden  
 
The Snowden leaks and its aftermath are an important component in further out-
lining the nature of this datafication paradigm. Having served as contractor for the 
National Security Agency (the NSA), Edward Snowden gained privileged access to 
information about secret surveillance programs run by the NSA and British Gov-
ernment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), amongst other agencies. In 
2013, he leaked this information to leading global media organizations. Starting in 
June 2013, organizations such as The Guardian, the Washington Post, Der Spiegel 
and The New York Times began to publish detailed and wide-ranging stories reveal-
ing the unprecedented extent to which our activities and behavior in digital envi-
ronments are tracked, monitored, analyzed and stored. While the leaks focused on 
surveillance by state agencies, they also highlighted the ‘‘oligarkhia” of state, cor-
porate and commercial actors mentioned above.  
 
Whilst protests were prevalent in the immediate aftermath of the Snowden leaks, 
in particularly in the United States with the Stop Watching Us protests, and in 
Germany with the Freedom Not Fear protests, dominant interpretations have sug-
gested that there was little response from the broader public concerning these rev-
elations of surveillance (Cable 2015). Often this has advanced a narrative that peo-
ple either do not care, or feel that surveillance practices are largely justified in a 
perceived trade-off between security and privacy (Mols and Janssen 2017). Yet such 
an analysis is too simple and neglects the complexities of the contemporary digital 
environment. In this section I build on the above arguments with regards to shifts 
in the nature of data-driven surveillance, focusing particularly on the immediate 
aftermath of the Snowden leaks. I advance the concept of surveillance realism as a 
way to articulate the context in which we are to understand public debate and 
responses to the revelations of mass data collection and analysis. I use this concept 
to describe the nature of acceptance and resignation in relation to the increasing 
mass collection of data across social life and the active marginalization of alterna-
tives, despite widespread unease and concerns about these infrastructures and sys-
tems.  
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The justification and normalization of data-driven surveillance has been actively 
advanced in public debate. When the Snowden leaks were first published, we saw 
a quick convergence across media, government and security services around a dis-
course of threat and (in)security. In the UK, condemnation of both Snowden as a 
whistle-blower and The Guardian newspaper for publishing the documents was 
prevalent across political parties, and state agencies responded with overt force to 
stop information from being released. This became symbolized in the now notori-
ous confrontation at The Guardian where editorial staff was forced to destroy hard-
disks and files under the watchful eye of the British intelligence agency, GCHQ, 
in a feeble attempt to prevent further publications of the Snowden files. Within 
months of the first publications the sitting director of MI5 made a rare public 
statement condemning the newspaper, accusing it of ‘‘handing the advantage to 
the terrorists” (Whitehead 2013). This argument was replicated in mainstream me-
dia debate with the majority of newspapers advancing the opinion that the publi-
cation of the Snowden leaks had compromised the work of the intelligence services 
(Wahl-Jorgensen and Bennett 2017). In fact, editor of The Independent Chris 
Blackhurst went as far as to publish an editorial explaining that he would not have 
published the leaks had it been up to him, stating ‘‘if MI5 warns that this is not in 
the public interest who am I to disbelieve them?” (Blackhurst 2013).  
 
As Wahl-Jorgensen and Bennett (2017) have illustrated, the media debate on sur-
veillance and data collection following the Snowden leaks became marked by an 
overarching discourse of securitization that situated surveillance firmly within a 
terrorism context. This is despite the fact that journalists themselves are often 
critical about surveillance practices, acknowledging not only the increasing nor-
malization of datafication, but also raising concerns about the limited public 
knowledge of the extent of data collection and critiqueing the media’s contribution 
in providing justifications for it (Hintz et al. 2018). However, as Wahl-Jorgensen 
and Bennett (2017) point out, data-driven surveillance was discursively justified by 
stories about the Snowden revelations and its aftermath through the reliance on 
official sources expressing the view that surveillance should be increased or is ac-
ceptable/necessary; the most frequently expressed opinion in newspaper coverage. 
Sources expressing this view suggested that surveillance is crucial to national 
security, and is particularly important to strengthen in light of terrorist threats. As 
Wahl-Jorgensen and Bennett state, ‘‘the prominence of opinions that justified sur-
veillance in the name of national security in mainstream media is not accidental. 
Rather, there is evidence to suggest a longer-standing legitimation of state inter-
ventions through a reference to concerns about state security in the British con-
text.” (2017: 10). That is, as they put it, the idea of national security constitutes a 
discursive ‘‘trump card” overriding all other claims. This narrative was intermit-
tently supported with statements from intelligence agencies which claimed that 
surveillance played an active role in curbing terrorist attacks (cf. Bakir 2015).  
 
In such a context, a widespread logic that this also means mass surveillance is pri-
marily a concern for those who have ‘‘something to hide” (i.e. terrorists, criminals, 
and other social deviants) became manifest. As Wahl-Jorgensen and Bennett (2017) 
suggest, the ‘‘nothing to fear” position ‘‘offers a common-sense articulation of the 
idea that being under constant surveillance is not only a fact of life in contemporary 
societies but also entirely acceptable given the constant terrorist threat.” Whilst 
the Snowden leaks constituted a global media event in which coverage differenti-
ated across social, historical and political contexts with reference to national and 
geopolitical interests (Kunelius et al. 2017, Hintz et al. 2018), the ‘‘nothing to hide, 
nothing to fear” pretext as a way of describing public responses and attitudes has 
been prominent across national contexts (Lyon 2015, Mils and Janssen 2017). Alt-
hough blogs and alternative media provided a space for more critical arguments 
that highlighted a lack of transparency surrounding intelligence agencies and vio-
lations of privacy, ‘‘the mediated public debate on the issue has, in the longer run, 
contributed to rendering such concerns less visible and marginalized” (Hintz et al. 
2018, 77).  
 
Research on public attitudes to post-Snowden data collection highlights that 
whilst many people actually have these concerns, the justification for surveillance 
is often widely internalized (Dencik and Cable 2017) along with a trust in institu-
tions that collect data, as pointed out by Van Dijck (2014). This is not to suggest 
that people are either passive or apathetic in relation to their digital environments, 
but rather that attitudes and practices are continuously negotiated in relation to 
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the way data-driven systems have become integrated and mediated in society. In 
fact, numerous studies have shown that people feel a ‘‘lack of control” over how 
information is collected (Eurobarometer 2015) and are ‘‘bewildered and fearful” 
about the use of their data (Gompertz 2016) but do not necessarily act according 
to such concerns. In explaining the ‘‘privacy paradox”, for example, Hargittai and 
Marwick (2016) emphasize pragmatism as a central component. This is the paradox 
that emerges from a prominent concern with privacy in the digital environment 
that is not manifested in actual online behavior. Focusing on young people in par-
ticular, they outline how people experience ‘‘privacy fatigue” and confusion about 
the data-driven systems in place, which leads to an acceptance of their data being 
collected as a pragmatic response in the negotiation with digital infrastructures. 
Moreover, research has shown that, despite an increasing awareness of surveillance 
and a prevalent unease with the implications of such systems, people feel largely 
disempowered to fundamentally challenge the nature of data collection (Dencik 
and Cable 2017). Rather, they come to negotiate their own position and vulnera-
bility as part of an everyday practice within what they recognize as being relatively 
limited parameters, such as adjusting privacy settings on social media, or refraining 
from sharing certain content or not engaging in particular searches (Marthews and 
Tucker 2015, Penney 2016, Hampton et al. 2014).  
 
In other words, the sheer ubiquity of surveillance infrastructures and their embed-
dedness in ordinary aspects of social, political and cultural participation make it 
difficult to think they can be challenged. Adjusting to this ‘‘reality” pragmatically 
is a key tenet of what Draper and Turow (2017) term a ‘‘sociology of digital resig-
nation”. Crucially, for Draper and Turow, a sociology of digital resignation suggests 
that these developments are not natural or inevitable, nor that people are simply 
passive agents in the process. Rather, in addition to the nature of public debate 
discussed above, they stress the ways in which resignation to mass data collection 
has been actively manufactured through a number of different practices, such as 
obfuscation in privacy agreements between users and platforms, or simply by mak-
ing services inaccessible if personal data is not shared. These defaults are ingrained 
in the general standards and design of digital infrastructures and are advanced in 
the operations of data mining practices. At the same time, people continuously 
navigate this environment, negotiate costs and benefits, adjust settings where prag-
matically possible, but with the recognition that any actual control over the envi-
ronment is limited. In recognizing the extent of a prevalent ‘‘surveillance culture”, 
as Lyon (2017) suggests, such resignation also illustrates the increasing struggle to 
actually imagine alternatives. Rather, in line with Fisher’s ‘‘realism”, expectations 
become lowered, and data-driven surveillance, along with its perceived infringe-
ments upon civic rights, becomes a small price to pay for being protected from 
terrorism, or for being able to participate in society through digital means. This 
surveillance realism is a realism that speaks to a hampered imagination where data-
fication and surveillance is seen as the only legitimate response to social ills.  
 
Whilst the Snowden leaks provided opportunities for reflection and substantial 
reform on data collection, any substantial overhaul of digital infrastructures was 
kept at bay. Although new legislation was introduced in places like Brazil with the 
Marco Civil Act, and changes to the Freedom Act in the US intended to curb 
surveillance powers, any fundamental questioning of surveillance, and indeed of a 
data-driven digital economy underpinning contemporary surveillance culture, was 
undermined. In fact, several countries have extended surveillance powers and ena-
bled further data collection following the Snowden leaks, with the UK’s Investiga-
tory Powers Act leading the way (Hintz and Dencik 2016). The political discourse 
on surveillance in the aftermath of the leaks restricted the policy debate within 
very limited parameters and served to advance hegemonic powers. Disputes circu-
lated around definitions of surveillance (e.g. at point of collection vs. point of anal-
ysis), infrastructure security and the need for encryption, and the nature of state-
corporate relations in the sharing of data (Hintz and Brown 2017). However, po-
litical consolidation around the justification for mass data collection marginalized 
possibilities for fundamental opposition. In what can be considered atypical fash-
ion, digital rights and civil liberties groups were invited to the table through con-
sultations, and were allowed to participate in the policy process, but their partici-
pation became predominantly token in nature, being allowed to provide expertise 
and winning some battles on specific aspects of surveillance policy at the expense 
of any fundamental review of surveillance practices and mass data collection. In 
what can be considered a ‘‘compromised equilibrium”, in Gramscian terms, that 
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comes to stabilize surveillance as ‘‘common sense”, Hintz and Brown point out that 
the recognition of campaign groups and advocacy organizations as legitimate actors 
‘‘has enabled civil society to participate in a key policy process, but it has also risked 
the normalization of surveillance as principled opposition is replaced by collabora-
tion, and it has exposed differences in civil society agendas.” (2017, 794). 
 
These developments speak to a context in which the Snowden leaks, and their 
aftermath, whilst creating awareness and unease with digital infrastructures, also 
illustrate the perseverance of surveillance culture and dataism. When Fisher de-
scribed capitalist realism, he wrote of the credit crisis of 2008: ‘‘The speculations 
that capitalism might be on the verge of collapsing soon proved to be unfounded. 
It quickly became clear that, far from constituting the end of capitalism, the bank 
bail-outs were a massive re-assertion of the capitalist realist insistence that there is 
no alternative.” (2009, 78). In this spirit, the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, in 
terms of both policy and technology developments (just think of the proliferation 
of Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things, ‘‘smart” cities and ‘‘smart” homes), 
largely enabling further and wider data collection and data sharing, has made clear 
that Snowden’s revelations did not constitute the end of surveillance. In fact, the 
Investigatory Powers Act was, to use Fisher’s words, a massive re-assertion of the 
surveillance realist insistence that there is no alternative.  
 
 
Beyond Surveillance Realism? 
 
So what power does imagination have in a state of surveillance realism? Imagination 
has the potential for both oppression and emancipation; it may limit or expand 
that which we see as possible. As Castioradis as well as Ricoeur and Taylor make 
clear, a concern with the creative and collective dimensions of imagination as social 
imaginaries is also a concern with the ways the instituted order of society is prob-
lematized in the search for ‘‘the possible” as opposed to ‘‘the given” (Adams et al. 
2015). Any established social order always includes resistance, and the aftermath of 
the Snowden leaks also included continued and new challenges to surveillance re-
alism. However, the nature of resistance in any instituted order is also partly 
generated and shaped by the circumstances of that society. In his analysis of the 
anti-capitalist movement at the time of Fisher’s writing, he describes the staging 
of protests as ‘‘a kind of carnivalesque background noise to capitalist realism” where 
the suspicion was that the actual aim was not to replace capitalism but to mitigate 
its worst excesses (2009, 13). Although Fisher has been criticized for succumbing 
to ‘‘Left melancholia” (Hoffman 2016), an interesting aspect is his concern with 
the rejection of political organization in formulations of resistance at the time, and 
a turn to moral critiques of capitalism that only reinforce capitalist realism. In 
discussing the limits of confining critique to the moral realm, he states: ‘‘Poverty, 
famine and war can be presented as an inevitable part of reality, while the hope 
that these forms of suffering could be eliminated easily painted as naïve utopian-
ism.” (Fisher 2009, 20). Capitalist realism, therefore, according to Fisher, can only 
be threatened ‘‘if it is shown to be in some way inconsistent or untenable; if, that 
is to say, capitalism’s ostensible ‘realism’ turns out to be nothing of the sort.” 
(ibid.). 
 
In her analysis of environmental movements in late capitalism, Naomi Klein (2014) 
has posited a similar critique. Whilst there has been an increased awareness of 
climate change and a substantial normative overhaul in media and political debate 
on the crisis of the environment (Castells 2009), there has also been an ongoing 
concern with ways in which to engage public response and resistance. A key issue 
has been the marketization of environmental concerns such as the notion that it is 
possible ‘‘buy yourself green” through more environmentally ethical consumption. 
This has, at one and the same time, attributed socio-economic status to environ-
mentalism as an aspirational consumerist lifestyle whilst also individualizing the 
response. That is to say, the onus is on the individual consumer as the emblem of 
environmental resistance (Scott 2010). More broadly, Klein (2014) highlights the 
limitations of engaging with the environment as a question of moral conscience, 
or to frame it as an opportunity for competitive advantage in a market economy, 
instead of linking it more directly to questions of economic justice. ‘‘A different 
kind of climate movement”, Klein contends, ‘‘would have tried to challenge the 
extreme ideology that was blocking so much sensible action, joining with other 
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sectors to show how unfettered corporate power posed a grave threat to the habit-
ability of the planet.” (Klein 2014: 20).  
 
In thinking about resistance to data-driven surveillance post-Snowden these con-
cerns can inform a useful critique. Whilst there has been an increased awareness 
and important prominent developments in activism that has sought to challenge 
dominant trends of datafication (Milan and van der Velden 2016), resistance in the 
aftermath of Snowden has also been pursued through particular avenues. Most 
notably, these have been technological pursuits to self-protect against surveillance 
(what Milan and van der Velden refer to as ‘‘reactive” data activism) and lobbying 
around policy pertaining to privacy and data protection (Dencik and Hintz 2017). 
Forums to provide secure digital infrastructures proliferated in the wake of the 
Snowden leaks, with ‘‘numerous digital rights and internet freedom initiatives seiz-
ing the moment to propose new communication methods for activists (and every-
day citizens) that are strengthened through encryption.” (Aouragh et al. 2015: 213). 
Increase in the use of privacy-enhancing tools such as the TOR browser, GPG 
email encryption, and encrypted messaging software such as Signal, indicate a rising 
consciousness and concern with surveillance practices. Alongside this, digital rights 
and civil liberties groups, such as Open Rights Group, Big Brother Watch, Article 
19 and Liberty in the UK, have regularly issued statements regarding their concerns 
about surveillance, organizing public debates and lobbying legislators particularly 
around the Investigatory Powers Act and data protection regulation. This has been 
accompanied by litigation activism where groups have taken governments to court 
over particular policies, and made concerted efforts to change technical standards 
and protocols within relevant institutions and bodies, such as the Internet Corpo-
ration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Dencik et al. 2016).  
 
These efforts have been significant in creating a contested environment for advanc-
ing mass data collection and for pushing back on certain surveillance practices. 
However, resistance of this kind has also struggled to challenge the wider social 
imaginary and provide a substantial threat to surveillance realism (Dencik et al. 
2016). Partly, an issue with technological responses to mass data collection is the 
risk that they come to advance individualized understandings of resistance in which 
the onus is on the individual to change their own behavior. This means that chal-
lenging data collection becomes an individualized act based on perceived skill and 
ability to engage in privacy-enhancing digital practices, such as downloading en-
crypted software, using anonymised browsers, and changing security settings. Lob-
bying for policy reform and engaging in litigation activism, meanwhile, is often 
bounded by technical and issue-specific expertise that confines the debate to a small 
constituency of experts (Hintz and Brown 2017).  
 
Moreover, resistance to data-driven surveillance following the Snowden leaks has 
often focused on trying to mitigate the excessive harms of datafication rather than 
questioning developments at a fundamental level. Gürses et al. (2016) highlight 
how this has led to digital rights campaigns centred on ‘targeted’ surveillance as a 
more benign alternative to ‘mass’ surveillance, and an emphasis on proportionality 
as the overarching goal. As Gürses et al. argue, this constitutes depoliticized fram-
ings that are unable to account for the ways in which surveillance has been histor-
ically central to the control of particular communities and as a way to limit and 
suppress dissent. Furthermore, such framings serve to entrench the constructed 
trade-off between privacy and security that underpins the surveillance realist nar-
rative that mass data collection is, indeed, a necessary and inevitable part of con-
temporary society. Although these responses are shaped, in part, by what is per-
ceived as possible, what is missed in these efforts is a form of resistance that ex-
plicitly highlights how datafication and data-driven surveillance relates to domi-
nant economic interests and political agendas in advanced capitalist societies. These 
processes are neither accidental nor inevitable but serve a particular form of social 
organization. In such a context, identifying infringement upon individual privacy 
as the core harm produced by mass data collection may do little to reveal the power 
structures that shape digital infrastructures. And individual technological self-pro-
tection may do little to overcome or change them.  
 
Rather, an analysis of data-driven surveillance as a ‘‘realism” invites a more systemic 
critique of datafication in which resistance is intimately linked to questions of so-
cial and economic justice; what has also been referred to as a ‘‘data justice” move-
ment (Dencik et al. 2016). In advancing such a framework, the aim would be to 
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situate data-driven surveillance in the context of the interests driving such pro-
cesses, and the social and economic organization that enables them. For example, 
this involves engaging with the ways in which data collection and analysis embodies 
historical institutionalized forms of discrimination and exclusion that limits op-
portunity and participation for certain communities in society (Gangadharan et al. 
2015, Eubanks 2018). Similarly, the asymmetries of power between those who col-
lect and analyze data and those who are subject to such data collection and analysis 
as an inherent feature of datafication (Citron and Pasquale 2014), are seen as an 
expression of the increasing concentrations of power in fewer hands and related to 
a wider trend of privatization and deregulation (along with a shift in decision-
making away from the public realm). Or, the corporate and centralized nature of 
data systems is understood in relation to the organization of the digital economy 
and the labour relations and governance that sustain it (Scholz 2017). In this sense, 
questions of economic and social justice precede any analysis and development of 
data infrastructures and their position in society. 
 
Although there is not the space to outline it fully here, resistance, through this 
lens, would involve dynamic collaboration between different groups and move-
ments in civil society that combine economic, social, cultural, ecological and tech-
nological dimensions in articulating both problems and solutions (see also Hintz 
et al. 2018). Pointing to surveillance realism in this context is therefore about in-
viting a more active politicization of data processes that, to borrow from Ricoeur’s 
(1986) assertions, articulates the ideological imagination as a way to nurture the 
utopian imagination (here I also take inspiration from writings on ‘‘real utopia” 
such as those of Olin Wright 2010). As Fisher notes, ‘‘nothing is inherently polit-
ical; politicization requires a political agent which can transform the taken-for-
granted into the up-for-grabs.” (2009, 79). Surveillance realism identifies contem-
porary (often undesirable) mass data collection as a contingency that has been actively 
constructed as an inevitability, which can therefore also be challenged and recon-
structed. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In drawing on Fisher’s notion of ‘‘capitalist realism” as a way to understand the 
contemporary social condition with regards to data-driven surveillance, and the 
datafication paradigm more broadly, this article posits a way to reveal the contin-
gency and construction of our current digital environment. The perceived necessity 
and inevitability of mass data collection is one that has been advanced partly 
through a compromised equilibrium, to use Gramsci’s term, in which the normal-
ization and entrenchment of a surveillance culture has stabilized the nature of con-
temporary digital infrastructures as ‘‘common sense”. This, in turn, has established 
a social imaginary of resignation to ubiquitous data collection despite prevalent 
feelings of unease and recognition of discriminatory and suppressive effects. In a 
context of surveillance realism, the injustices and fallacies of the system become a 
small price to pay to fight off inefficiency, threats and terror.  
 
The Snowden leaks constitute a significant moment in the advancement of surveil-
lance realism. They provided unprecedented insights into the extent of datafication 
and created increased awareness of surveillance practices. This led to outbursts of 
resistance, which focused particularly on what we might think of as techno-legal 
solutionism. Such a response, however, has been unable to transform the social 
imaginary and pose a substantial threat to surveillance realism. Rather, it has strug-
gled to overcome enclosed expert discourses and individualized acts of resistance 
that have been confined to mitigating the worst excesses of mass data collection, 
sometimes even advancing the inevitability of the model through its suggested 
compromises. The UK’s Investigatory Powers Act in the wake of the Snowden 
leaks has come to symbolize the re-assertion of the surveillance realist insistence 
that there is no alternative. 
 
The inability to articulate a coherent alternative to surveillance culture and dataism 
speaks to the politics of imagination that is played out in the kind of ‘‘realism” that 
Fisher described. It is one in which our aspirations and hopes are formatted to fit 
the hegemonic system. In advancing a critique, therefore, suitable for an emanci-
patory politics, it becomes essential to destroy the ‘‘natural order” of surveillance 
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realism in order to make what seems impossible attainable. That is, the challenge 
becomes one in which the issue is not simply to harvest the resources available to 
mitigate the excessive harms of the current datafication paradigm, but is one in 
which we have to expand the limits of our imagination and reassert the possibilities 
of another world, another way of organizing society.  
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Introduction 
 
The progressive datafication of social life is often perceived as a threat to democratic 
publics. Critics warn that filter bubbles would undermine dialogue and consensus, 
that social discrimination will be reinforced (Barocas and Selbst 2016) or that ‘sur-
veillance capitalism’ is fundamentally anti-democratic (Zuboff 2015). Yet as “dem-
ocratic power is calculated power” (Rose 1999, 200), datafication is also driven by 
democratic visions and closely linked to notions of political accountability, fairness, 
and citizen empowerment. Forms of datafication driven by commercial players or 
governments have always been accompanied by civil society actors or journalists 
who have utilized data and related forms of quantification to advance their goals. 
However, given the new structures of (data) power that shape the workings of 
governments and businesses today, Milan and Van der Velden (2016, 6) suggest 
that it is increasingly important to investigate “how activism evolves in relation to 
big data”. They argue that new forms of ‘data activism’ are “enabled and constrained 
by data […] and this special relation shapes tactics, identities, and modes of organ-
izing” (Milan and Van der Velden 2016, 3). 
 
In this article, I explore ways in which activism is enabled by datafication by looking 
at a group of actors who not only reacted to processes of datafication, but pro-
actively embraced them: civic technologists. Civic tech is an umbrella term for 
diverse projects that attempt to make engagement easier for citizens, improve com-
munication and feedback between governments and citizens, and strengthen polit-
ical accountability. Among other things, civic technologists develop parliamentary 
monitoring websites, tools to help citizens report local infrastructure problems to 
local government, or freedom of information (FOI) websites that help users to 
submit freedom of information requests to public institutions. In its modern in-
carnation, civic tech is the result of a convergence between “communities of tech-
nological and political openness” (Yu and Robinson 2012, 195). Early examples 
include the British FaxYourMP (2003), which helped citizens to find and contact 
their representatives in UK parliaments (Townend 2008), or the monitoring web-
site GovTrack.us (2004), which made information provided by the US Congress 
more accessible (Yu and Robinson 2012). From these early volunteer experiments, 
civic tech has grown substantially in recent years as it has been embraced by gov-
ernments, corporations and foundations (Baraniuk 2013). 
 
In addition to their success and growth, civic technologists are relevant because 
they act as pioneers for the use of data to facilitate civic engagement. While there 
have been predecessors of the tools they developed, the way they utilized data to 
make them accessible and offer additional services was novel. They took infor-
mation that was available elsewhere and made it machine-readable, shared it 
openly, and built services on top of it, e.g. the ability to type in one’s post-code to 
find one’s representative in the British parliament on FaxYourMP. Through such 
practices, they combined concepts of legal and technical openness in new ways (cf. 
Yu and Robinson 2012). Being pioneers of this type of work is also part of the self-
conception of at least some civic tech organizations. They possess a sense of mission 
and make teaching their (data) skills and experiences to other civil society or media 
organizations an important part of their work.1 Finally, non-profit civic tech or-
ganizations such as the Sunlight Foundation in the US or mySociety in the UK 
were also among the first to advocate for open data policies, and supported related 
freedom of information policies (Schrock 2016). 
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However, despite civic tech’s success and potential influence, it has received little 
attention in media and communication studies to date. Most of the research that 
does exist is interested in how the phenomenon might reinforce existing power 
structures (cf. Gregg 2015), or who is using civic tech applications and in what way 
(cf. Cantijoch, Galandini, and Gibson 2016). What is missing is a nuanced under-
standing of the practices, ideas and motivations that guide civic technologists 
themselves and how those practices and ideas provide orientation for others. Crit-
ically examining civic technologists themselves is relevant because the broader im-
pact of civic tech goes beyond the impact of individual civic tech applications. As 
Hepp (2016, 919) describes, pioneer communities such as civic technologists are 
influential in the sense that they develop “a horizon of possibility to which the eve-
ryday media appropriation of others orients itself, or at least can do so” (Hepp 2016, 
919). Accordingly, we also need to be sensitive to how the practices and imaginaries 
civic technologists develop provide orientation for others, i.e. how other actors 
adapt and modify them. 
 
This paper therefore critically examines how civic technologists understand and use 
data to “meet their social ends” (Couldry and Powell 2014, 2). What are the key 
practices of civic technologists in relation to data and how do they themselves un-
derstand what they are doing? Addressing these questions will contribute to our 
understanding of how activism is enabled or constrained by datafication, as it pro-
vides a basis for subsequent studies to examine if and how these practices and im-
aginaries can be found elsewhere, and how they might have been modified. 
 
I present findings from a case study about the British non-profit organization 
mySociety. Founded in 2003, mySociety is one of the oldest and most influential 
civic tech organizations and arguably represents ‘best practice’ in the extremely di-
verse civic tech sector. Its UK websites have millions of users (mySociety 2015) and 
the organization had a direct influence on British policy-making (cf. www.parlia-
ment.uk 2014). Some of its more popular projects include FixMyStreet, which lets 
citizens report local problems like broken streetlights or potholes to local govern-
ment; its right-to-know website WhatDoTheyKnow which helps users to submit 
FOI requests to public institutions; or its parliamentary monitoring website 
TheyWorkForYou which gives detailed information about voting records and 
makes parliamentary speeches more accessible. mySociety’s projects are also prom-
inent internationally and customized versions of its tools are used in 44 different 
countries (mySociety 2015), which let mySociety to transition from a UK-centric 
to an international organization. While it is not representative of the phenomenon 
as a whole, mySociety’s success and international influence provide a good starting 
point for studying the values and practices which shape civic technologists’ use of 
data. 
 
In the following, I shall first discuss my methodological approach. I follow a prac-
tice theory approach and use the concept of ‘imagined affordances’ (Nagy and Neff 
2015) as a lens which helps amplify how members of mySociety themselves under-
stand data and how they imagine it to advance their agenda. The remainder of the 
article describes how the data practices of mySociety relate to their broader imagi-
naries. In the conclusion, I will reflect on the implications for studying civic tech 
and data activism in general. 
 
 
Researching the Imagined Affordances of Data 
 
To examine how members of mySociety understand and use data to meet their own 
ends, this paper relies on the concept of ‘imagined affordances’ (Nagy and Neff 
2015). According to Nagy and Neff (2015), whatever actions a particular technology 
enables or constrains does not solely depend on its features or its material proper-
ties, but also on the perception of users and designers. Both may have “expectations 
about their communication technologies, data, and media that, in effect and prac-
tice, shape how they approach them and what actions they think are suggested” 
(Nagy and Neff 2015, 5). Applied to the subject of this paper, what data enables 
civic technologists to do does not solely depend on the properties of the data they 
collect or re-use, or on the applications they are able to develop with it; it also 
depends on how civic technologists themselves understand and perceive how data 
can serve their agenda. These perceptions and understandings are the basis for the 
“horizon of possibility” (Hepp 2016, 919) they develop as a pioneer community, 
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which affects the perceptions of other actors concerning how data can be used to 
facilitate forms of civic engagement and activism. 
 
To study the imagined affordances of data for members of mySociety, this paper 
relied on a methodological approach inspired by practice theory. First, a focus on 
practices aligns well with the concept of imagined affordances because affordances 
enable or constrain certain actions, and people make sense of affordances “in and 
through practices” (McVeigh-Schultz and Baym 2015, 2). Second, practices are 
useful for examining the role of pioneer communities because they act as exemplars. 
This means that they not only communicate ideas and visions about how a tech-
nology can be used, but they also become influential because they demonstrate 
their own visions and thereby affect the perceptions of others. The practices they 
develop are expressions of their broader visions and we have to consider them in-
separable if we want to understand their influence. 
 
Accordingly, I employ methods that helped exploring what members of mySociety 
are doing and how they themselves understand and categorize what they are doing 
in relation to data (cf. Couldry 2004, 2012). I followed a constructivist grounded 
theory approach (Charmaz 2006). Grounded theory was chosen because of its core 
principle of theoretical sampling, i.e. an initial data sample is continuously ex-
panded with new data to systematically elaborate and refine the theory. This ap-
proach was useful for exploring the open-ended range of practices (Couldry 2012) 
and to more fully reconstruct the perspectives of the research subjects without 
applying pre-conceived concepts. 
 
Spread over three rounds of data collection, I conducted five semi-structured in-
terviews with members of mySociety, including its founder and former CEO, two 
senior developers, a member of the international team, and a member of mySoci-
ety’s research team. These interviews had an average length of one-and-a-half 
hours. A large part of each interview consisted in the reconstruction of a particular 
project. Each interviewee was asked to pick a project that illustrates her or his work 
and then walk me through the development process: What was the initial idea 
behind the project, what were the different steps and phases for implementing the 
project, what happened after the initial release? Reich (2013, 422) calls this ‘recon-
struction interviews’ because it reconstructs “technological ‘biographies’”. Explor-
ing the development of a project in-depth vividly illustrated the practices and rou-
tines of my interviewees. If not mentioned by the interviewees, specific questions 
about the role of data were asked. After one project was explored, I asked whether 
this was a ‘typical’ project and if there are very different examples. If there were, I 
explored those as well. Other questions addressed self-understandings (preferred 
job title, understanding of civic tech) and personal or organizational ambitions and 
values. 
 
These interviews were complemented by 17 documents found online: mySociety’s 
homepage (including the use of the Internet Wayback Machine to retrieve older 
versions), project specific websites, blog posts and forum discussions from Tony 
Bowden (who has been working for mySociety since 2009), other interviews given 
by different mySociety members to newspapers or bloggers (e.g. Townend 2008), 
as well as presentations given by members like Tom Steinberg or Dave Whiteland 
available online (UsNowFilm 2008; Arcopix 2014; IndigoTrust 2011; mySociety 
2014). Some of these documents were included in the initial data sample, others 
were added later following the theoretical sampling. Moreover, I conducted eth-
nographic research on two separate conferences which were visited by several 
mySociety members: The Open Knowledge Festival 2014 in Berlin and the Mozilla 
Festival 2015 in London. These conferences helped to get an impression of the 
larger community mySociety is involved with and provided a helpful guidance for 
both the interviews and the analysis. 
 
 
How mySociety Members Imagine the Affordances of Structured 
Data 
 
In the following, I describe the imagined affordances members of mySociety hold 
around structured data. First, I will explore mySociety’s mission and self-under-
standing in more detail to give a dense description of the broader ambitions and 
imaginaries that drive this organization. Then I show how data is used to facilitate 
this mission by describing four imagined affordances: deep linking into documents 
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to engage citizens with the processes of governments; making the performance of 
governments legible to affect how they implement laws and public services; affect-
ing its users’ perceptions by demonstrating their impact to them; and scaling tech-
nological solutions to support a distributed form of agency. 
 
 
mySociety’s Mission: Facilitating Engagement 
 
mySociety’s self-proclaimed mission is to “help citizens demand better […] our web 
tools and apps are breaking down the barriers around governments” (mySociety 
2016b). Its tools are supposed to give “greater access for citizens to the work of 
government and the democratic process”, which essentially means improving how 
publics can monitor and provide feedback to governments: “We believe that gov-
ernments tend only to get better at serving the needs of citizens when citizens are 
capable of demanding better, creating a virtuous circle that leads steadily to better 
government” (Cridge 2015). While this statement might imply advocacy for spe-
cific policy changes, mySociety understands its role as a ‘mere’ facilitator of civic 
engagement, not as an advocacy organization. 
 
Members generally reject the idea of being a gatekeeper that stands between the 
citizens and their governments. Instead, they suggest to provide the means by 
which others are able to take actions more effectively: “What we do is present the 
facts: This is how your MP [Member of Parliament] voted, this is where the money 
went, this is what was said. It’s then up to other people to do with that what they 
will, which might well be using it to promote a cause” (Interview: Research Team). 
The idealized and simplified scenario that members sketch out rhetorically to de-
scribe their role can be outlined as follows: Before mySociety enters the arena, 
citizens are apathetic and disengaged because engagement is too difficult and time-
consuming due to high barriers raised by governments (in most cases unintention-
ally). mySociety identifies these barriers and then ‘drops’ its tools into the public 
arena to make engagement easier for citizens, which subsequently facilitates en-
gagement between citizens and their governments and leads to better governance. 
 
Underlying this approach is the assumption that more means for citizens to provide 
feedback to elected representatives leads to ‘better’ outcomes, i.e. more representative 
and therefore more democratic outcomes. Given its self-understanding as a ‘facili-
tator’, mySociety is not advocating for specific outcomes, but is concerned with the 
processes by which outcomes are generated: “We’re in favour of a vibrant, healthy, 
lively democracy. That means a rude and obnoxious place. Although we don’t want 
to do that ourselves, it’s entirely appropriate that we should facilitate other people 
to” (Steinberg quoted in Krotoski 2010). This approach builds on the principles of 
open source culture (Kelty 2008; Lewis 2012). “The essence of open source,” Weber 
(2004, 56) describes, “is not the software. It is the process by which software is 
created”. As the ideas and practices of the ‘open source process’ were increasingly 
applied outside of software development (most prominently with Wikipedia) they 
formed the basis for a larger technological and cultural phenomenon that Jenkins 
(2006) has described as participatory culture, a culture “which posits that 
knowledge is richest and most accurate when it reflects the pooled inputs of a 
distributed population, as opposed to the expertise of a single agent” (Lewis 2012, 
847). 
 
MySociety builds on previous forms of participatory culture and has particularly 
strong connections to technology-driven open data initiatives and rights-based 
open government or freedom of information initiatives, both of which are inter-
ested in applying the ‘logic of open participation’ (Lewis 2012) to institutionalized 
politics (Schrock 2016; Janssen 2012; Yu and Robinson 2012). mySociety was an 
early supporter of open data in the UK and its founder was part of a group that 
articulated the ‘8 principles of open government data’ (OpenGovData.org 2007). It 
also promoted freedom of information laws through its website 
WhatDoTheyKnow, which helps users to submit FOI requests to public institu-
tions, and advocated for strong FOI legislations. Yet despite this strong connec-
tion, advocating for open data and FOI is not mySociety’s main purpose, they are 
rather perceived as “resources that mySociety needed to function” (Interview: For-
mer CEO). This is because mySociety does not just build on participatory culture, 
it also extends it in important ways. Participatory culture relied on the connectivity 
of internet technologies to establish new forms of governance based on 
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collaboration and sharing. As Lewis (2012, 848) describes, participatory culture is 
based on a forging of technology and culture, in that digitalization “enables greater 
user participation on a seemingly infinite order, and the socio-cultural context of 
this technology has encouraged greater participation to achieve normative aims of 
collective wisdom and well-being”. 
 
MySociety similarly wants to create a more collaborative and participatory process 
for achieving better outcomes, but it does not solely rely on the connectivity ena-
bled by internet technologies and ways of ‘coordinating collaborations’ (Kelty 
2008). Its civic tech applications are not primarily about connecting people, but 
about facilitating them, i.e. enabling them to engage with governments in ways that 
go beyond ‘mere’ connectivity or access to information. In other words, mySociety 
is extending participatory culture by drawing attention to the conditions that 
would allow and encourage people to participate. Civic tech at mySociety is essen-
tially about feasibility, in that it aims at making engagement more feasible for cit-
izens by removing frictions such as needing to find out who represents them in 
parliament and how to contact them. 
 
MySociety’s imagined affordances of data are closely tied to this broader mission of 
creating a participatory culture. To illustrate the fundamental importance of struc-
tured data for mySociety, a member uses the analogy of cooking ingredients: 
 
If the useful thing is a cake that people want to eat, you’re interested in 
the ingredients…But you don’t want raw ingredients like wheat, you need 
the flour. Some processing has to be done to the ingredients before they 
are ingredients that you can sensibly make a cake with…Without the struc-
tured data, you wouldn’t be able to offer that service and until you can 
offer that service you couldn’t really prove that the demand for it would be 
so great. (Interview: International Team) 
 
This suggests that structured data, if ‘served’ correctly, would increase engagement 
and subsequently alter the relationship between citizens and their governments 
because it shows that the ‘demand is great’. In the following, I unpack this state-
ment and describe the imagined affordances of data underlying it. 
 
 
Improving Engagement with Governments: Deep Linking 
 
One of the most popular services on mySociety’s parliamentary monitoring website 
TheyWorkForYou are email alerts. For example, users can search for keywords in 
parliamentary discussions and then sign up to regularly receive emails informing 
them when their keyword comes up in future discussions. This service was signif-
icant because British parliaments used to publish transcripts of speeches as PDF 
files. To monitor keywords or what individual MPs are saying in parliamentary 
discussions, one needed to download these PDFs regularly and search through 
them individually. The email alerts at TheyWorkForYou turned this monitoring 
process into something people are able to do along the way, without investing 
considerable time and effort. 
 
The key practice behind this service is the idea of ‘deep linking’: “The idea that 
there is councilor Jones who said ‘This is what we have to do in my home town!’ 
and you can cite it directly” (Interview: International Team) – similar to Twitter, 
where every individual Tweet has its own URL which can be shared or embedded 
on other websites. For deep linking, mySociety (2016c) considers transcripts “made 
of nicely structured data […] hard to beat”. If documents are in a format that does 
not allow deep linking, “you can’t cite, you can’t share, you can’t show specific 
utterances […] that pretty much stops details in documents being called out in 
debates” (Whiteland in mySociety 2016a). Today, it uses a data standard for mod-
eling parliamentary speeches called Akoma Ntoso. It allows granular filtering (eve-
rything this person has said), an analysis of the speakers’ behavior (what was said, 
how and when?), and the ability to link speakers and what they say to other state-
ments and events: “We would like to see people…build sites like ‘all public state-
ments by the Prime Minister’” (mySociety 2016c). This creates a level of “semantic 
understanding” with an “awareness of speakers” (Interview: International Team) 
that is necessary for the services mySociety develops. 
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The ability to link deeply into a document using structured data is considered “re-
ally important in public discourses about documents” (Interview: International 
Team). More fundamentally, documents are considered important because mySo-
ciety is “concerned with the process of government and most government […] is 
actually the business of making laws, and laws traditionally have been written 
down” (Interview: International Team). 
 
From the perspective of mySociety members, enabling deep linking into docu-
ments and providing services around it improves the public’s awareness of, and 
engagement with, the businesses of governments (as those businesses are captured 
in documents). As mySociety explains: 
 
Transcripts are a kind of oil that greases the wheels of well-functioning 
societies. They let people discover when powerful people have made pro-
nouncements that affect less powerful people. We believe that by making 
transcripts function better, more people will end up learning about deci-
sions and opinions that affect their lives. (mySociety 2016c) 
 
In the interviews, members also frequently referred to a claim by mySociety’s 
founder: “everything you can and cannot do in your life has been decided by more 
powerful people in a meeting” (cf. Whiteland in mySociety 2016a). Deep linking is 
about improving access to such meetings to help figure out “who was responsible 
for things” (Interview: Former CEO) by improving the accessibility of those doc-
uments which capture what was said by whom. Put simply, deep linking should 
help to keep track of where and when powerful people make decisions. 
 
Taken together, mySociety is imagining the affordances of structured data in this 
case as a basis for a document-driven monitoring tool to help engage the public with 
the businesses and decision-making processes of governments. Through deep link-
ing, structured data is imagined to “even [affect] an apathetic population, it affects 
the way that they behave and what they know about what’s going on in their own 
society” (Whiteland in Arcopix 2014). This makes turning documents into struc-
tured information a central part of mySociety’s mission of creating a more 
participatory culture. Importantly, deep linking is more likely to facilitate individ-
uals who are already highly engaged and interested in the processes of governments 
to begin with, either privately or professionally (e.g. journalists or activist groups). 
As I will discuss below, mySociety also imagines data to help engaging citizens who 
are not necessarily interested in politics or feel disengaged and powerless. 
 
 
Mediating between Governments and Their Publics 
 
On FixMyStreet and WhatDoTheyKnow, mySociety collects all the problem re-
ports or freedom of information requests by its users, tracks the responses by public 
institutions, and makes both publicly accessible. By making the resulting databases 
public, mySociety creates new forms of legibility and assessability. The database on 
FixMyStreet enables the analysis of a city’s infrastructure problems by the public 
and makes the performance of governments, e.g. how fast they fix problems in 
specific regions, legible. WhatDoTheyKnow similarly allows an assessment of how 
different public institutions respond to FOI requests and subsequently how the law 
is being practiced. 
 
One reason for mySociety to ‘aggressively’ impose transparency on governments is 
its reliance on their cooperation. Its applications are built on top of services provided 
by governments and cannot exist independently without them. If public institu-
tions refuse to cooperate, for example by ignoring reports sent via FixMyStreet, 
their tools would be of little or no use. By imposing transparency and allowing the 
public to assess their performance, mySociety makes it more difficult for authorities 
to ignore them. It is a way of pushing institutions to cooperate and to adopt mySo-
ciety’s emphasis on user-friendliness and accessibility (see below). This is described 
as “the one bit of activism that we occasionally engage in” (Interview: Research 
Team). 
 
A less obvious aspect of this ‘one bit of activism’ is how mySociety’s use of data 
enables it to mediate between the bureaucratic and legal processes of governments 
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and the users of its applications. The way mySociety’s tools work is usually not a 
direct reflection of how public institutions or legislations are working: 
 
We think about the aim of the software as not being necessarily to model 
exactly the processes as they already exist in the world, but to make the 
software embody a slightly better way of doing things. (Interview: Senior 
Developer 2) 
 
In this sense, mySociety’s tools are “intended to provoke some friction” (Interview: 
Senior Developer 2). In the cases of FixMyStreet and WhatDoTheyKnow, the laws 
and regulations did not prohibit the publication of problem reports or FOI re-
quests, but it also was not something that was suggested. In addition, mySociety 
reinterprets how services and laws should be implemented in smaller ways, for ex-
ample by forwarding reports to councils via email, while councils prefer people to 
use a form on their website; or by allowing users to send FOI requests to institu-
tions that were not subject to the FOI law on WhatDoTheyKnow (mySociety 
2011). 
 
MySociety developer Tony Bowden (2010) described this principle as ‘dreaming 
out loud’: “simply act the way you want the world to be, then wait for reality to 
catch up” – by finding ways to make institutions cooperate and push ‘reality’ in 
that direction. This ‘dreaming out loud’ principle fundamentally depends on mySo-
ciety’s use of data to make the performance of governments legible and assessable 
for the public. 
 
However, mySociety cannot simply invent new ways of how governments should 
work and then impose this vision on institutions. While they are intended to create 
frictions, the software tools and data structures mySociety develops need to reflect 
the real-world processes they are supposed to represent to a large enough degree 
“to actually work” (Interview: Senior Developer 2). Instead of ‘reinventing’ govern-
ment, mySociety’s tools are compatible with existing services and legislations, but 
simultaneously utilize data to asses and affect how they are being implemented: “that 
gap between the way the law works, the way institutions implement the law and 
the way perhaps it might be ideal from a citizen’s point of view is an important one 
and one where I think it’s significant to build an artifact that demonstrates that” 
(Interview: Senior Developer 2). Using data to demonstrate and potentially close 
this gap is mySociety’s definition of ‘empowerment’: people are empowered by giv-
ing them tools which enable them to “see and be able to do what they are legally 
entitled to as easily as possible” (Interview: Research Team). 
 
This understanding of empowerment encapsulates how mySociety imagines to af-
fect the relationship between citizens and their governments through data. It uses 
data to facilitate the use of preexisting rights and services, not to fundamentally 
change them. It envisions its tools to act like a ‘layer’ that translates the bureau-
cratic and legal procedures followed by public institutions into user-friendly inter-
faces with accessible language for citizens. They are supposed to both reflect exist-
ing processes and visions of how these processes should ‘ideally’ work. The legibility 
and assessability created by data is imagined by mySociety to affect the implemen-
tation of rights and public services in ways intended to make engagement easier for 
citizens and thus ‘push reality’ closer to its vision of a more participatory culture. 
 
 
Changing Perceptions: Providing a Sense of Agency 
 
While facilitating already interested users via deep linking is important to mySoci-
ety (see above), it ultimately aims at engaging people who are usually not engaged. 
mySociety aims at a more long-term change in perception about “what is normal 
rather than what is exceptional” (Interview: Former CEO). Using TripAdvisor as 
an example, the former CEO explains that it “has caused a massive power shift in 
the hotel industry from the people who run the hotels towards people who stay in 
hotels”, even though it is not a “campaign for better hotels”. Services such as 
TripAdvisor would change people’s expectations about things like going to hotels 
if they are popular enough, i.e. widely used (cf. Steinberg in IndigoTrust 2011). In 
a similar vein, mySociety wants its tools to be “popular rather than idealistic” (In-
terview: Former CEO) and has a strong emphasis on usability, i.e. on making sure 
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its tools are easy to use and provide “the same level of service that the best [com-
mercial] websites we use nowadays would have” (Interview: Senior Developer 1). 
 
In order to simultaneously achieve popularity and promote a more participatory 
culture, mySociety tries to ‘harness self-interest’ (Bowden 2014b) by generating 
“public good from private desire” (Steinberg in Nestoria 2008). It aims at develop-
ing services that address individual end-users, but use the data gathered from the 
engagement of these users to create “public value” (Steinberg in UsNowFilm 2008) 
on top of it. Crowdsourced databases such as those created on FixMyStreet or 
WhatDoTheyKnow are key to this. FixMyStreet helps individuals to fix their spe-
cific problem, but it also collects all the reported problems to create a public data-
base about local problems that can be useful for others, for example local journalists 
who can sign up to get email alerts for problems reported in a specific region.  
 
By bridging individuals with collectives in this way and by emphasizing ease-of-
use, mySociety ultimately wants to affect the perception of users about their own 
agency. For example, when a problem reported via FixMyStreet has been fixed, it 
will be removed from the public city map and the user who reported it will receive 
an email encouraging her to report more, or to try out mySociety’s other projects 
for contacting her representatives. This way, mySociety is not only solving an in-
dividual’s problem, but is also trying to demonstrate the public value created by its 
action. This is intended to give users a “sense of agency…some ability to change 
their environment” (Interview: Senior Developer 2) by demonstrating that their 
actions do have an impact: 
 
[W]hat we often see as apathy is really just learned helplessness. People 
feel powerless, because they don’t believe they can make a difference. And 
the best way to change that is not to argue with them […] It’s to simply 
show them that they do actually have power. That what they do can have 
an effect, not only for themselves but for people around them. (Bowden 
2014b) 
 
Here, the legibility and assessability of crowdsourced data is imagined to create a 
more abstract, cultural and psychological change in perception. 
 
Taken together, the crowdsourced databases mySociety creates are imagined to af-
fect both governments and the public. On the one hand, they enable mySociety to 
push governments and influence how laws and public services are being imple-
mented, as they make the performance of governments legible in new ways (see 
above). On the other hand, it uses the data generated by its users in ways intended 
to change how they feel about engagement by providing easy-to-use tools and by 
demonstrating that their actions had an impact. Databases are imagined to affect 
emotions and perceptions in order to advance a vision of a more participatory cul-
ture, which illustrates the importance of emotions and perceptions around data (cf. 
Kennedy and Hill 2017). As I show in the next section, data is also key to mySo-
ciety’s ambition to support the development of similar applications elsewhere. 
 
 
Scaling Civic Tech: Supporting a Distributed Form of Agency 
 
The bulk of mySociety’s work today is based on collaborations with groups in other 
countries to create national versions of projects originally created in the UK, espe-
cially Alaveteli (an international version of its right-to-know site 
WhatDoTheyKnow) and tools for parliamentary monitoring. In part, this interna-
tional orientation is driven by funding opportunities, but also because numerous 
groups in other countries expressed a desire to have customized versions of mySo-
ciety’s UK tools. While partly self-interested, members share the desire to support 
groups that similarly want to promote a form of participatory culture elsewhere. 
They think of themselves not merely as ‘tool suppliers’, but as part of an interna-
tional civic tech community. 
 
MySociety essentially wants to promote its values and practices in many different 
contexts by supporting local groups with developing customized versions of its 
tools. To achieve this, it has to accommodate the fact that “people in different 
places care about different aspects of politics. In some countries what really counts 
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is how politicians vote, in others the crux is campaign finance contributions” 
(Steinberg 2012). Data is seen as both a key problem and a solution to this ap-
proach. One of the main obstacles for transferring an existing application to a new 
country or for building new civic tech applications from scratch is the design of 
consistent data models that adequately reflect the structures and legislations of the 
respective national government. A data model designed to capture the British par-
liamentary system cannot simply be transferred to another country. If they are not 
already available (as open data), developing such data models is complex. 
 
Therefore, mySociety is one of the founding members of Poplus, a ‘global civic 
tech federation’ of organizations similar to mySociety, like Code for America in the 
US or g0v in Taiwan. The basic idea that drives Poplus is that “pretty much every 
tool in the civic and democratic space can be broken down into some parts that are 
universal, with usually only a little bit of local glue holding them together”: 
 
Although pretty much every Parliament has different processes, they’re 
still dealing with the same raw ingredients – people, parties, speeches, bills, 
votes, etc. – and if we could create standardised ways of modelling each of 
those things, it would be a lot less work for people to combine these in 
the way that makes most sense for their own situation. (Bowden 2014a, 
emphasize added) 
 
In connection to Poplus, mySociety supports data standards for modelling govern-
ment structures and develops EveryPolitician, a project that literally collects data 
about every politician in the world. In this project, mySociety makes “data editorial 
decision[s]” (Interview: International Team) about how the ‘basic elements’ that 
can be found in every government are represented in a consistent manner across 
countries to ensure tools can be easily deployed internationally. 
 
On a technical level, mySociety is trying to reduce problems of scale through data 
structures and tools that standardize how common ‘ingredients’ of government 
systems are formalized. However, members perceive this not merely as a techno-
logical detail, but as a way to facilitate mySociety’s vision of a more participatory 
culture elsewhere. By enabling other groups with similar values and social imagi-
naries to create their own, local versions of civic tech applications that serve their 
particular needs, mySociety is essentially trying to support a distributed form of 
agency. By promoting data standards and reusable tools, it tries to create the con-
ditions necessary for supporting its values and approaches in as many different con-
texts as possible. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Cultural and Historical Situatedness of Af-
fordances 
 
This article examined the imagined affordances members of mySociety hold around 
data to gain a deeper understanding of how civic technologists rely on data to meet 
their own ends. mySociety is trying to facilitate civic engagement and, by extension, 
create a more participatory culture. Taken together, it is imagining the affordances 
of structured data in ways that are supposed to expand the agency of publics to-
wards governments: ways intended to enable citizens to better influence and inter-
act with governments or other powerful institutions. Four imagined affordances 
have been identified. 
 
First, members of mySociety use structured data to make ‘deep linking’ into doc-
uments possible, thereby aiming to increase the publics’ awareness of, and engage-
ment with, the processes of governments. Second, crowdsourced databases enable 
mySociety to mediate between governments and their publics. By collecting data 
to monitor the performance of governments, and by making this data publicly 
available, mySociety is trying to push governments to cooperate with its services 
and thereby affect how existing laws and public services are being implemented in 
supposedly more user-friendly, i.e. ‘citizen oriented’ ways. Third, members of 
mySociety are trying to use data to affect the perceptions and self-understandings 
of their users. Crowdsourced databases are supposed to help connect the individual 
with the collective by demonstrating to individual users that their actions have an 
‘impact’ and create a kind of ‘public value’. Fourth, members of mySociety are scal-
ing technological solutions to support a distributed form of agency that should 
enable groups in other countries, which similarly want to promote a more 
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participatory culture, to develop customized versions of mySociety tools that serve 
their particular needs. 
 
The way mySociety is using data to apply notions of participatory culture to politics 
suggests that we should understand the role of civic technologists in the public 
arena as facilitators of engagement. Facilitating means that data is used in ways that 
are supposed to enable others to take actions themselves. mySociety does not ad-
vocate specific outcomes (such as particular policy changes), but is concerned with 
how the processes by which outcomes are generated are designed. It aims to enable 
users to easily engage with authorities in order to ensure that decision-making 
“reflects the pooled inputs of a distributed population” (Lewis 2012, 847). In other 
words, mySociety wants to influence the conditions by which others participate in 
the public arena without directing the public discourse or influencing policy mak-
ing. At the same time, it sees its role as complementing actors who do want specific 
outcomes, like advocacy groups within civil society, or professional journalists who 
emphasize gatekeeping. 
 
By showing how members of mySociety understand and use data to facilitate civic 
engagement and realize a more participatory culture, this article draws attention to 
the fact that “the political and democratic possibilities of data” (Milan and Van der 
Velden 2016, 8) cannot be determined in an abstract way. What data affords to 
whom does not only depend on the technological properties of data, but is funda-
mentally social, and both culturally and historically situated. This has implications 
for studying data activism in general and civic tech in particular. Related to data 
activism, the findings presented here invite us to extend Milan and Van der 
Velden’s (2016) conceptualization of data activism as creating novel epistemic cul-
tures around datafication within civil society. The epistemic cultures and related 
social imaginaries promoted by mySociety are not novel: the practices and imagi-
naries described here build on participatory culture, which itself has roots predating 
computer culture and notions of open source software (Tkacz 2012). mySociety’s 
practices and epistemologies did not appear out of nowhere and the epistemic cul-
tures they create are not necessarily novel, but they develop imagined affordances 
around data to implement these ideas in new ways. To understand imagined 
affordances, historical trajectories are just as important as the new elements added 
by data activists.  
 
Studying imagined affordances does have a lot of potential for further developing 
and refining notions of data activism. First, imagined affordances provide a useful 
angle for moving beyond broad dichotomies of pro-active and re-active forms of 
data activism (Milan and Van der Velden 2016) and for studying how the epistemic 
cultures developed by data activists are connected to data in nuanced ways. Espe-
cially when combined with a focus on practices, it is a powerful tool for illustrating 
the “distributions of agency and organising forces” (Tkacz 2012, 404) activists set 
in motion. Second, the article shows how imagined affordances can be used as an 
integrative framework for studying how data activists affect the distribution of 
knowledge and power. I described how mySociety is trying to utilize the legibility 
and assessability created by data to change the perceptions of users about their own 
agency. Subsequent studies could examine how the practices and social imaginaries 
of data activists interrelate or clash with the self-understanding and perception of 
different groups in the public arena, and how different imagined affordances by 
various types of users emerge around civic tech applications. 
 
Applied to civic tech, the research approach developed here calls for a more differ-
entiated picture of the civic tech sector. Civic tech organizations and their funders 
are very much interested in a “coherent and clearly articulated vision and sense of 
shared identity for civic tech” (Donohue 2016). Yet while the diverse actors in the 
field of civic tech might align inasmuch as they are all interested in open data, 
reusability and a vague sense of improving ‘civic life’, their interests might eventu-
ally clash. For example, European non-profits like mySociety or the Open 
Knowledge Foundation Germany advocate for governments to copy civic tech ap-
plications. At mySociety, this even goes as far as stating that most mySociety pro-
jects “shouldn’t need to exist at all” (Interview: Senior Developer 1). Elsewhere, 
civic tech is closely aligned with start-up culture and attempts to create new in-
dustries. Wanting public institutions to copy civic tech applications in order to 
change the relationship between citizens and these institutions, or favouring the 
‘government as a platform’ paradigm (O’Reilly 2010) and wanting public 
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institutions to ‘step back’ and foster ecosystems of for-profit services, has very dif-
ferent implications for civic life (Baack in DataDrivenJournalism.net 2016). 
Pointing out such differences is also important for developing a more differentiated 
critique of civic tech. Civic tech and open data initiatives have been said to uncrit-
ically support a neoliberal agenda driven by commercial interests rather than gov-
ernment accountability or citizen empowerment (cf. Bates 2012; Slee 2012; Gregg 
2015). Moreover, their focus on technological solutions would merely reinforce 
existing power relationships by ‘empowering the empowered’ (Gurstein 2011). 
While this critique is important, it does not equally apply to every actor in the civic 
tech sector. We should not discard the agency and intentions of non-profit organ-
izations such as mySociety, who are aware of these discussions and conduct research 
to better understand the impact of their applications. Members of mySociety con-
stantly experiment and explore ways to support and encourage civic engagement. 
In this sense, they are “potential ‘laboratories’” (Hepp 2016, 929) that we should 
not ignore if we want to formulate normative principles for making processes of 
datafication more democratic and for creating more self-aware and agentic publics 
(Kennedy and Moss 2015). 
 
The imagined affordances identified and described here can help to map differences 
among actors in the civic tech sector: Are other civic tech organizations relying on 
data in the same way, and do they promote similar ends with them? Are actors 
outside the field of civic tech adopting them, and in what way? Which actor in the 
civic tech sector influences what field? Given civic tech’s status as a ‘pioneer com-
munity’ (Hepp 2016), tackling these questions is one way to conduct empirical 
research to trace and understand how forms of civic engagement and activism are 
changing due to their growing reliance on data. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1] An example are the ‘Schools of Data’ organized by Open Knowledge, which are active in various 
countries. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Ayuda Ecuador,’ a deployment of the Ushahidi platform, was launched on April 
16, 2016, after the first tremors of the earthquake that killed 660 people and injured 
4,605 (USAID 2016). Within a matter of two hours, a group of ‘digital humani-
tarians’ – who typically comprise bloggers, techies and activists willing to volunteer 
their time to assist in emergencies remotely (Gutiérrez 2018a) — launched the 
deployment to ‘generate collectively data relevant to the emergency, threats, lo-
gistic needs and response that the affected population was experiencing (…) and 
effectively channel the efforts by different institutions and agencies’ (Ayuda Ecua-
dor 2016). 
 
The Ushahidi platform – a non-profit tech company from Kenya that allows the 
visualization of crowdsourced crisis data for humanitarian purposes – is a proactive 
data activist organization, proactively employing software and data for humanitarian 
assistance (Gutiérrez 2018a). 
 
Data activism involves a series of practices ‘at the intersection of the social and the 
technological dimension of human action,’ aiming at either ‘resisting massive data 
collection,’ in the case of reactive data activists, or ‘actively pursuing the exploita-
tion of available data for social change,’ in the case of proactive data activists (Milan 
and Gutiérrez 2015, 127). This article deals with the second type of data activism. 
 
Proactive data activism is currently being harnessed to understand, analyze and de-
velop solutions to a range of social problems, from climate change and biodiversity 
loss, to inequality and human rights abuses (Hogan and Roberts 2015), as well as 
to assist in humanitarian crises, as in the case of the Ushahidi platform. 
 
Because of its capacity to generate alternative digital public spheres (called here 
APSs for short), this paper specifically refers to a type of proactive data activism 
termed ‘geoactivism,’ which employs interactive cartography to communicate and 
trigger action. In this paper, Geoactivism galvanized to address an emergency is 
called ‘crisis mapping,’ while geoactivism employed in evidence-gathering for ad-
vocacy is called ‘activist mapping’ (Gutiérrez 2018a). 
 
The cases mobilized to illustrate this article include mainly deployments of the 
Ushahidi platform, based on crowdsourced data, as well as other cases, including 
InfoAmazonia, which relies on public data, as well as crowdsourcing and sensors to 
generate data. They are introduced in the analysis because they are typical geoac-
tivist organizations (Gutiérrez 2018a).  
 
To examine how APSs behave, I draw on ‘Why the net is not a public sphere’ 
(Dean 2003). Particularly useful are Jodi Dean’s reflections on how the net cannot 
be considered a public sphere, but a set of democratic configurations that she calls 
‘neodemocracies’ (ibid., 105). Dean considers that the architecture of the public 
sphere is based on a set of components – specifically, site, goal and vehicle, as well 
as means and norms (2003, 96). I take this idea further to highlight facets of the 
APSs (see Table 1). 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is not to compare the public sphere and Dean’s 
neodemocracies, but to contribute to a theory of data activism, a relatively 
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unexplored phenomenon. Therefore, the theoretical comparison provided in this 
paper is a heuristic exercise for enlarging the concept of the APS in data activism. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this section, some of the central concepts and theories mobilized for this study 
are explored and put in the context of data activism, including Dean’s neodemoc-
racies (2003), Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere and its criticism, James Bohman’s 
electronic public space (2004), Nancy Fraser’s counterpublics (1990), and the the-
ory of dataveillance (Poell, Kennedy and Dijck 2015). A brief comparison of the 
public sphere, the neodemocracies and the APSs is offered, which is explored in 
the next section. 
 
According to Dean, the Habermasian public sphere arises in the nation, is aimed 
at consensus, abides by the rules of inclusivity, equality, transparency and rational-
ity, and revolves around actors (2003). Meanwhile, Dean’s internet-based neo-
democracies aim at contestation, happen on the web via networked conflict occur-
ring within the canons of duration, hegemony, decisiveness and credibility, and 
emerge around issues (ibid.). The concepts emerging from this taxonomy are em-
ployed here probingly to observe the APSs generated by data activism. 
 
I do not entirely subscribe to Dean’s criticism of the Habermasian understanding 
of the public sphere. Dean’s criticism does not take into consideration how the 
concept of the public sphere has evolved in Habermas’s thinking. Habermas up-
dated it, suggesting that ‘a cosmopolitan matrix of communication’ could make a 
‘world public sphere’ possible (Habermas 1996, 514), decoupling the public sphere 
from the nation. Therefore, when I uphold the idea that the public sphere is linked 
to the nation, I am referring to Dean’s critique. 
 
Besides, the Habermasian public sphere is not as placid as Dean portrays it, since 
it also deals with struggle and is intended for action. In the public sphere, discourse 
commences once there is a problem and actors can contest each other’s validity 
claims (Habermas 2006, 413). In fact, the public sphere is the place where differ-
ences are settled by reason, and not by war (Negt and Kluge 1993, ix). Likewise, 
when I mention consensus as the goal of the public sphere, I am using Dean’s 
views. 
 
One of Dean’s criticisms is that adding an ‘s’ to the concept does not save it, because 
groups either share the same norms (and therefore are a public in Habermasian 
terms) or they do not (and therefore are not a public) (Dean 2003, 97). 
 
This distinction does not apply easily to the APSs created by data activism. APSs 
may share the same norms, underlying values and solidarity, but their evanescence 
makes them plural and ad hoc. They are similar to Stefania Milan’s karst river 
movements, which remain dormant, reappearing when conditions require it (2013), 
while their members feel part of the same movement and principles (Grabowski 
2012). They match Donatella della Porta’s and Mario Diani’s description of a net-
work organisation combining formality (i.e. norms) with elements typical of a dis-
tributed network, based on the independence of single components which adapt 
and change as the occasion demands (2006, 159). 
 
Dean’s taxonomy arranges the features of the public sphere and the neodemocracies 
into boxes whose boundaries blur once you look more closely at them. Conscious 
that any classification is arbitrary, I employ Dean’s taxonomy as a heuristic tool for 
reflecting on data activism.  
 
Thus, APSs’ frame of reference is the local and the global concurrently (not the 
national or the web), since they are ‘transnational,’ in Bohman’s terms (2004). They 
are directed at action (not solely at consensus, as Dean asserts for the public 
sphere), and are established around conflicts (not actors or simple issues). 
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Table 1: Comparing the public sphere, neodemocracies and APSs 
 
 Public 
Sphere 
Neo- 
democracies 
APSs 
SITE Nation Web Local/global 
GOAL Consensus 
(legitimiza-
tion) 
Contestation Action (via consensus) 
VEHICLE Actors Issues Crises and problems 
MEANS Procedures 
(legal,  
national) 
Networked 
conflict 
Networked coordination 
(via procedures) 
NORMS Inclusivity 
Equality 
Transparency 
Rationality 
Duration 
Hegemony 
Decisiveness 
Credibility 
Inclusivity and evanescence 
Equal access 
Transparency 
Credibility 
 
Source: Elaboration by the author based on Dean (2003, 108). 
 
This new taxonomy allows me to make some observations about how APSs behave. 
 
Other authors’ arguments, compatible or not, are employed later in this paper for 
thinking about APSs, although the intention is not to subscribe to any theory of 
the public sphere. 
 
For example, Bohman’s reflection on ‘a new kind of public sphere’ that emerges in 
the era of ‘electronic democracy’ (2004, 131) is useful. Bohman acknowledges that 
an ‘electronic public space’ – understood as a computer-mediated, Internet-enabled 
communication — may have the potential of generating a ‘novel public sphere,’ 
enlarging the scope of ‘certain features of communicative interaction across space 
and time,’ especially when applied to ‘deliberative transnationalism’ (2004, 132-
151). 
 
Data activism could be considered an enhanced variety of activism in that it is 
enabled by a cutting-edge form of technology (i.e. the data infrastructure), and 
data activists often use the Internet as a platform for disseminating information 
(together with other information and communication technologies or ICTs). 
Bohman’s viewpoints are therefore interesting for considering how data activism 
employs technology to generate novel public sphere(s) for transnational advocacy 
and humanitarianism. 
 
This article draws too on Fraser’s look at marginalized groups excluded from the 
public sphere, and the formation of their post-bourgeois public spheres as ‘subal-
tern counterpublics,’ overcoming a ‘hegemonic’ mode of domination (1990, 61-62). 
These groups generate counterpublics, or ‘parallel discursive arenas,’ to develop and 
circulate ‘counter-discourses,’ which present alternative ‘interpretations of their 
identities, interests and needs’ (ibid., 67). 
 
Although there is a difference between Fraser’s bottom-up counterpublics and the 
spaces generated by proactive data activism, her conceptualization is useful here 
too. In 2008, four volunteering techies and bloggers, who could hardly be described 
as ‘marginalized’ in spite of being ‘repressed,’ launched the first deployment of the 
Ushahidi platform. 
 
This first application was set up to bypass an information shutdown during the 
bloodbath that arose after the presidential elections in Kenya a year earlier, and to 
give voice to the anonymous victims. The deployment allowed victims to dissemi-
nate alternative narratives about the post-electoral violence. Since then, other ap-
plications have been set up by campaigners, organizations and digital humanitarians 
in every major disaster not only to visualize what is happening but also to assist 
people affected in real time, offering some ‘expectation of a response’ and opening 
a ‘space for interaction,’ in Bohman’s words (2004, 135). Namely, the APSs of data 
activism could be considered subaltern in that they are parallel discursive arenas 
where people disseminate counter-discourses in opposition to top-down narratives 
and approaches. 
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This paper also takes into account the backdrop in which proactive data activism 
emerges, which includes the datafication process – that is, computing aspects of 
life that had never been quantified before (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 
78) — and the massive collection of data by governments and corporations, giving 
rise to ‘computational politics’ (Tufekci 2012), what Braman calls the panspectron 
(2009, 314) or dataveillance (Poell, Kennedy and Dijck 2015). Dataveillance em-
ploys ‘the massive flows of data circulating between devices, institutions, industries 
and users’ for ‘new and troubling practices’ (ibid.). Reactive data activism, a front-
runner of data activism, emerges precisely in answer to this data-gathering and 
intrusion (Milan and Gutiérrez 2015).  
 
Labels employed in this paper are derived from Gutiérrez (2018a), where eleven 
attributes observed in forty data initiatives (i.e. how collaborative a concrete organ-
ization is), thirty semi-structured interviews with data activists, practitioners and 
experts, and four in-depth interviews with Ushahidi developers and deployers were 
the basis for a non-normative taxonomy employed in examining proactive data ac-
tivism (ibid.). According to this classification, proactive data activists can be cate-
gorized as: skills transferrers, focused on transferring data or social science skills, 
forging opportunities for alliances and generating digital platforms and tools for 
data activism; ‘catalysts’ who chiefly fund data projects; activists who produce data 
journalism, when news media organizations are not willing or capable of doing so; 
and the actual data activists and geoactivists (ibid.).  
 
The ability of some proactive data activist initiatives to generate APSs is the pivotal 
idea in this paper. Happening both locally and globally across borders (site), aiming 
at action (goal) and gathered as a temporary network around the crisis caused by 
the earthquake (vehicle), ‘Ayuda Ecuador’ is an example of how data activism can 
generate temporary spaces for dialogue and action.  
 
The ‘deployers’ at ‘Ayuda Ecuador’ included several organizations from different 
countries, supported by four experts: Luis Hernando Aguilar, on knowledge man-
agement; Byron Herrera, on software development; Estela Navarrete, on mobile 
software development; and Angela Oduor, from Ushahidi (Ayuda Ecuador 2016). 
The application connected them and other digital humanitarians with victims (re-
porters) generating data via the crowdsourcing platform, and traditional humani-
tarian agencies, using the resulting information on the ground. For almost three 
weeks, these three communities – that is, deployers, reporters and humanitarian 
workers — ‘met’ in the public space generated by the platform to agree, make 
decisions and coordinate actions. 
 
The theory of the public sphere is employed here to analyze these spaces. It was 
Habermas who described the public sphere’s emergence in the 17th and 18th cen-
turies as space where a communicative action leads to mutual understanding (Ha-
bermas 1984, 17–18). However, Habermas was criticized for having created too 
abstract a model, and for having bypassed some challenges, such as the exclusion 
of women and men from the lower classes, and the heterogeneity of the public 
(Webster 2006, 163–68; Calhoun 1992).  
 
Nevertheless, the idea of the public sphere has been revived with the emergence of 
ICTs, the ‘networked information economy’ (Benkler 2006, 212), and the data in-
frastructure — including databases, algorithms, servers and systems needed to ob-
tain, curate, analyze and visualize data (Gutiérrez and Milan 2017) —, due to the 
fact that these technologies appear to augment opportunities for interaction and 
debate (Rheingold 2002; Papacharissi 2002; Benkler 2006). Habermas himself re-
viewed the concept, suggesting that ‘a world public sphere’ could become possible 
(1996, 514). 
 
However, in the ‘network society’ (Castells 2010b), the public sphere does not re-
main intact. The rise of ‘digital contention’ generates a ‘structural transformation 
of the public sphere,’ where access, participation and communication ‘are con-
stantly redefined and renegotiated’ in ‘multiple arenas‘ (Celikates 2015, 14). 
 
This revival, again, met with more criticism. Distinctions between the bourgeois 
and proletarian public sphere (Negt and Kluge 1993), national and translational 
publics (Bohman 2004), the Habermasian public sphere and the ‘networked public 
sphere’ (Friedland, Hove, and Rojas 2006), as well as discussions about whether 
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the concept of the public sphere could be applied to the net (Dean 2003) and social 
media (Fuchs 2013) ensued, leading the debate towards ‘opposing assessments’ 
(Bohman 2004, 132). 
 
For Lewis A. Friedland, Thomas Hove and Hernando Rojas, the ‘centrality of net-
works’ demands revisions of the public sphere (2006, 5). These authors argue that 
the ‘networked public sphere’ presents challenges to the public sphere in that it 
raises questions about the structure of communicative action, as the institutions of 
socialization are now networked, transforming ‘core forms of intersubjective com-
munication and sociation’ (ibid., 24).  
 
Echoing Oskar Negt’s and Alexander Kluge’s proletarian public sphere, Christian 
Fuchs critiques ‘the contemporary web’ and social media as false emancipatory pub-
lic spheres because they are dominated by capitalist interests (2013). He adopts the 
notion of ‘proletarian counter-public sphere’ as a ‘radically different’ public sphere 
(Fuchs 2010, 176).  
 
Concurring, Dean notes that the net is ‘the architecture for communicative capi-
talism, both as order establishing itself and as an order being resisted’ (2003, 105). 
The online presence of activists supports her arguments that resistance and discord 
are the goals of the web (ibid.). There is a different way to look at it. The data 
infrastructure embeds several forms of bias, discrimination and asymmetry, which 
do not disappear when activists use it for their causes (Gutiérrez 2018a, 2018b). 
However, I do not think that these contradictions annul the APSs’ power to foster 
democratic participation; they simply reflect the complexity of our world, where 
simultaneous, often clashing, phenomena happen. 
 
Having framed the discussion, what follows is an analysis of the comparison be-
tween the public sphere, the neodemocracies, and the APSs. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Tensions of the Site, the Goal and the Vehicle 
 
Data activism imposes tensions on the public sphere. The following section dwells 
on them, paying particular attention to three strains (site, goal and vehicle), which 
are mainly significant because they present the most noteworthy differences be-
tween the public sphere, the neodemocracies, and the new APSs. 
 
 
The Tension of the Site 
 
Several communities typically convene when launching a Ushahidi deployment 
tackling a crisis: the group of expert ‘digital humanitarians’ (Meier 2015a) setting 
up and supporting the deployment remotely; the people affected by the disaster or 
violence, who contribute their data and use the information; and the humanitarian 
workers, responding to the crisis. 
 
The first group can be based on different geographic locations, taking advantage of 
the ‘space of flows,’ which allows real-time social practices to happen simultane-
ously (Castells 1992, 2010a). The second and third groups operate locally, on the 
ground, and globally, when they communicate in the APSs generated by the plat-
form. ‘Ayuda Ecuador’ offers an example: ‘locals’ (i.e. on-the-ground humanitarian 
personnel and reporters) and experts from different parts of the world (i.e. the 
digital humanitarians) create a space where they can discuss and coordinate actions. 
 
According to Dean, the public sphere occurs in the nation, while the neodemoc-
racies are situated on the web (ibid., 108); meanwhile, the new APSs happen both 
locally and globally, all at once. During the Enlightenment, the public sphere sur-
faced in the salons of England, France and Germany, a neutral arena of critique 
against the absolute power of royals (Habermas 1991, 33-34). The conceptions that 
Habermas mobilized initially to examine the bourgeois public sphere (i.e. ‘State,’ 
‘Church,’ ‘aristocracy’ and ‘royalty,’ among others) cannot be fully appreciated out-
side the framework of the nation.  
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Meanwhile, Dean states that neodemocracies – understood as democratic configu-
rations which are organized through contestation (2003, 108) — happen on the 
web, a place of conflict and antagonism, where differences ‘emerge, mutate, link 
up into and through networks’ (ibid., 105-106). 
 
Instead, the communities that engage in initiating an Ushahidi deployment inter-
act in a space where the local and the global intersect via the web or other com-
munication systems (i.e. mobile phones). 
 
As with neodemocracies, the concept of the nation limits the way proactive data 
activism can be theorized. In proactive data activism, a global interaction seeks local 
effects. The nation can be an element in the offline aspects of proactive data activ-
ism (i.e. the level of freedom of speech of the country where the crisis happens), 
but it is not determining. For instance, the first Ushahidi deployment in Kenya 
managed to bypass national restrictions and to impose an alternative narrative 
thanks to a synchronized, collaborative effort. 
 
 
The Tension of the Goal 
 
APSs are created for tangible action. The interactive mapping employed by Usha-
hidi, for example, depicts different layers of information in diverse formats (i.e. 
images, graphs, text). These strata are provided by reporters and deployers (i.e. 
where and when ‘water purification and sanitation’ services are offered on the 
‘Ayuda Ecuador’ map) so that others can use them. Namely, verified reports about 
where water purification and sanitation services are available, and for how long, are 
offered so people can act on them. 
 
Another example is the geoactivist initiative ‘Rede InfoAmazonia,’ which offers 
actionable information on the quality and quantity of the Amazon river’s water and 
issues warnings, so the communities in the West of Pará, Brazil, can make decisions 
in their daily lives (Rede InfoAmazonia 2016). ‘Rede InfoAmazonia’ is based on a 
system of connected sensors that capture data based on physical and chemical 
parameters, which produces cartography, data and notifications via mobile tech-
nologies when the water indicators exceed or go below boundaries of normality 
(ibid.).  
 
Ushahidi largely engages in crisis mapping, increasing the efficiency in response to 
humanitarian emergencies, while InfoAmazonia often deals with activist mapping, 
generating data and empowering communities for participating in decision-making 
processes. Occasionally, data activism engages in contest (which places it closer to 
Dean’s neodemocracies). That is, crisis mapping is the art of visualizing citizen 
reports on a map during a crisis to enhance humanitarianism, whereas activist map-
ping is more focused on galvanizing communities and gathering bodies of evidence 
that can be used for advocacy (Gutiérrez 2018a). 
 
Consequently, the idea of proactive data activism should be regarded here as a broad 
grouping that embraces cases with multiple goals related to action, but not all of 
them are considered in this article. 
 
Habermas regarded the public sphere initially as a locus of rational discussion aimed 
at understanding (Habermas 1991). In the public sphere ‘everybody’ gets a chance 
to talk and to be listened to. That is why Dean considers that the Habermasian 
public sphere’s goal is principally consensus; in contrast, contestation is what neo-
democracies aim at (Dean 2003, 109). A democratic theory built around the notion 
of issue networks aiming at struggle recognizes that antagonism is what gives de-
mocracy ‘its political strength’ (ibid., 111).  
 
Meanwhile, the APSs generated by proactive data activism exhibit a propositive 
teleological pragmatism, as seen in crisis and activist mapping. This makes proac-
tive data activist initiatives ephemeral: they are created only as a response to a crisis 
or to an issue perceived as problematic, which they seek to highlight, elucidate and 
even solve. When the difficulty disappears (or the deployment fails), these initia-
tives tend to fade as well, in the same way as collective action sometimes remains 
concealed and resurfaces only when the conditions are auspicious, mimicking a 
karst river (Milan 2013, 137–68). 
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The Tension of the Vehicle 
 
The crisis or problem that the data-activist endeavor is tackling is the vehicle, if 
‘vehicle’ is to be thought as the trigger for the formation of the APS. However, 
actors are as significant in the APSs as in the public sphere, giving good reason 
why they deserve some attention here too. 
 
As with citizens’ media, proactive data activism places people at the forefront of 
content production (Rodríguez 2001, 20). In ‘Rede InfoAmazonia,’ local commu-
nities generate data via sensors, contribute to their interpretation and use the re-
sulting information to make decisions. Their data agency is enhanced when the 
datafication process – typically the monopoly of governments and corporations — 
is reversed. Thus, these communities’ ‘routine association’ with automatized data 
collection is transformed (Milan and Gutiérrez 2015, 130). 
 
In the case of crisis mapping, actors include deployers, reporting victims and hu-
manitarian workers. These three communities are fundamental. Useful crisis map-
ping cannot occur without credible deployers, eager reporting witnesses (reporters) 
and collaborating humanitarian workers. The challenge in crowdsourcing data does 
not come from its technical sophistication, but from the convening power of the 
project. For instance, hundreds of Ushahidi deployments have failed due to the 
absence of people submitting reports from the ground, transforming maps into 
‘dead maps’ (Vota 2012). Likewise, the failure of some Ushahidi deployments to 
engage humanitarian forces on the ground has led to hiccups as well (Keim 2012).  
 
Actors in APSs are significant in more ways because they can include marginalized 
people, making APSs close to Fraser’s counterpublics (1990, 61). For example, the 
Ushahidi deployment in Haiti in 2010 offered visibility and decision-making power 
to the victims affected by the earthquake. Another example is InfoAmazonia’s ‘An-
nual cycles of the indigenous peoples of the Rio Toque’ project, which 
crowdsources and visualizes information from indigenous people (Cardoso 2015). 
However, APSs can be considered counterpublics, up to a point. Even if some 
deployers are victims themselves, there are apparent power asymmetries between 
the tech-savvy deployers, building and managing the platform, and the data report-
ers, merely using it under predetermined conditions. 
 
Nonetheless, actors are not the vehicle for APSs. Without the emergency or con-
flict, the APS do not make any sense. The vehicle for proactive data activism is, 
then, the crisis or problem at hand, and the nature of data activist projects is tele-
ological.  
 
Proactive data activism can be seen as an instance of collective action triggered by 
conflicts and problems, which then deploys unconventional means – specifically, 
the data infrastructure used critically – to deal with them.  
 
In contrast, in the public sphere actors are the vehicle. They are conceptualized as 
rational beings that make coherent choices, based on reason (Habermas 1984, 89-
93). As said, the public sphere has been challenged from many fronts, one of them 
questioning who can be an actor because the bourgeois public sphere was an elitist 
island for educated, propertied, white men. Its character was ‘equal’ only for the 
privileged few, but ‘exclusionary’ for others (Calhoun 1992, 223).  
 
Dean states that a democratic theory built around the notion of issue networks can 
avoid this ‘fantasy of unity’ (2003, 107). In fact, the neodemocracies are focused on 
issues because the web is structured by networks formed around issues (ibid., 110-
111). Although actors are ‘always embedded in networks,’ they are replaceable be-
cause networks’ configuration continuously changes as players enter or leave them 
(Dean 2003, 108), realizing forms of autopoiesis, ‘or network-based self-organiza-
tion’ (Friedland, Hove, and Rojas 2006). In a Ushahidi deployment, for example, 
roles are static while people can change responsibilities or move in and out of the 
APS. 
 
Looking at the element of the vehicle, APSs seem closer to neodemocracies than 
to the public sphere in that they are characteristically triggered by (problematic) 
issues and not actors. However, while any neodemocratic network can be gathered 
around any issue, any problem will not trigger a proactive data endeavor. 
Data activism in Light of the Public Sphere 
Miren Gutiérrez 
 Krisis 2018, Issue 1 
Data Activism 
www.krisis.eu  
64 
 
 
Whether an issue is catastrophic or problematic enough (or perceived as such) de-
pends on different factors. Droughts, for example, are amongst the most deadly 
disasters regarding the loss of lives (Live Science 2013), but because they often 
occur over long periods in far-away developing countries, most droughts get a frac-
tion of the coverage that any hurricane receives in rich countries (Tzvetkova 2017). 
Meanwhile, public attention, media reach and emotion are essential in any success-
ful Ushahidi deployment, since they require a high degree of buy-in among actors. 
 
 
Other Tensions 
 
The new APSs stand in contrast to both the bourgeois public sphere and Dean’s 
neodemocracies; but the lines which separate them become more imprecise when 
looking at their means and norms. 
 
The means mobilized by APSs is networked coordination, while the public sphere 
is only possible through procedures, and neodemocracies ‘open up opportunities 
for (networked) conflict’ (Dean 2003, 108). 
 
Networked coordination works within the APS through the formation of tempo-
rary networks for action, triggered by the conflict or problem and glued together 
by solidarity and values, enacting a ‘logic of aggregation’ as they assemble individ-
uals from diverse backgrounds (Juris 2012). While the deployment lasts, the de-
ployers become digital humanitarians, a collective category that groups people of 
different backgrounds, ranks and nationalities. 
 
However, the ‘diversity of individualized actors’ imposes stress on the sustainability 
of the effort (Juris 2012, 261). In fact, the need for an unremitting exertion inflicts 
a strain within the APSs of crisis mapping. Volunteer burnout is, for example, a 
problem in humanitarian emergencies, since they can last for months, demanding 
a sustained determination and long hours. It is not the individual that guarantees 
results but the network, which is resilient because their elements are disposable. 
In that way, data activist organizations resemble the flexible networks described by 
della Porta and Diani (2006). 
 
From the perspective of norms, the APSs are ruled by inclusivity and evanescence, 
equal access, transparency and credibility. This places them halfway between the 
public sphere, whose rules are inclusivity, equality, transparency and rationality, 
and the neodemocracies, governed by duration, hegemony, decisiveness and credi-
bility (Dean 2003, 108).  
 
Where the public sphere is regulated by ‘inclusivity’ in Habermasian terms, the 
neodemocracies value duration (Dean 2003, 109). But for APSs duration makes no 
sense, since they exist only while the conflict or problem persists. APSs get con-
stantly activated and discontinued, and a conditioned ‘inclusivity’ is essential for 
generating the crowds, networks and communities that keep them alive.  
 
Paradoxically, ‘inclusion’ in crisis mapping is delimited by the rules determining 
that actors must belong to one of the three communities necessary to launch a 
deployment. But for Bohman, ‘any social exclusion undermines the existence of a 
public sphere’ (2004, 134). To think about the inclusion of the APSs, this concept 
must be qualified.  
 
The APSs are inclusive, but they establish boundaries for inclusion. Ushahidi de-
ployments create spaces for equal participation with concrete rules: anybody can 
become a digital humanitarian, but they need to register, declare their abilities and 
potential contributions to the crisis, and then follow guidelines to produce as much 
verified, actionable information as quickly as possible. These guidelines are not 
imposed from external actors in a higher hierarchical position, though, but as a 
result of internal, horizontal processes of evaluation (Gutiérrez 2018a). For the du-
ration of the deployment, the space is open to experts and non-experts, as long as 
they share the same objectives, can contribute time and comply with the rules. 
Then, it shuts down. 
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Volunteering experts are privileged people with access to technology; however, the 
APSs also include victims and vulnerable people. The only barrier to the victims’ 
mediated participation is their access to ICTs, especially mobile phones, which in 
the past few years has been growing [e.g. in 2008, with a population of over 39 
million people, Kenya had experienced a sharp growth in mobile technology pen-
etration, with more than 16 million subscribers (Oteri, Kibet, and Ndung’u 2015)]. 
In the case of InfoAmazonia’s ‘Annual cycles of the indigenous peoples of the Rio 
Toque’ project, participation is even more mediated. 
 
Therefore, APSs are ruled by impermanence and qualified inclusion. 
 
In the context of antagonism, ‘neodemocratic politics are struggles for hegemony’ 
(ibid. 110), and the public sphere is governed by the norm of equality. Meanwhile, 
the APSs are ruled by equal access. 
 
In Ushahidi deployments, for instance, all actors can participate in the decision-
making process: everyone has a parallel capacity of generating and accessing infor-
mation. 
 
However, equal access does not mean equality here. There are three primary power 
asymmetries that can be observed in crisis mapping. First, by verifying the infor-
mation reported by witnesses, deployers turn into gatekeepers of what is public in 
an APS. Namely, they are placed in a higher echelon. Second, although victims can 
include deployers, being a deployer is not as dangerous as being a witness or a 
conventional humanitarian worker, and there is an abyss of difference between 
working on a disaster remotely and confronting the physical conditions of an emer-
gency on the ground. Third, the reports that are published by the deployment can 
expose, and have exposed, the victims’ and the human rights defenders’ wherea-
bouts, activities and networks, endangering them in situations of repression and 
violence (Hankey and Clunaigh 2013; Slater 2016). 
 
Another rule of the public sphere is transparency. But according to Dean, nowadays 
power is not hidden, so transparency does not need to be a goal. Echoing the 
concept of infoxication (Toffler 1984), Dean means here that, in the net, there is 
not a lack of information, but the opposite: an overload. ‘Fully aware that there is 
always more information and that this availability is ultimately depoliticizing, ne-
odemocratic politics prioritizes decisiveness’ (ibid.). 
 
But contrary to what Dean says, information is not always available, even when it 
is most needed such as in the case of disasters or emergencies. Snowden revelations 
in 2013 put an end to any illusions of transparency on the part of governments too 
(Castells 2015). 
 
APSs seek transparency when information is hidden, not as a final goal, but as a 
tool for action. Ushahidi’s first deployment was put in place precisely to break the 
news blockade by the Kenyan government and media. 
 
However, too much transparency can render victims vulnerable to being targeted. 
The use of the data infrastructure enables digital humanitarianism, but it also pro-
duces new risks for both humanitarian workers and witnesses, since their reports 
can disclose their location, actions and networks to the dataveillance machinery 
(Hankey and Clunaigh 2013, 536; Stottlemyre and Stottlemyre 2012, 12). Namely, 
data and metadata produced in data activism can be harvested by people in power 
to control and locate activists and witnesses (Burns 2014). That is why Ushahidi 
deployments do not usually open their data. 
 
Proactive data activism can also offer alternative narratives when the mainstream 
versions of reality are manipulated. An example is the ‘counter-mapping’ project 
set up by several communities in Indonesia in resistance to governmental initiatives 
to remap land and surrender it to companies (Radjawali and Pye 2015). Indigenous 
counter-mapping challenges the state power over maps, and its categorization of 
land uses (ibid., 4). This movement is currently testing ‘grassroots UAVs’ (Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles) to generate data, and strengthen people’s datasets and 
political actions (Meier 2015b). Again, the idea in data activism is not to produce 
transparency for transparency’s sake or to create awareness, but is aimed at action. 
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Finally, issue networks are ruled by credibility over rationality; in contrast, ration-
ality governs the public sphere (Dean 2003). The APSs look more like neodemo-
cratic networks since credibility and trust are vital to sustaining the crowd and the 
activist effort (Gutiérrez 2018a).  
 
The APSs are not ideal havens of cooperation and equality: power asymmetries 
exist within actors, and some glitches and oversights in real-life cases have created 
‘dead Ushahidi maps.’ However, the rules of the APSs imply that they have to be 
guided by: conditioned inclusivity and temporality, within a set of procedures; 
equal access, so actors can communicate and act; transparency, so unconventional 
data-based narratives are produced; and credibility, so buy-in and adhesion on the 
part of the actors involved in tackling a crisis are generated.  
 
 
Framing the New APSs 
 
Based on the observations made earlier, this section justifies why the sphere of 
communication and action created by data activism are called here ‘alternative dig-
ital public spheres,’ and also provides a broader context for the rise of data activism 
in the big data society. 
 
The APSs are ‘alternative’ because they engage alternative actors (i.e. non-experts, 
victims and vulnerable people) in producing counter-narratives, using technologies 
in unconventional ways (i.e. the data infrastructure employed critically), and some-
times altering power dynamics by reversing the monopoly of maps and the datafi-
cation process. Namely, they propose formats, actors and subjects outside the es-
tablished norms. 
 
They are ‘digital’ because they are enabled and constrained by the data infrastruc-
ture, that is, a digital infrastructure that allows the managing, sharing, storage and 
use of data. That is, they are digital because they are enabled by information, com-
munication and data technologies. 
 
The APSs conform to the rule of ‘publicness’ as a condition of the public sphere, 
defined by Bohman, although he talks about face-to-face interaction (2006, 134). 
In the APSs, there is little physical contact, but the ‘conversation’ is public not 
purely because it could be seen online by others but to the extent that it could be 
taken to address anyone, paraphrasing Bohman, (ibid.). That is, they are public 
because they are ‘the result of the social activities made by individuals sharing sym-
bolic representations and common emotions in publicness’ (Mateus 2011, 275). 
 
Data activism happens in the context of other social uses of the data infrastructure. 
It can be employed in two opposing ways: it can facilitate governmental and cor-
porate intrusion, manipulation and control, but it can also be a powerful tool for 
interaction, activism and social change. 
 
The unyielding datafication of all human activity has profound impacts. With big 
data and computational techniques, massive surveillance and manufacturing con-
sent is easier: it has moved from the ‘magnifying glasses and baseball bats’ of the 
20th century into ‘telescopes, microscopes and scalpels’ of the 21st century (Tufekci 
2012, 6).  
 
To be exact, employed as a scalpel, data infrastructure allows manipulators to en-
gage people on an individual basis. Before data infrastructure, social scientists an-
alyzed relevant samples of the universe they wanted to study and relied on surveys 
in which people said what they thought they did. With data infrastructure, social 
scientists now can examine what people do (Stephens-Davidowitz 2017). Data in-
frastructure enhances and quickens surveillance, makes it personal and renders it 
ubiquitous and surgical. Surveillance today involves ‘the ability to go beyond what 
is offered to the unaided senses and minds or what is voluntarily reported’ (Ball, 
Haggerty, and Lyon 2012, 26). 
 
But the ICTs and, lately, data have transformed activism too. The rise of the data 
infrastructure and massive surveillance prompted ‘reactive data activism,’ which 
employs the data infrastructure to shelter online interactions and communities 
from massive surveillance (Milan and Gutiérrez 2015, 127). With reactive data 
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activism, the infrastructure that makes it possible has become more accessible to 
the average user, ‘rapidly evolving from a peripheral, elitist form of activism to a 
diffused one, whereby also non-skilled users take part in the game’ (ibid.). 
 
Data infrastructure allows a zooming in and out of processes and places and can 
offer both the high-resolution landscape of a situation and a vision of the life of 
one single person at a given time (i.e. a request for help posted at ‘Ayuda Ecuador’). 
These capabilities are incorporated into the new APSs.  
 
The realization of the APSs is not free of contradictions. Differing from that which 
reactive data activists usually do, proactive data activists often resort to capitalist 
technologies, whose values they do not seem to share. Some of these technologies 
are based on business models that require the low production costs that only semi-
slave conditions and child labor afford (Amnesty International 2016, 29), and create 
environmental damage (Hogan and Roberts 2015). Proactive data activists typically 
turn to whatever tool is at hand – including Google Maps, mobile technology and 
other corporate inventions — to respond to a crisis (Gutiérrez 2018a). Other prob-
lematic issues include the power asymmetries and the failures that real cases of data 
activism accumulate. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The spaces for debate, consensus and networked action that are generated in pro-
active data activism can be theorized as public spheres, because they share some of 
their attributes: although proactive data activism’s final aim is action, it is articu-
lated by actors who interact and organize following procedures framed by ‘inclusiv-
ity,’ equal access and transparency. However, they do not resemble the bourgeois 
public sphere entirely. I have called them ‘alternative digital public spheres’ or APSs 
for short. Table 2 summarizes their qualities, which emerge in comparison with 
the public sphere and the neodemocracies. 
 
 
SITE:  
Local/global 
Global interaction in the space of flows with local effects (local 
dimension also in on-the-ground action). 
GOAL: 
Action  
Ø Consensus (which embeds an expectation of response) is a 
tool for action; 
Ø crisis mapping’s aim is tackling emergencies and activist 
mapping’s is to enhance advocacy and empower commu-
nities. 
VEHICLE: 
Crises  
and problems 
Ø APSs can bypass information blockades, generate alterna-
tive narratives and counter-maps, and revert datafication; 
Ø emergencies can trigger crisis mapping and social prob-
lems, activist mapping;  
Ø although not the vehicle, actors are important, citizens are 
placed at the forefront of production, marginalized people 
can get empowered and some roles are fundamental in cri-
sis mapping. 
MEANS:  
Networked  
coordination 
Ø APSs behave like decentralized network organizations, 
where roles are static (i.e. crisis mapping), while concrete 
individuals are expendable;  
Ø a sustained effort over time strains the endeavor, but net-
works are resilient. 
NORMS:  
Inclusivity,  
evanescence,  
equal access,  
transparency,  
credibility 
Ø Norms come from the network, not imposed in top-down 
processes; 
Ø APSs emerge with an built-in obsolescence; 
Ø they are ruled by conditioned inclusivity; 
Ø their equal access (not equality) is framed by asymmetries 
(in the roles and rules, in the level of danger and because 
victims can be exposed); 
Ø transparency is a tool (like consensus), which can generate 
disruptions, but too much transparency can be dangerous 
for victims/reporters; 
Ø without credibility, data activist initiatives fail. 
 
Table 2: The alternative digital public spheres. Elaboration by the author. 
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What follows is an explanation of Table 2. APSs generated by data activism have 
lost the nation as a reference because they are located both in the local and the 
global, taking advantage of the space of flows. The action coordinated globally in 
the APSs has local consequences. In crisis mapping, for instance, the local deter-
mines the conditions in which victims can report, and humanitarian workers can 
use the information on the ground. 
 
Actors in the APSs seek consensus, but this accord embeds an expectation of a 
response and is used as an instrument for action. The two main varieties of geoac-
tivism, crisis mapping and activist mapping, are targeted at action, although the 
former’s aim is tackling emergencies (short-termed action,) and the latter is de-
ployed to generate evidence for advocacy and empower communities (medium- and 
long-termed action). In APSs there is a difference between the local and the na-
tional. For example, disasters may affect vulnerable people in remote rural areas 
more than others living in cities of the same country. Also, catastrophes do not 
respect national frontiers. 
 
APSs are formed around conflicts and problems they seek to address, and some-
times they bypass information blockades and generate alternative narratives and 
counter-discourses. They can allow ordinary people to generate their own data on 
their own terms, reversing the datafication process, which is typically the monopoly 
of governments and corporations. Emergencies can trigger crisis mapping, which 
is the geolocation of citizen data to assist humanitarian efforts, while activist map-
ping can be activated by social causes. Although not the vehicle, actors are essential 
in APSs: citizens are placed at the forefront of content production; disenfranchised 
people are at the decision-making table, which empowers them and enhances their 
agency; and some roles are fundamental in crisis mapping, for example. 
 
APSs are managed by decentralized, networked coordination in which roles are 
static, while individuals are expendable. Although a sustained effort over time can 
impose strains on the actors supporting the APSs, it can be overcome by the resil-
ience of the network. 
 
The norms that rule APSs come from the network, that is, they are not imposed 
in top-down processes by external actors. APSs in data-activist initiatives are fluid 
and short-lived, embedding a built-in obsolescence because they arise in the face 
of finite emergencies and problems. Another rule governing APSs is conditioned 
inclusivity, which allows the participation of anyone, as long as he or she follows 
the guidelines, for example, to produce verified reports during crises. However, 
this equal access (not equality) embeds some asymmetries. In the case of crisis 
mapping, for example, deployers act as gatekeepers of verified reports, victims and 
humanitarian workers often face dangerous situations, and victims can be exposed 
by the APS. Transparency, another rule, is employed in the APS as a tool and can 
generate disruptions when it becomes evident that, for example, news media or-
ganizations are not doing their jobs. However, too much transparency can be dan-
gerous for victims reporting data about their situations. Finally, credibility, needed 
to generate buy-in, ensures the success of the data-activist initiative. 
 
But exactly as is the public sphere, the APSs are a construct. They are offered here 
as a heuristic concept for understanding how proactive data activism raises net-
worked communities of individuals from a diverse background, sometimes based 
in remote locations, for coordinated action. APSs, in which actors work in perfect 
harmony towards results, are never to be found in real life, as actual-life imple-
mentations discussed in this paper demonstrate.  
 
What real cases show is that, with enhanced data-based capabilities, activism can 
unleash processes of real communication conducive to action. APSs also provide 
another turn of the screw in the theoretical debate about the validity of the public 
sphere as a concept today. 
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Introduction 
 
Data are often framed as tools of organized, entrenched power. The etymology of 
the word “statistics” reveals its origins as an aspect of the operation of the state, 
and it has traditionally been states, bureaucracies, and large capitalist enterprises 
that accumulate and manage through data, and especially through digital infor-
mation-processing technologies. Indeed, since the 1960s, the dominant models of 
organizational action have been information-processing models (Simon 1997). 
Data, then, have largely lived within these centers of power and indeed have been 
thought of largely as consolidating that power. 
 
To some extent, though, recent shifts have challenged this status quo. While most 
data sets remain located exactly where they were—in centers that have the capacity 
to produce, analyze, and make use of data—technical developments, such as the 
burgeoning capacity for information processing in the hands of everyday users, and 
social developments, such as transparency initiatives and movements advocating for 
more public access to data and data literacy, have begun to put similar kinds of big 
data and data processing tools in the hands of individual citizens, grassroots organ-
izations, activist groups, and others engaged in what we might broadly class as “data 
activism.” This offers the potential for new forms of activism and a reconfiguration 
of power relations – the opportunity for forms of “sousveillance” to counter the 
“surveillance” at the heart of data-driven governance, for example. 
 
We ask, what happens when these new opportunities must be enacted in the richer 
textures of practical organizations, and how do actors and activists resolve the ten-
sions and frictions that shape the contexts of their action? In this paper, we exam-
ine the practical realities of everyday data activism in urban governance, with a 
particular focus on the ways in which people balance the activist ideals and insti-
tutional mechanisms of their daily work. In so doing, we seek to unpack notions 
of “activism” itself and identify within it multiple different moments, functions, 
and positions individuals may adopt for achieving activist goals and for opening up 
opportunities for others. Our argument draws on material from an ongoing re-
search investigation into civic data work. For the last ten months, the first author 
has been conducting ethnographic fieldwork with an official urban data team. This 
team sits in the office of the mayor of one of the largest cities on the West coast 
of the United States. Our ongoing study looks at the practical, day-to-day work of 
the data team, including advocacy work (articulating and communicating the value 
of open data and extending data capabilities, both internally to departments and 
externally to the public), organizational work (including formulating, running, and 
publicizing specific data-driven initiatives, and developing and maintaining collab-
orative relationships with other parts of city government), and technical work 
(working with the city’s legacy systems, and cleaning, regularizing, publishing, and 
maintaining data sets). Through participant observation, it becomes apparent that 
many of the grand notions surrounding the revolutionary power of big data for 
both social justice aims, or for the reinvention of the bureaucracy, occur incremen-
tally, collectively, and non-linearly, in the quotidian moments of data work. Here, 
the ambivalences and contested dynamics of fields of activist action become more 
prominent. 
 
The data team itself comprises a range of diversely skilled individuals who evince 
(in casual conversations, presentations, and formal mission statements alike) a 
strong individual and collective concern with open government and the value of 
Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Activism: Data Organizing Inside the 
Institution 
Leah Horgan and Paul Dourish 
 Krisis 2018, Issue 1 
Data Activism 
www.krisis.eu  
73 
 
 
data. They see open access to data as a site for accessible and equitable city services, 
enhanced quality of life for all citizens, and deeper forms of citizen engagement 
across the range of city government functions. Some members of the data team 
consider themselves data activists, or at the very least more on the “radical” side of 
the civil servant ethos, as stated by the chief data officer in conversation with a 
social media platform research team in the planning of a forthcoming partnership. 
The actors leverage a variety of resources—such as county and state, or private, 
sources of data, as in the case of this collaboration—to achieve these “open” aims 
even as they work inside city government and within its practical limits. 
 
Drawing on Meyerson and Scully’s notion of “tempered radicals” (Meyerson and 
Scully 1995), we consider how the staff of municipal data offices, and other infor-
mal data workers, enact their own “more radical” agendas and forms of data activism 
while negotiating the complex dynamics and organizational structures of city gov-
ernments. This formulation encourages us to adopt a more nuanced approach to 
questions of power, activism, and resistance, one that focuses on the variety of 
configurations of “insider” and “outsider” perspectives, the complexities of meshing 
politics and practical action, the diversity of positions within the landscape of re-
sistance, and the ongoing daily encounter with the ambiguities of positionality. 
Our ethnographic work, then, provides a starting-point for a broader reconsidera-
tion of how politics and activism are enacted in practice. 
 
 
Data Activism, Organizing, and Ambivalence 
 
Exploring the political consequences of the contemporary spread of data-driven 
analytics, Milan and van der Velden (2016) describe data activism efforts as sup-
porting “the emergence of novel epistemic cultures within the realm of civil society, 
making sense of data as a way of knowing the world and turning it into a point of 
intervention and generation of data countercultures.” They suggest that data activ-
ism might even incite new populations of tech activists, stating:  
 
because datafication is such a prominent feature in public life, data activ-
ism, as a mode of dealing with it, might progressively appeal to more di-
verse communities of concerned citizens, beyond the expert niche of pre-
vious incarnations of tech activist engagement (Milan and van der Velden 
2016, 4). 
 
Milan and van der Velden describe the opportunity for activists to appropriate the 
technical tools of data analytics typically associated with sites of corporate power 
and municipal governance, and the opportunities that those tools provide both for 
holding such entities to account and for offering alternative accounts of matters of 
concern. Central to the authors’ concern is a notion of resistance, counter-hegem-
ony, or alterity – that is, the idea that the core of any activist position is its oppo-
sition to mainstream thought or to traditional power.  
 
However, as writers such as Turner (2006, 2013), amongst others, have noted, stark 
dividing lines and oppositional stances are not always so clear. Particularly in the 
domain of digital technology and its development, a complex interplay can be seen 
between mainstream culture and counter-culture “resistance.” This interplay re-
sults in complicated, hybrid contexts, such as former Merry Prankster Stewart 
Brand operating the camera for Douglas Englebart’s famous demonstration of his 
military-funded NLS project. Turner traces a complex lineage, reaching back to 
American anti-fascist movements, in which the distinctions between “conven-
tional” and “counter-cultural” positions are not always easy to discern.  
 
Noting that “politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms,” 
Chantal Mouffe (2013) has advanced a political philosophy focused on disagree-
ments, local tensions, and radical plurality. Perhaps most important for us here is 
the intricate texture of the forms of agonistic political relations that she explores, 
in which, again, no global orientations are easily sustainable in the face of a multi-
dimensional and multi-faceted series of local tensions and distinctions of position. 
In light of Mouffe’s thinking, any activism must always be read locally, as a rela-
tional matter, and as a matter of degree, allowing again for a complex internal 
polyvocality. Sometimes, this polyvocality reflects intersectional concerns and the 
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work involved in engaging in, and maintaining positions of, strategic essentialism 
in order to achieve particular political ends. Sometimes it speaks purely to the 
pragmatics of effecting action. 
 
In a recent episode of the Politically Reactive podcast series (Bell and Kondabolu 
2017), guest Patrisse Kahn-Cullors—one of the founders of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, and a decorated social organizer—spoke briefly on her role as an or-
ganizer. When one of the hosts queried why she identifies as an organizer instead 
of an activist, Kahn-Cullors answered that she works to make distinctions between 
the various critical roles in resistance movements, namely the activist and the or-
ganizer. The activist, to paraphrase, is the one who goes out and does the action, 
one such example being attending a protest. Conversely, the organizer lays the 
groundwork for there to be a protest in the first place, through planning, organiz-
ing, and networking. Kahn-Cullors states, that for her, activists are “super im-
portant” as “they sign the petition, they show up to the rally, they show up to the 
board meeting. But the organizer is the one who develops the petition, they are 
the ones who get the rally together, the ones that bring communities together so 
that activists can show up.” Both roles are critical in order for social change to take 
place.  
 
Within the revolutionary rhetoric of the digital, these pragmatic considerations 
and organizing efforts often go unrecognized. Tufekci (2017) draws attention to 
this oversight when discussing the role of digital technologies in supporting and 
organizing protest movements in sites such as Istanbul’s Gezi Park and Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square. While celebrating the power of social media to mobilize and connect 
large numbers of people in the absence of prior large-scale social infrastructure, she 
cautions that traditional protest movements build infrastructure slowly as they 
grow, and so are more likely, when decisive moments come, to already have in place 
the support structures necessary to, say, provide food, clothing, material assistance, 
and medical care to protesters. In enabling mass assembly without passing through 
the phase of building a community, movements grounded in social media risk fo-
cusing on the “activism” component of Kahn-Cullors’ construction without proper 
attention to the “organizer” role. 
Building on these analyses, we want to take a further step, moving from the or-
ganizational requirements of activism towards a consideration of the potential con-
figurations of activism in organizations more broadly. We see “activism” here as a 
complex set of practices and acts of positionality, encompassing many different 
kinds of work. Importantly, we aim to underscore a need to look at activism and 
social change at the scale of the micro negotiations of the everyday, while under-
standing their affects are neither discrete nor direct. Our field site is one where the 
data team members find themselves navigating and leveraging the uncertainty in 
large formal institutional structures undergoing change, working to effect social 
change, but charged too with the need to acknowledge limits and conditions upon 
that change. The questions that this paper attempts to open up is just how radi-
calism is “tempered,” in Meyerson and Scully’s (1995) terms, and how that shapes 
encounters with new understandings of data, particularly in terms of what new 
forms of data and data technologies can mean for social justice and urban govern-
ance. 
 
The budding forms of data collection and expression that we see in the data team 
(making data open, automated, and interoperable), provide new ways of knowing, 
or new knowledge, and along with them alternative methods for challenging he-
gemonies. We approach activism in this domain as a collective process. In reflecting 
on our own experiences at the study field site, we ask: how might those with more 
radical aims incorporate activist modes and ideals into the everyday operations of a 
large urban bureaucracy? What does it mean to do so at a politically volatile time? 
We focus on data activism as it is expressed in organizing roles, embodied by the 
ambivalent data activist. Here, we consider the productive ambivalence in everyday 
data work for understanding how uncertainty is leveraged to push activist ideals in 
a bureaucratic setting. The characteristics of this setting, along with the motiva-
tions of the individuals who inhabit it, allow for expressions of activist ideals and 
of “making sense of data as a way of knowing the world and turning it into a point 
of intervention” (Milan and van der Velden 2016, 1). 
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Possibilities in Being Data-driven 
 
The broader domain of this inquiry is the increasing turn to data-driven approaches 
in urban governance. Promising greater transparency, quality of life, and civic par-
ticipation, these data-driven approaches avow to more effectively and efficiently 
address complex social problems. While information objects have long been a key 
resource in the creation of systems, products, and policies that shape the world in 
which we live, this current movement—what many term a “data revolution”—
marks the advent of a new and forceful volume, variety, and velocity of data (Kitchin 
2014). Derived from sources such as citywide sensor systems and more pervasive 
online tracking through a myriad of personal devices, these new data assets engen-
der new forms of data curation and processing, along with a greater anticipation of 
new possibilities.  
 
Milan and van der Velden characterize the big data movement writ large as evoking 
“a broad set of socio-technical phenomena enveloped in quasi-mythological narra-
tives that univocally emphasize possibility and magnitude” (Milan and van der 
Velden 2016, 2). The “datification” of everything, from sleep habits to stock-bro-
kering to municipal sanitation services, emphasizes in particular the possibilities of 
better, faster, and more accurate decision making; these “better decisions” become 
the foundation for a more effective problem solving. This is owed in part to the 
seeming objectivity and representativeness located in big data’s near constant accu-
mulation and administering, as compared to earlier forms of quantification. This 
data-as-truth account is leveraged by data activists and the civic realm (citizens, 
civic technologists, and city staff) alike; each hope for data to more objectively 
expose entrenched injustices and enable equitable futures. 
 
The movement is not without its critics. Many are quick to point out that these 
new forms of data-driven decision-making may—much like extant forms of social 
rationalization—end up reinforcing both existing inequities and hegemonic inter-
ests (Kitchin 2014). There are certainly concerns that these novel tools will make 
and remake unjust futures and do so with greater potency. But while many have 
viewed the burgeoning enthusiasm around the possibilities of big data with 
skepticism, there exists a greater lot of researchers, corporations, technologists, and 
other technology users and data workers who encourage and normalize the poten-
tiality of big data. Such stakeholders have lent a legitimacy to this burgeoning 
movement, as exhibited by the increasing number of formal data positions and 
identities (such as the data scientist, the data janitor, the chief data officer, the data 
journalist, official city data teams, and so on); in fact, a current project of this urban 
data team is to expand the formal position titles and training tracks within the 
bureaucracy to “modernize the workforce,” encompassing more of such roles and 
skills.  
 
 
Context: Everyday Data Work  
 
The data workers in our study sit in the mayor’s office in one of the largest cities 
in the United States, with a population of well over one million and a city govern-
ment that employs about 40,000 people. Established in 2013—when many cities 
around the world were beginning to “open” data— this team is responsible for 
managing data assets and related technologies within and beyond city hall, for mak-
ing data visualizations and data dashboarding tools available to departments and 
citizens, and, most expressly, for motivating the city to be open and interoperable 
with their data practices for the making of data-driven decisions. This latter charge 
involves encouraging different departments, initiatives, and teams to work across 
otherwise siloed operations in order to utilize each other’s data, as well as other 
sources of public (county) and private data (via data warehousing services and tech 
companies). The aim here is to optimize data operations and engender a level of 
transparency whereby departments and citizens alike know how (and what) the city 
is performing.  
 
The team itself is comprised of a small but diversely skilled set of data enthusiasts 
who collect, clean, analyze, visualize, package, and promote data assets, techniques, 
and tools; much of this work occurs behind the face of a given initiative (e.g. re-
cently the team cleaned, visualized, and trained a group of city staffers working on 
domestic violence awareness and prevention). The professional and educational 
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backgrounds of these individuals run the gamut, spanning from software engineer-
ing and business analytics, to public policy and communications; together these 
skillsets forge the necessary work of accumulating, organizing, and communicating 
the city’s data. Whether it is a focus on equity, transparency, or environmental 
sustainability, each team member is invested in data-driven governance as a means 
to enhance the quality of life for city staff and the citizens they work for, to make 
the city more “livable” for all.  
 
The data with which they work are generated from a range of government func-
tions, including city services (e.g. tracking speed and distribution of graffiti cleanup 
or waste management), urban planning (e.g. measuring traffic, tracking affordable 
housing stock or the quality of paved lane-miles and sidewalks), and economic 
development (e.g. understanding local business needs, or the landscape of employ-
ment opportunities in the growing tech industry). In the best cases, this means 
that data from numeric tables in static spreadsheets will be moved to a system (via 
sensing or scraping) that automatically collects and updates standardized data re-
currently, whereby the data sources have defined “owners” and all necessary 
metadata, and in some cases universal IDs (categories that work across all opera-
tions in the city). 
 
Opening and activating new streams of data, then—especially all-encompassing, 
continuously accumulating data—requires a lot of organizing. Organizing toward 
transparency can be a challenge in a bureaucratic institution for a variety of reasons, 
not least of which is the fact that making governing processes transparent creates 
new accountabilities that departments may not yet have the bandwidth to address. 
While there was indeed an executive mandate to open data and become both more 
open and more data driven, there is little direction on how this should work in 
practice, or how to define success. Thus, there is much uncertainty surrounding 
the open data movement at the sites of actual instantiation, especially with regard 
to authority, accountability, and even the very definition of data work.  
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty, Bureaucracy, and a Tempered Approach 
 
A bureaucratic setting may not be the first that comes to mind when looking for 
examples of data (or any form of) activism or radical thinking. However, through 
leveraging contingency and ambiguity in day-to-day workflows, and by embodying 
the position of the “tempered radical” within those areas whereby a given bureau-
cratic staff member maintains both an authentic activist self as well as a professional 
position self, opportunities to exercise activist aims arise.  
 
In The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Michael Crozier (1964) outlines a theory of power 
and uncertainty, particularly the important role of the latter in enabling agency as 
well as stabilizing conflict (if one is to bend rules or exploit uncertainty, it is im-
portant that organizational homeostasis remains a possibility). Crozier offers a 
broad study of a French monopoly where automation is not able to fully rationalize 
work or action, and he characterizes the ways in which there remain undefinable, 
human-dependent actions within an organizational system. These un-rationalized 
moments create a wellspring of wiggle room against authority.  
 
Crozier finds that “even those with the least amount of status in an organization” 
will push “to the extreme their initial advantage—their control over the last source 
of uncertainty remaining in a completely routinized organizational system” (Crozier 
1964, 154). The reason uncertainty becomes important is because it removes pre-
dictability. Where behavior is determined, it will be obvious and anticipated. With 
full rationalization, there would be little need for interpersonal negotiation, leaving 
no room for bargaining or ingratiating, no room to expand or push upon the 
boundaries of roles or duties. Crozier argues that in a completely determined and 
predictable bureaucracy, power relationships could not develop because staff would 
exist in a context where no one person’s actions would have any potential to impact 
the behavior of another’s.  
 
In being a sanctioned office of the mayor, this data team certainly owns some lev-
erage for making data demands of other departments. However, there are many 
ideological and infrastructural constraints to fostering engagement and 
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transparency through open data. Due in part to this being both a newer office, 
concept, and indeed a new organizational function, there is considerable uncer-
tainty as to what these data projects produce, or how they should be structured. 
The data team attempts to take advantage of this lack of determinacy in defining 
their roles in relation to data as a means of procuring it from less than willing 
departments, (those who, perhaps, do not see the value in increasing their workload 
to clean and “open” their data, or do not have the capacity to do so, nor the capacity 
to address what the data might reveal). However, these departmental operations 
are already rather opaque, and departments are likewise able to contest or expand 
upon the areas of uncertainty in turn, offering up reasons of bandwidth, capability, 
political, or infrastructural complications that prevent them from submitting to 
the data team’s requests. While many leverage this uncertainty against open data 
advocacy (in the very form of resistance against authority Crozier hints at), ambi-
guity can be operationalized in favor of activist-leaning goals with the new tools of 
big data.  
 
Although full rationalization and prediction is often the goal of big data, it is still 
a novel and unfolding practice, especially in these civic spaces, and the data team 
can and does define the meaning and structure of this data work, iteratively and 
collectively, in a variety of creative manners, to expand their own domain of au-
thority. This may translate into a series of more informal programs, meetings, and 
trainings to build mutual understanding in micro-moments and discussions over 
time, or it may mean sacrificing the visibility of their own work in order to build 
bridges and partnerships on matters that they care about. It may also mean lever-
aging external networks such as the neighborhood, academic, and civic tech com-
munities—in the form of events, public talks, trainings, or dedicated projects. In 
leveraging others’ time, motivation, and expertise, the team is able to push projects 
forward that may otherwise raise hackles inside the bureaucracy, or simply become 
stalled due to lack of proper economic or personnel capacity.  
 
In contrast, the overarching structure of bureaucratic rules and hierarchy create 
just enough unity to avoid conflict; organizations are buttressed by the fact that 
employees need to coexist, which often includes a mutual dependency, and a 
mutual desire for efficiency, ease, or efficacy in getting the work done. In the con-
text of urban governance, the mayor’s influence, in tandem with an overall desire 
for recognition, may become a structuring order, but as each department holds 
domain over their given expertise, or in this example, their own information and 
data, departments and individuals within them can exploit the unpredictable vari-
ables of their territory to strike a balance.  
 
Crozier also shows the tendency, with the advent of new technologies, to move 
toward “technical controls instead of human leadership.” This desire to displace 
the human is rhetorically framed as a move away from the “affective” and mistake-
ridden to the “rational” action of machines, and such a logic can be found again in 
the big data or the data-driven governance paradigm. In this movement, there is 
perhaps an aim to rationalize even more invasively, and more rapidly. This is in 
some ways the entire premise of data-driven governance: a move not only to ra-
tionalize but also to automate (and predict) decision-making so that action is based 
on information unsullied by human affect. How can these same rationalizing tech-
niques instead be leveraged for a more positive and inclusive form of social change? 
 
 
Exploiting Uncertainty: Data Activism as Tempered Radicalism 
 
Milan and van der Velden (2016, 7) note that “[m]any contentious actions in data 
activism are performed at the individual level: think, for example, of engaging in 
programming or inserting data into a spreadsheet.” Bureaucratic employees simi-
larly—especially in zones of uncertainty—have the agency to exploit ambiguity in 
their discrete, daily work practices and “perform activism at the individual level” 
even in the rote aspects of data work. The concept of the “tempered radical” be-
comes important here, which is a theoretical and feminist position of productive 
ambivalence (Meyerson and Scully 1995).  
 
Tempered radicals are individuals, often located in a professional organization, 
“who identify with and are committed to their organizations, and are also commit-
ted to a cause, community, or ideology that is fundamentally different from, and 
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possibly at odds with the dominant culture of their organization” (Meyerson and 
Scully 1995, 585). Frequently, these are people whose work focuses on aspects of 
organizational change or evolution. While this mode of boundary-pushing and 
change is situated in the domain of organization science, their concept is in con-
versation with both feminist and activist inquiry. Here the authors seek to expand 
the frame of “being radical” most commonly featured in literature, and move to-
ward a “collaborative division of labor among activists” which will help to buffer 
against what they term “the counterproductive tendency […] to judge who is being 
the best and most true advocate for change.”  
 
Adhering to radical ideals, while working professionally in a bureaucracy of slow 
and opaque data practices, is one such example. Importantly, the tempered radical 
is a position of purposeful ambivalence, and it is a challenging role to occupy as it 
requires holding multiple intensities. The authors of the concept state that: 
 
individuals can remain ambivalent and quite clear about their attachments and 
identities. In contrast to compromise, ambivalence involves pure expression of both 
sides of a dualism; compromise seeks a middle ground which may lose the flavor 
of both sides (Meyerson and Scully 1995, 588). 
 
Far from the typically negative connotations of the word ambivalence, Meyerson 
and Scully show both the challenges and the constructive nature of maintaining a 
dualism. Simply by existing in an organization while not fitting into the organiza-
tion’s overarching, hegemonic structures gives rise to owning ambivalence; this 
certainly holds true for the data activist enlisted in bureaucratic processes, but may 
also characterize anyone working through or with data who maintains skepticism 
about its promises. Alongside the ambivalence exists a complimentary embracing 
of uncertainty, or an embracing of the inability to completely control. While this 
may fly in the face of what using data-driven practices hope to achieve, the prag-
matic response to precariousness can be used productively in the spaces of big data 
administering.  
 
 
 
Strategies of the Tempered Radical 
 
Meyerson and Scully describe four important strategies of effecting, affecting, and 
surviving via the role of tempered radical. The first strategy employs Karl Weick’s 
concept of small wins whereby the tempered radical can undertake smaller or trial 
projects to encourage larger moments of change, and test or expand existing and 
entrenched cultural boundaries (Weick 1984). Local boundary-pushing schemes 
can build, creating future opportunities and ultimately turning into larger projects 
over time. As does the human body in reaction to something perceived as invasive, 
so too does the organization when faced with dangerously different and potentially 
destabilizing ideas. A small wins approach helps to avoid any such reaction while 
still effecting real change.  
 
The second strategy may seem reductive, but it is that of essentially being true to 
oneself, or what the authors call authentic action. Specifically, they refer to being 
oneself continuously and spontaneously. Being true to oneself when one does not 
neatly fit into predetermined parameters of organizational culture creates opportu-
nities, through exposure, for new ways of doing things by providing examples of 
alternative modes. The third strategy is that of language styles, or speaking or being 
fluent in multiple languages (i.e. the languages of each facet of the ambivalent self, 
or the language of each space the tempered radical inhabits). The important work 
of this language strategy involves communicating a collage of these languages (i.e. 
knitting the radical or activist language together with that of the urban bureaucrat 
so as to be legible to both domains) instead of employing only one language across 
domains, or only the local language. Strategically leveraging language styles allows 
for discourse deconstruction, where the tempered radical can dismantle hegemonic 
ideas and assumptions in either domain to “make room for alternative conceptions 
of organizing and management” (Meyerson and Scully 1995, 597). Lastly, owing to 
the cumbersome nature of juggling these dualities, a final and important tempered 
radical approach involves actively garnering support. The authors cite an affiliations 
strategy—particularly maintaining affiliations outside of the organization for emo-
tional, ideological, and informational support—as a means to express rather than 
suppress emotions and ideas, and avoid burnout.  
Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Activism: Data Organizing Inside the 
Institution 
Leah Horgan and Paul Dourish 
 Krisis 2018, Issue 1 
Data Activism 
www.krisis.eu  
79 
 
 
With this in mind, then, we explore productive ambivalence in everyday data work 
to understand how uncertainty is leveraged to push activist ideals in a bureaucratic 
setting. We ask: how might civil servants leverage zones of uncertainty in daily data 
work to push personal or “radical” agendas using these strategies? How do orien-
tations towards “data” in particular allow them to present a view on new organiza-
tional opportunities within “legacy” organizational frameworks? Our ethnographic 
work begins to provide us with a view of how these concerns figure in the work of 
the data team. 
 
 
Civic Data Organizing  
 
The constellation of the aforementioned big data enthusiasms—alongside streams 
of private sector support, civic-minded investment, and a growing political interest 
in the administrating potentiality of big data—has engendered formal data teams 
in urban governance across the globe. On taking office, the mayor of the city of 
our study sought to lead the way for these global smart cities to certify that the 
city uses data to solve problems and promote innovation, as stated in the open data 
mandate. The city thus institutionalized data work in an official mayoral data team 
(a common configuration for these official data teams), which has been the site of 
our inquiry.  
 
Despite the data team’s institutionalization, the onus is on the scrappy data team 
to define what data-driven governance looks like by encouraging personnel in the 
more than forty departments to switch over from legacy systems and make their 
work “transparent.” Many share the excitement of potential and possibility through 
data, but enthusiasm is dampened by tensions surrounding the previously opaque 
becoming open to scrutiny; once a performance issue is identified, it must be ad-
dressed lest it be subject to media attention or citizens’ demands. What “tempered 
radical” strategies might be enacted by the data team staff members to encourage 
this leap of faith into data-driven governance? How can they provide public access 
to the city’s data assets and the more activist ideals of civic participation, justice, 
and equity?  
 
Small Wins 
 
As Crozier explains, being in a position where one does not have full authority to 
direct occupational efforts engenders a situation where “each group fights to pre-
serve and enlarge the area upon which it has some discretion” (Crozier 1964, 156). 
This is certainly true of the tempered radical caught in the crossfire of opposing 
definitions of data work and civic responsibility. Where the data team makes at-
tempts to define and fortify their open data program throughout the city, other 
departments are likewise doing the same (i.e. holding onto their old and opaque 
ways, or even coopting and claiming new forms of data work as their dominion). 
Nevertheless, the streamlining and opening of city data is precisely the type of 
organizing work that will allow for other forms of data activism to take place: data 
resources can be used to advocate for various community needs where, for instance, 
one is able to see the landscape and distribution of city services. Of course, revealing 
that one neighborhood is not receiving timely sanitation or security services, for 
instance, is the sort of visibility that some city departments may be keen to avoid.  
 
Meyerson and Scully (1995) show how the tempered radical strategy of obtaining 
small wins (instead of, say, a top-down overhaul of civic data work) can be used as 
trials to “test the boundaries of an organization’s capacity for change.” The city data 
team members employ such incremental moves to “test the boundaries” of a given 
department’s ability and willingness to partner in the open data paradigm. A recent 
instance of this boundary-testing at our field site involved the need to release (via 
a mandate and pressure from citizen and media data requests), and the desire to 
automate (so as to avoid manually uploading data every month), the city’s safety 
data. One data staff member in particular, whom we refer to here as “Dina” (a 
pseudonym), dedicated herself to procuring this data so as to allow it to, in her 
words, “speak” about crime patterns across the city with the hope of fostering both 
discourse and action. Dina met with the data-owners—the city’s police department 
data team—in person in a series of more casual office visits, coffees, and lunches 
to explain aims and intentions, and to learn what she could do to facilitate the 
process. She offered up extra time to jump-start the project with hands-on 
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training, and encouraged regular problem-solving check-ins throughout (a process 
which later became institutionalized across the city).  
 
The experimental nature of small wins helps to “uncover resources, information, 
allies, sources of resistance, and additional opportunities for change” (Meyerson 
and Scully 1995, 595). Rather than insisting the data be fully and immediately 
released per the top-down mandate, Dina labored continuously to ease concerns, 
educate, and enhance overall capacities, eradicating at first the infrastructural bar-
riers and later the ideological ones. In the course of these nudging efforts, she also 
came to learn that prior resistance was enacted for a constellation of less-obvious 
reasons, namely, legitimate concerns surrounding citizen privacy, technical and 
personnel bandwidth, and the complicated nature in which data are gathered and 
stored in the field. This process, then, garnered unlikely allies within the police 
department itself, data workers who align with her ideals despite the appearance of 
opposition; these new allies in turn are able to leverage their domain expertise to 
create space for opening data within broader systems of actual departmental re-
sistance. 
 
Weick suggests that “small wins reduce large problems to a manageable size. Big, 
unwieldy problems produce anxiety, which limits people's capacities to think and 
act creatively” (Meyerson and Scully 1995, 595). Through persistent, smaller pro-
jects of familiarization, narrativization, accommodation, and automation, Dina was 
able to secure the release of the contentious data (contentious as the data points 
to marginalized neighborhoods with fixed or increasing crime while other neigh-
borhoods are experiencing a decline), paving the way for other highly-desired but 
potentially problematic datasets to follow suit. This day-to-day organizing work is 
certainly not part of the city’s open mandate, nor is it the way many other data 
workers have interpreted what it means to be data-driven; this labor often is invis-
ible and goes unrewarded. However, small wins such as these are a crucial founda-
tion for other efforts of data journalism, data activism, and even internal advocacy, 
that aims to use the city’s data for political action. For example, owing in particular 
to the scale and granularity of new forms of data, advocates can discern whether 
the city is indeed becoming safer for all.  
 
Authentic Action and Language Styles 
 
Dina achieved a cultural shift by “acting in a way that was simply authentic” (Mey-
erson and Scully 1995, 596). Her earnest interest, in both the release of safety data 
and in being supportive to those who owned the data, demonstrated an alternative 
interpretation of the mayor’s open data directive (collective vs. authoritative), and 
city work writ large which tends to be guarded and competitive. Rolled into the 
small wins strategy are two other tempered radical approaches: authentic action and 
language styles. In the conversations regarding safety data, Dina was able to leverage 
the language of the mandate to open data, and also define the data work as a service 
and as mutually useful, by couching it in both bureaucratic and progressive frame-
works. Her authenticity was perceived and appreciated by others, and even allowed 
her to forge new partnerships for the open data efforts to come. 
 
However, Dina later stated that she wishes that all of these laborious negotiations 
(e.g. constant follow-ups, couching transparency in terms of automated workflow 
efficiency, or framing what the data reveals in a more palatable light) were not 
necessary; she wishes the data could instead “speak for itself.” This individual con-
siders herself a data activist. She works in the data team less than full time so as to 
perform other forms of data work in her spare time to achieve activist pursuits. 
When engaging with the various audiences, she is able to stitch together bureau-
cratic languages with the vernacular of activists, data scientists, and tech evange-
lists. She finds that holding these multiple identities and maintaining ambivalence 
is useful, that “there’s value being both an insider and an outsider.”  
 
Currently, she believes that a lot of the more legible data activism is occurring 
outside of official offices, but she finds the organizing work done within the data 
team to be very important for achieving activist ends. When asked what work, if 
any, is done to ensure external data activists are able to leverage the work done 
inside city hall, she stated:  
 
“You don’t have to do that much, all you need to do is to put the data out 
there. Like a lot of people say it [the work that needs to be done to 
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promote social change] is not just open data, like you can’t just do that on 
its own, but what I’m finding is that you can, as long as you have a data 
dictionary and that there’s enough data where it’s interesting, people im-
mediately do something with it.” 
 
 
Multiple Languages and External Affiliations  
 
Meyerson and Scully discuss the importance of external affiliations for tempered 
radicals (with “people who represent both sides of their identity”), not only to 
strategize and accumulate useful information, but also for maintaining the ability 
to remain “fluent in multiple languages.” In another recent instance, the data 
team’s membership fluency allowed them to take special advantage of an event in 
the informal civic data-hacking sphere to affect change inside the institution. The 
advent of new information-processing tools, and broader data literacy in everyday 
users, has engendered new data cultures such as those located in the volunteer-
based civic tech community. Civic data hacking, one such example, “can be framed 
as a form of data activism and advocacy: requesting, digesting, contributing to, 
modeling, and contesting data” (Shrock 2016, 4). Many cities utilize such civic tech 
groups and efforts to enhance the function of their city, or to address social con-
cerns and injustices more directly. In fact, once off the clock, the city employees 
themselves may also participate in such endeavors to build bridges or exercise their 
own interests. 
 
One such informal civic data group recently organized around a controversial 
topic—that of racial discrimination in police procedures—using the “Veil of Dark-
ness” hypothesis. The Veil of Darkness hypothesis “asserts that police are less likely 
to know the race of a motorist before making a [traffic violation] stop after dark 
than they are during daylight” (Grogger 2006, 878). Thus, if there is indeed a pat-
tern of racial discrimination, the pattern of traffic stops will differ during the day-
time from those conducted at night, where the race of the driver is (supposedly) 
less readily visible. On the event’s online description, however, the organizer re-
marked that this more contentious open dataset was recently made inaccessible 
(password-protected), and those attending the event would now need to collect the 
data from the organizer who had already downloaded it. This otherwise unexcep-
tional caveat within the event description quickly traveled to city hall. 
 
Employing “multiple languages” (activist language surrounding concerns about ra-
cial profiling, together with the language of data science and inclusive of bureau-
cratic undertones), the team was able “to speak to multiple constituencies” (Mey-
erson and Scully 1995, 590) about this issue, and leverage the novelty of the situa-
tion for their benefit. In the context of this city’s open data efforts, all departments 
retain control of the datasets they share. That the local civic tech community (and, 
thus, citizens) noticed and publicized the locking of a particular department’s data 
became cause for general concern, but there was much uncertainty with regard to 
what the occasion meant or how it should be dealt with. The data team converted 
this event into a lever for imploring transparency objectives. They leveraged uncer-
tainty here by highlighting this open data breach to remind stakeholders that these 
assets (and especially their withdrawal) have the capacity to garner positive or neg-
ative citizen and media attention. Thus, the event became an opportunity to apply 
pressure on appropriate parties to (re)release data, not only in the vein of the open 
data mandate, but as a means to serve their constituents’ needs and interests. In 
this sense, the data team was able to use the more familiar language of civil service 
to encourage the opening of data.  
 
Leveraging external networks like the civic tech community as such exemplifies 
the affiliations strategy, where those holding dual modes garner the necessary sup-
port (emotional, professional, and otherwise) from like-minded peers to buttress 
against “difficult emotions” and the possibility of burnout (Meyerson and Scully 
1995). Members of the data team connect with formal and informal networks that 
seek to use data for social good to extend their bandwidth, but also to attain sup-
port within and outside of the walls of city hall. In a recent interview, Dina re-
flected on leveraging such a network: civic volunteers (often data scientists or tech-
nologists) in the city. She remarked that there appeared to be a boost in interest 
from citizens (especially those in the civic tech domain), stating that there are: 
“just a lot of people looking to help the city” via socially-minded data projects. She 
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credited the increased interest to the current political climate; many see this liberal 
sanctuary city as “a pocket of hope in the nation.” 
 
Local concerns, then, play out against a broader backdrop. The current US presi-
dential administration’s value system is markedly different to predecessors, with 
differing data policies and demands, notably with regard to immigration and citi-
zenship. The support and enthusiasm shown by citizens and other city data teams 
helps the team remember why their values are important, providing emotional, 
technical, and ideological support to buffer against the fatigue incurred from the 
lack of internal support or recognition, especially at a time of nation-wide conster-
nation.  
 
 
Tempered Data Organizers 
 
Organizing in the era of big data—and especially big and open data—allows new 
forms of activism to be layered on top of such efforts. There is a copious amount 
of work that goes into standardizing and contextualizing data (with meta data, data 
dictionaries, attributed ownership available for questioning datasets, and so on), as 
there is with “making it interesting.” Members of the data team believe that this 
work of making data relevant is their most challenging charge, as it involves pro-
curing vast amounts of interoperable data across city functions and over years before 
anyone will be able to derive useful meanings from these data resources. In desiring 
the data to “speak for itself,” the data team is referring to its opposite: the invisible 
and tedious labor entailed in training, standardization, and meaning-making with 
data. Tempering data projects with useful interpretations, quality control, and ca-
pacity building, allows the data to travel with more ease, making it more accessible 
and less likely to engender resistance.  
Milan and van der Velden discuss how data activism is “polyfunctional” because “it 
can be read through diverse disciplinary lenses, and can be domesticated to inves-
tigate different dynamics and relations, between and within people, information, 
technology, and the state/industry complex.” Allowing the data to speak for itself 
does not mean that the data team believes data are wholly objective. Instead, they 
believe the data are tools to reveal patterns which might help various city workers, 
civic technologists, non-profits, and data activists speak to matters of concern 
which might not otherwise be legible.  
 
Although exhausting, organizing from the inside allows for invaluable insight into 
how and why decisions are made; this has the effect of productively humanizing 
the opposition, allowing space to introduce activist ideals that may indeed only be 
impeded by structural ones. By leveraging insider knowledge and strategically push-
ing zones of uncertainty to engender change, along with being their authentic 
selves, using variegated language styles, and leveraging external networks, tempered 
data activists can normalize the exposure and scrutiny involved in releasing massive 
streams of data to the public, push their own social justice ideals into every day 
open data work, and allow others outside of centers of power to advocate using 
these resources.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Open data initiatives in urban governance have been advocated by many in and 
outside of city government. Values embedded in these programs attract those with 
more radical ideals about transparency, technology, and civic participation into bu-
reaucracies. However, there are practical realities, and even contradictions, in car-
rying out such an agenda in the vein of more traditional forms of civic work. We 
have turned to Crozier’s discussion of the productive uses of uncertainty, and to 
Meyerson and Scully’s concept of tempered radicalism, to find conceptual resources 
to account for the practical work of a municipal government data team involved 
not just in making data work for the city and its citizens, but also charged with 
figuring out what that might even mean. 
Of course, it is easy, particularly for those more actively and visibly radical, to crit-
icize a tempered approach for not going far enough, for not doing all that is possible 
with data assets, or to accuse those within positions of power of not advocating 
social change. The authors of the tempered radical concept also take up these con-
cerns, explaining that while judgements of conservativism and hypocrisy abound, 
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the ambivalent position of the tempered radical can play a role in a larger movement 
outside of themselves and outside of their organizations. They conclude that “the 
labor of resistance may be divided among those who push for change from the 
inside, from the outside, and from the margin, each effort being essential to the 
others and to an overall movement of change” (Meyerson and Scully 1995, 598). 
Perhaps the world of the tempered data activist in a bureaucratic context can only 
go so far as that of the data organizer, working tirelessly to systematize institutional 
data practices to make as much data as accessible as possible, and to normalize ideas 
of data transparency (whatever that may mean). This role or duty aims to produce 
a framework and resources for others who own more radical or visibly activist po-
sitions, or more fully dedicate their time to activist causes (such as organizations 
that explicitly work to do so, or data and civic technologists who have more re-
sources at hand in conjunction with less entrenched hierarchies to answer to). 
Thus, in the broader context of the work that data (and non-data) activists must 
perform, the work of a tempered radical in this domain, or an activist-as-organizer, 
is only one, though important, node in the larger data activism assemblage.  
 
The tempered data activist will face additional skepticism—coming from outside 
the big data movement—as to how well data capture any meaningful truths or 
experiences of urban citizens, particularly the experiences of those most in need of 
services and social change. As we noted at the outset, big data itself can only go so 
far, and it is important to consider what conversations spoken through the language 
of data might restrict or preclude. In considering tempered radicalism, Meyerson 
and Scully deliberate on the role of language and its tendency to circumscribe. The 
authors reveal in one interview that “the power of language was located not in the 
ability to communicate technically, but rather in its capacity to rule out other forms 
of talk, thought, and identity." What possibilities do the current expressions of 
data assets, technology, and the still unfolding practices of data activism rule out? 
 
Tempered radicals have the advantage of being “outsiders within,” and although 
this position entails a lot of unaccounted for and uncredited labor, of both a tech-
nical and emotional nature, they are also positions of power (fringe identities op-
erating in more traditional power structures are less predictable, and as Crozier 
shows, there is power in unpredictability). Although she speaks to a more chal-
lenging and entrenched position on the margin, bell hooks holds that ambivalent 
identities offer “the possibility of a radical perspective from which to see and create, 
to imagine alternative new worlds” (Meyerson and Scully 1995, 589; hooks 1984). 
The very nature of holding such an identity allows for a vantage point not afforded 
those well within the margins, though maintaining this ambivalent post certainly 
has its challenges. What practices—located in everyday negotiations—might foster 
appreciation and collaboration in and outside of the margin? How can we encour-
age and better appreciate those embodying these exhausting roles to stick with the 
discomfort of ambivalence? Given the uncertainty surrounding the possibilities of 
new data technologies and their application, and their emphasis on vastness and 
speed, it is crucial to examine the more micro moments of potential as a means to 
indeed “imagine alternative new worlds,” and to do so incrementally, and collec-
tively.  
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Introduction  
 
‘New!’ ‘Improved recipe!’ ‘Now better than ever!’ This much is clear: if you want to 
sell something, you have to emphasize its novelty. The driving force of history is 
innovation, constant progress and improvement. That is at least what we are made 
to believe; the dominant ideology of our times. This ideology was once most force-
fully voiced and promoted by nineteenth-century artists and art theorists. Make it 
new! said Ezra Pound. Il faut étre absolument moderne, said Arthur Rimbaud. ‘And 
plunge to depths of Heaven or Hell, / To fathom the Unknown and find the new!’ 
said Charles Baudelaire. After God, morality and even beauty had ceased to func-
tion as credible criteria for evaluating the arts, all that remained were novelty and 
originality. The shock of the new, as Australian art critic Robert Hughes later 
called it, became the primary characteristic of modern art, the first as well as the 
final criterion for its valuation. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, theorists of the postmodern argued that this final 
criterion now too failed us. In his essay ‘The Sublime and the Avant-garde’ (1984) 
Jean Francois Lyotard scorned ‘the cheap thrill, the profitable pathos, that accom-
panies an innovation’ (106), Fredric Jameson in his seminal essay ‘Postmodernism 
and Consumer Society’ (1983) argued that ‘the writers and artists of the present 
day will no longer be able to invent new styles and worlds’ (7), and American art 
critic Rosalind Krauss published a book titled The Originality of the Avant-garde 
and Other Modernist Myths (1986). In his essay ‘Comrades of Time’ (2009) Boris 
Groys writes: 
 
The present as such was mostly seen in the context of modernity as some-
thing negative, as something that should be overcome in the name of the 
future […] Today, we are stuck in the present as it reproduces itself with-
out leading to any future. […] One can say that we now live in a time of 
indecision, of delay—a boring time. 
 
This boredom characterizes contemporary art, in Groys’ view. The contemporary 
artist for him is like Sisyphus, who in the same repetitive and senseless act has to 
keep rolling the boulder up the mountain. The modernist artist was facing the 
glorious horizon of the future, but the contemporary artist swims in a sea of con-
templation and confusion. For Groys this is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does 
raise questions on the nature and function of ‘artistic innovation’ today. 
 
These were questions that he already dealt with in his book Über das Neue (On the 
new), which was published 25 years ago in 1992, in the context of aforementioned 
debates on art and theory.1 According to Groys, something peculiar was happening 
with regard to the new: on the one hand, and in line with the theorists mentioned 
above, no one ‘believed’ in the new any longer; but on the other hand, everyone 
still expected to see or hear something new, upon entering the museum, going to 
concerts or theatre plays, or when reading novels, poems, philosophical books etc. 
For Groys, this meant that we had to start looking for a new understanding of the 
new. 
 
In order to do that, Groys first stripped the new from its – mostly modernist – 
connotations of concepts such as utopia, historical progress, creativity and authen-
ticity. Referring back to Nietzsche, he defines innovation instead as the revaluation 
of values: 
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Innovation does not consist in the emergence of something previously hid-
den, but in the fact that the value of something always already seen and 
known is re-valued. The revaluation of values is the general form of inno-
vation: here the true or the refined that is regarded as valuable is devalor-
ized, while that which was formerly considered profane, alien, primitive, 
or vulgar, and therefore valueless, is valorized. (10) 
 
The exemplary work of art, to which Groys would return again and again through-
out his oeuvre, is Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1917). What Duchamp did, after 
all, was not to invent something that was not there before, but to place something 
from the domain of the profane in the domain of the sacred. In retrospect, argues 
Groys, this was what art and artists have always done. Duchamp, by stripping the 
act of artistic transformation down to almost nothing, shows us what innovation 
comes down to: cultural revaluation. 
 
For Groys this meant that the answer to the question of innovation was to be found 
in a specific place: the collection or archive. To collect something, whether it con-
cerns the library, the collection of immortal souls, or the museum of modern art, 
means to grant it importance, that is, to sanctify it. Hence, Über das Neue can be 
considered as the starting point of Groys’ reflections on the function and status of 
the museum in our contemporary society, which he later developed in books such 
as Logik der Sammlung (1997) and Topologie der Kunst (2003). As the subtitle of 
Logik der Sammlung makes clear – Am Ende des musealen Zeitalter, ‘at the end of 
the museum age’ – Groys was already well aware of the waning influence and im-
portance of the traditional museum, in the face not only of societal developments 
such as the suspicion of a supposedly elitist culture and the increasing power of 
private collectors, but also of artistic movements, which in several waves of so called 
‘institutional critique’ tried to break out of, or emancipate themselves from, the 
museum. Still, as Groys emphasizes again in the interview below, without the mu-
seum, there can be no innovation. 
 
Groys distinguishes the new from modernist ‘myths’ of historical progress and uto-
pia, but also from contemporary myths such as creativity and the ‘Other’. With 
regard to the latter, he has always been critical towards the idea of the art world 
having to be a ‘reflection’ of society. In Art Power (2008), for instance, he writes: 
 
When art relinquishes its autonomous ability to artificially produce its own 
differences, it also loses the ability to subject society, as it is, to a radical 
critique. All that remains for art is to illustrate a critique that society has 
already leveled at or manufactured for itself. To demand that art be prac-
ticed in the name of existing social differences is actually to demand the 
affirmation of the existing structure of society in the guise of social critique 
(113). 
 
However, this does not mean, for Groys, that art is apolitical. On the contrary, as 
he argues below, the revaluation of values which is the general form of innovation, 
i.e. to value something that was not valued before, or to devalue something that 
was valued, is the political act per se. Scenes from everyday life, the dream, rituals, 
household equipment, advertisement and popular culture – all these things were 
considered too base or banal for art, but were included in the cultural realm by 
innovative artists, in much the same way as voices that are not heard in the political 
realm strive to be heard, and as entities that were not previously represented in 
politics and law gained rights.2 
 
Born in East Berlin in 1947, Groys began his academic career in Leningrad and 
Moscow, where he was also active in the unofficial art scene. In 1981 he moved to 
West Germany where he later received his PhD at the University of Münster. To-
day he is Global Distinguished Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at New York 
University, and travels around the globe as a lecturer and curator at art institutes, 
biennials, conferences, etc. His experiences of both sides of the Iron Curtain proved 
to be crucial for his thinking, which is always thought-provoking, sometimes puz-
zling, and which occasionally leads to controversial or even questionable state-
ments. He has a way of thinking through a certain statement up to its most extreme 
and seemingly bizarre consequences, such as in Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin (1988) in 
which he argues that Stalin completed the utopian project of Russian avant-garde 
artists like Malevich or Mayakovsky, and even understood it better than they 
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themselves did; or in Das kommunistische Postskriptum (2006), where he argued that 
the Soviet Union was the realization of the linguistic turn in the political realm. 
 
Another aspect of his work and style that makes him both a fascinating and pro-
vocative thinker is his apparent nihilism. In this interview as well as in any of his 
other writings, he resolutely refuses to be nostalgic or moralistic. He registers the 
differences between, and historical developments of, the modern and the postmod-
ern, between the East and the West, or between the museum and the supermarket, 
but he nowhere speaks of decline. Rather than passing value-judgments, Groys 
seems to be more interested in analyzing what has actually changed, and how this 
change allows or forces us to reframe our concepts and practices. 
 
On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Über das Neue, as well as, as it happens, 
that of the 100th anniversary of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, Krisis asked Groys to 
reflect on the legacy of this book, on the contemporary meaning of notions such 
as creativity, originality and novelty, and on the future of the new. 
 
 
I. On the New, 25 years ago 
 
Thijs Lijster: Could you tell something about the time in which the book was 
written? What was the situation in the art world, and why did you think it was 
important to write a book on the category of the new back then? 
 
Boris Groys: That was the time of postmodern discourses: everywhere everybody 
was speaking about the impossibility of the new. That was a core belief of the 
postmodern mind-frame. At the same time, it was quite clear to me – I was teach-
ing at the university and I was also, as a curator, participating in artistic activities 
– the factual criteria of the new were still valid. For example, imagine someone 
who has to write a doctoral thesis, saying: I don’t say anything new, because we 
live in postmodern times and the new is impossible, so let me only repeat what was 
said before. It would not be possible for him to make his doctorate. So, to make 
the doctorate, he would have to prove that he said something new. It was the same 
in the case of selection of artworks at an exhibition, especially contemporary over-
views of the state of the art world. Here again, the first question was still: is the 
art work a new phenomenon, did this artist do something new or not?  
So, there was a kind of duplicity in culture that I experienced at that point: on a 
theoretical level, everybody said that the new was impossible, but in cultural prac-
tice this requirement of the new was still valid. The goal of the book Über das Neue 
was to try to reconstruct and to describe the hidden, implicit presuppositions of 
this requirement. So: what does it mean to require something new after the new 
became impossible? What is the context in which the new is still possible? My 
book was an attempt to reconstruct the theoretical, and in a certain way also prag-
matic, presuppositions of the new, against the background of this cultural duplic-
ity. 
 
TL: In order to do that, you rid the concept of the new from all kinds of ideological 
connotations, like ‘utopia’ and ‘progress’. You start out by giving a series of negative 
definitions of the new: “The New is not just the Other”, “The New is not utopian”, 
“The New is not a product of human freedom”, etc. Could one say you try to 
‘rescue’ the category of the new, by detaching it from all these other categories? 
 
BG: I wouldn’t say I tried to rescue it, and I wouldn’t say I tried to negate all the 
other concepts. I merely responded to the situation I just described. I saw that all 
these connections, between the new and progress, utopia and so on, became obso-
lete, if we would take the postmodern discourse seriously. All the while, the new 
hadn’t become obsolete; it remained operative in our culture. So, it’s not like I 
tried to do something - to disengage the new from all these associations, it is what 
happened in culture. That was the situation. I was not the author of this situation; 
I just tried to phenomenologically describe it. 
 
TL: The new was, as you said, separated from utopia and progress, and with that 
also from its temporal dimension. You write: “The new stands in opposition to the 
future as much as to the past” (2014, 41). Innovation, in your view, is what happens 
when an object is transferred from everyday life into cultural tradition. Still, is it 
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possible to detach the new from its temporal dimension? After all, isn’t the new 
what happens after the old? 
 
BG: Again, I didn’t detach it; it was detached de facto. So, I asked myself: What is 
the function of the new in this context? It became clear to me that the new, in the 
context of art, is related to what is already in our archives. Our culture is structured 
in the following way: we have the archives, and the world outside of the archives. 
The archives exist in the here and now, and the world outside of the archives also 
exists now, it is not the world of the future or the past; both worlds – that of the 
archives and the outside world – are contemporary to each other and to our own 
experience.  
 
But what is their relation? My idea was that it is in the intersection between these 
two worlds that the new emerges. If I write a doctorate and I want to show that 
the doctorate is new I do not compare what I said to all possible opinions in the 
world I’m living in, because it can happen that some of these opinions actually are 
part of my world. I begin to compare this text, my own text, with the archives, 
with what is already accepted as valid in a certain discipline. So, I take some opin-
ions or knowledge – my own opinions and those of my friends – from outside of 
the archives, compare them to what is already in the archives and precisely if some 
of these opinions are not in the archives I present them as new. The artist does the 
same. That is something already described very well by Baudelaire, in his famous 
essay on ‘The Painter of Modern Life’. Baudelaire speaks about an artist who looks 
at the classical ideal of beauty and at the same time at what happens around him, 
and then what he tries to do is to combine them. The same can be said about the 
avant-garde. The avant-garde never ever indicated any future. If we look at the 
avant-garde writings, their programs and manifestoes, they tell you all the same: 
we have the museums, filled with ancient Apollos and so on, and outside of the 
museums and around us we have tanks, trains, airplanes, explosions and killings, 
industrial machines, and mathematics and geometry. Some kind of new order; 
these things are not precisely the things of the future, they are already around.  
 
TL: All they did was implement them into the cultural realm? 
BG: Precisely. That’s it, and only that. The avant-garde never went an inch into 
the future. The avant-garde always only wanted to transport and transpose certain 
experiences that the people in their contemporary life had into the museum space, 
into the space of the cultural archives. And the power of the avant-garde was pre-
cisely its ability to cross this border and to bring the lived experience into the 
cultural space. It was not concerned with some idle projection of the future, or 
some senseless utopia, but with the lived experience of everyday life in an industrial 
civilisation. It is the same with Marcel Duchamp, Andy Warhol, and so on. Du-
champ doesn’t invent anything. He takes a urinal and places it in the museum. 
Now imagine that you bring to the museum another urinal, and say: this is a dif-
ferent one, because it has a different form. No museum would take it, because they 
would say: it is irrelevant, because it is not new enough. What does that mean, not 
new enough? It means that it might be different in form, but does not engage in 
the difference between art and life, between the cultural and the profane realm, 
between the archives and everyday existence. So, I would say that the notion of the 
new, and the effect of the new, is something that has its place on the border of the 
cultural archive and contemporary life. 
 
TL: If the new is detached from the aforementioned categories like utopia, progress 
and human freedom, doesn’t that also imply a depoliticization of the new? In Über 
das Neue, also in Logik der Sammlung, you point to the many failed liaisons between 
artistic and political avant-gardes. However, if the idea of innovation is detached 
from the idea of a better world, what is then still the value of the new?  
 
BG: First of all, I consider my own theory of the new as a total politicization of 
the new. The decision to take something from everyday life or everyday experience 
and to put it into the archive is an eminently political decision. In a certain way, it 
is the actual political decision. It’s what Kierkegaard said with regard to Jesus 
Christ: believing he was not just a normal man but the son of God is simply a 
decision. To ascribe value to something that up till then had no value, to put it in 
a valuable context, is the Urform of political decision-making. Actual politics func-
tions according to the same pattern. For example: up to a certain point in history 
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the workers had no value in the system of representation. It takes a political deci-
sion to change this value, after which they are represented. 
 
In the Second Surrealist Manifesto, Breton asks: What is an authentic surrealist 
artwork? And he answers: to go into the crowd with a revolver and randomly 
shooting into it. So, you take this action, a terrorist deed, and put it into another 
context, the context of art. In the same way, Marinetti speaks of the metallization 
of the human body, the wonderful effect of exploding African villages, and so on. 
If you look at those examples, you see immediately that what I describe is eminently 
political. Utopias are not by nature political, they are literary fictions. Whether 
they have any political value has to be decided politically. In other words: utopias 
are not a source of politics, but an object of politics. I have to make the decision, 
and this decision cannot be delegated to any theory or any utopian vision. That 
means that the value of my political decision cannot be deduced from utopia itself. 
 
TL: The politics of the new, then, is that in the same way as people that were not 
politically represented get a vote and get representation, something that was out-
side of the cultural realm gets inserted. 
 
BG: Yes. And with regard to politics, not only people, but maybe even lions or 
plants. There has emerged a new ecological consciousness that believes that also 
certain animals or plants should be represented in our culture, which means they 
should be protected. The question what should be represented is the crucial ques-
tion of our society, because our society knows only two modes of relating to things 
and people: to let them perish, or to protect them. That is the basic political de-
cision. If you decide to include something into the system of representation, this 
means that you are interested in how this thing – object, human being, animal or 
whatever – will be translated into the future. The museum, the archive in general, 
is a futurist institution, because it keeps things for the future. Futurism was never 
about the future, innovation is not about the future, but it relates to the future in 
so far as it gives us a promise of protection and preservation. 
 
TL: So what is new now will be included in the collection and preserved for the 
future. 
 
BG: Yes, precisely. Being included, it will not be discarded. That is the promise 
on which our culture is based. This basis is so fundamental that it is often ne-
glected. For example, Nietzsche said: my writings will only be understood after 
three hundred years. It meant that he firmly believed that mankind, without actu-
ally understanding his writings, would be reproducing them, putting them in li-
braries, distributing them, for three hundred years. If you want to speak about 
utopia, this is a true utopia. There is an almost automatic and unconscious reliance 
on the institutions of protection in our culture. People writing books, producing 
art works, have an instinctive trust in the possibility of their survival. This faith is 
precisely what gives the basic energy to the effort to make something new, so that 
it would be safeguarded, protected, translated into the future. And that is precisely 
what I was and still am interested in. 
 
 
II. The new, then and now 
 
TL: What, in your view, is the main difference between the situation in the art 
world 25 years ago and now?  
 
BG: The main differences have to do with the emergence of the Internet, as an 
electronic archive. These differences manifest themselves in the two following 
ways. First, if you think of the traditional role of the writer, philosopher and artist, 
it was precisely to mediate between the archive and everyday life, that is, to provide 
artistic (or theoretical) expression and representation of everyday life. But the In-
ternet gives to everybody the immediate possibility to present oneself on the global 
stage – everybody makes selfies, videos, writes blogs, and so on. We no longer have 
a mass culture of consumers – the situation that was described by Adorno – but a 
situation of mass cultural production, where everybody is an artist, everybody is a 
writer, and a philosopher. We no longer need mediators, so we no longer need 
writers, philosophers, or artists. 
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The second difference, however, is that the Internet still does not produce the 
stability, security and protection that the traditional archives had. We often think 
this is an institutional question, or a technological one, but in fact it is an economic 
one. Internet platforms are privately driven, so they have to make profit. And that 
means that on the Internet there is no place for the museum, or an archive in any 
form. I’m quite sceptical about whether this will change. Basically, today, if you 
want to have an archive on the Internet, it should be based on already existing 
archives. Only institutions like the MoMA and Tate can establish something like 
an Internet archive, partially also because they are able to pay for this. In the EU, 
if you want to establish an Internet archive, you get a guarantee of protection of 
maximum 30 years. So it will cost a lot of money, and there is still a lot of insecu-
rity. 
 
What does it mean if you take these two points together? It means that in the 
contemporary global framework, you have total representation, but from a future 
perspective, it is all garbage. What is interesting is that the Silicon Valley people 
know this very well; they all create secret museums, libraries, documentation cen-
tres, etc. but these are not traditional archives in the sense I describe in my book, 
since they are not publicly supported and accessible for the public. There have been 
many attempts to create electronic archives, but de facto none of these attempts 
were really successful, precisely because of the general structure of the Internet and 
its relations of property. 
 
It is the classical Marxist situation of collective use and private property. That 
analysis, if there is any place to use it, very much applies here. Everybody uses these 
Internet platforms, but they belong to only a few companies. There is a tension 
between the interests of the users and the interests of the companies, but this 
tension is hidden and not thematized, because people believe that the Internet is a 
means of communication. If we would start to think the Internet as a means of 
archiving, then this tension would be obvious. It is possible, however, that people 
would give up the archive in general, that people will be only interested in com-
munication and no longer in archiving. That would mean indeed that they would 
not be interested in the future, and then the role of the archives would be 
decreasing. Partially we already are in this situation: the museums are poor; they 
cannot compete with private collections. Private collections are based partially on 
the current situation in the art world, but being private they are based very much 
on the collector’s taste, which cannot be collectivized. These private collections do 
not of course constitute the framework for protection that I was describing. The 
same can be said about libraries and so on. We more and more experience them as 
too expensive, taking up too much space. 
 
It seems to me that today we are in a period of transition. On the one hand, the 
structures I described in my book – in academia, in museums, in the art world – 
are still existing and function in the same way. Parallel to that we have Instagram, 
virtual reality, viral videos, and so on. I don’t say we have to make a choice; I only 
want to say that there is a factor of uncertainty and a lack of clarity about their 
relationship, and I think that is a factor that emerged only after the book was 
written. 
 
TL: You say that people are no longer interested in the archival function, but at 
the same time there is a lot of anxiety about the preservation of tradition, in the 
shape of ‘cultural heritage’ and so forth. In Über das Neue you write: “[T]he new 
ceases to represent a danger and becomes a positive demand only after the identity 
of tradition has been preserved” (2014, 21). Might one say that the contemporary 
anxiety emerges from a lack of historical orientation? In other words: since we 
cannot make sense of the present, or determine our direction for the future, we do 
not know what is historically meaningful and meaningless. And what would this 
mean for the category of the new? 
 
BG: Indeed, we can no longer rely on the tradition. And again, I think this is 
related to digital media: we are confronted with everything at the same time, and 
everyone globalized him or herself. At the same time, we’re not sure what the 
archive still means under this new condition. But as long as there are archives, it 
makes no difference for the category of the new. There would only be a difference 
if the archives would dissolve completely. If that happens, then we no longer have 
the new, but then we also no longer have philosophy, literature, and art. Probably 
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we’ll still have politics, but I’m not sure about it. All these phenomena relate to 
the archives, so if the archives dissolve, then all the other things dissolve as well. 
 
TL: Is that a real threat? 
 
BG: Maybe it is a threat, maybe a relief. I think a lot of people would see it as 
liberation. It is difficult to say. I think it is a mixture between threat and liberation, 
in the same way that every utopia is also a dystopia. But I think the fact is that 
many people welcome this development; that the feeling of liberation prevails, the 
feeling of being liberated from the archive, but also from literature, art and philos-
ophy.  
 
In a sense it would be another step in the history of secularization. European cul-
ture has a complex relation to its religious heritage. You still have the names of 
the saints, ideals of sovereignty and creativity, and an institutional long-term 
memory, which all together show that it is really a secularized version of a feudal 
or religious order. In one of my early texts, written at the same time as Über das 
Neue, I wrote that I would not be surprised if after a new revolution curators would 
be hanged on lampposts in the same way the French aristocracy was, because they 
incorporate the same feudal order. It is possible that we go through a new wave of 
liberation, which started in the 1960s, found its medium in the Internet, and now 
rids itself of the final traces of the feudal order. 
 
TL: And would this also mean the end of the new? 
 
BG: Yes. The problem is that the new itself, in European culture, has of course its 
origin in the New Testament. So what is the new? The New Testament is new in 
relation to the Old Testament. If you don’t have the Old Testament, you can’t have 
a New Testament. That’s only logic. Now, if we have an anti-testamentarian move-
ment, as we have now, almost already full-fledged, then it is all over. There is no 
old, no new, there’s no culture. And I tell you: people experience that as liberation. 
I see that a young generation is very happy about it. And I’m not against it. 
 
TL: In your book, you discuss the issue of representation, and also the struggle of 
minorities or socially oppressed groups that want to be represented in the collection 
or archive. This seems to be a highly topical issue (not only with regard to the 
museum, but for instance also with regard to popular culture, e.g. Hollywood that 
is considered to be too masculine, too white, etc.). However, you are quite sceptical 
of the way this debate is usually framed. You write: “Even if an artist or theoretician 
utilizes things and signs of the social class from which she comes, she has always 
already detached herself from this class and acquired a capacity for observing it 
from without.” (2014, 169). But isn’t it also the question from which direction the 
innovation is supposed to come? In other words: whether it is from the perspective 
of the collection that something appears as new (as you argued in your book), or 
that something from the outside demands access to the collection? In the latter 
case, you might say that claims to just representation or, in Honneth’s terms, cul-
tural recognition, are in fact highly important. 
 
BG: They are relevant. But first of all: if there is a pressure from the outside, a 
struggle to enter the collection, this struggle is almost always successful. Why is 
that? It is always successful because, as I try to show, it corresponds to a certain 
kind of inner logic of the collection itself. It wants to expand. When the collections 
are confronted with something they overlooked they are eager to absorb it. 
 
However, as I tried to discuss in Über das Neue, the question of minority represen-
tation involves two problems. In my view, this whole issue has an American back-
ground. When I went to America some years ago, it was an interesting discovery 
for me that I had to fill in ‘race’ in many forms. I suddenly belonged to the cultural 
majority, because I am a white male. There are 1.5 million Russians living only in 
New York City, many don’t speak English, but they are supposed to belong to the 
majority culture of the US. So first of all, the problem is: what counts as a minority 
and what is the majority? These categories are always problematic. 
 
The second problem is that the individual artist, writer or philosopher never really 
represents his or her culture of origin. Could we say that Baudelaire is typical 
French, that Huysmans is, or who is typical German or Dutch? After all, these 
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artists represent only themselves. The idea that they represent a bigger group is, I 
would say, a very American idea. 
 
TL: But even if you say that the individual artist doesn’t represent a group, you 
still might say that the museum represents a certain western white male culture, 
rather than other cultures, which are present geographically speaking but aren’t 
represented in the museum’s collection. 
 
BG: I agree with that. We have a complicated structure of protest and domestica-
tion. To become a famous French poet you first have to hate everything French, 
to break with the tradition. Like Rimbaud who said: I want to become black, I 
hate France; or Breton who said: when I see a French flag I vomit, and so on. If 
you are really and typical French, you will never get into a French museum, and 
you will never be a French poet of genius, because you will be average French. You 
will have to break all the rules, hate France, committing some crimes is always 
helpful – think of Genet – and only then you get the status of being a great French 
artist. 
 
The problem with the contemporary struggles is that people want to get access to 
the collection, but without putting into question yourself and your own tradition. 
You are not obliged or expected to make this detour, not obliged to become other 
to yourself, which is, actually, the meaning of the word ‘other’. As French philos-
ophy crossed the Atlantic it changed in many ways, but the crucial change was in 
the word ‘other’. In the French tradition, the ‘other’ is either God, or the subcon-
scious, but in any case, it is something living in you that is not you, that can possess 
you, destroy you, take over. You are struggling against it, put it under control or 
otherwise it controls you. It is an old story, and eventually leads to Bataille, Fou-
cault and Derrida, for whom the other is writing: it is not you who write, but 
something in you and through you. But then, after this French philosophy crossed 
the Atlantic Ocean, the ‘other’ become simply: the other guy. People think they 
are already the other, because they are the other guy. This secularization or banali-
zation of otherness is actually what constitutes the major part of contemporary 
discourse.  
I don’t say it’s a wrong development, because secularization is at the core of our 
modern consciousness. I just wanted to point out that, in relation to the concept 
of the new, something changed. My relation to my identity changed. Instead of 
trying to destroy my identity, becoming other to myself and in this way gain access 
to the cultural tradition (as was always the case), now I simply reassert my identity 
and raise a claim to be accepted to the cultural archives, without any kind of suf-
fering or inner struggle. 
 
TL: Today, even more than when you wrote the book, innovation seems to be 
applauded throughout society, especially with regard to economic production. 
Think of Richard Florida’s praise of the creative class and the creative city, everyone 
has to be creative, think outside the box, every product has to be innovative, etc. 
How do you regard this imperative of creativity in the sphere of economic produc-
tion? 
 
BG: I think creativity is nonsense, total nonsense. The notion of creativity is a 
Christian notion per se, it is a residue of religion. I think that, if you are not a 
Catholic, and all these people probably are, you cannot believe in creativity. Man-
kind cannot be creative. It’s the worst form of religious naivety. The only form of 
human productivity is combining, putting things together. The Internet was mod-
elled after an elementary Turing machine, and that was actually a full description 
of what a human mind can do. After all it is just copy and paste. We cannot do 
anything ontologically new; that is the principle of human activity. So creativity is 
divine privilege.  
 
TL: You argue in your book that it is impossible to distinguish authentic from 
inauthentic newness. But don’t you think that newness/novelty means something 
different, or is used in a different way, in different spheres? For instance, the new 
iPhone that one needs to have every couple of years; is it the same kind of newness 
as an innovation in the art world? 
 
BG: A new iPhone is not an innovation. It is repetition. The structural condition 
of innovation is the archive. We have two models in our civilization: the 
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supermarket, and the museum. What is the difference? One model, the museum, 
allows for innovation, because it keeps all the old productions, and so you can 
compare the old with the new. If I introduce a new product in the supermarket, it 
is simply part of the offer. You don’t see what is not offered. Assyrian Gods, for 
instance, are not offered in the supermarket. What is not produced here and now 
is removed from the supermarket, and so we can’t see it. And because you can’t see 
it, you can’t compare it, and because you can’t compare it, you are in the same 
situation as you were before. Maybe you can remember what was in the supermar-
ket two months ago, if you have a good memory, but not for very much longer. So 
if you are not in the archive but in the real world, there is no real change, because 
every moment is like the other moment. As long as you don’t think teleologically 
– so if you don’t think there is an origin, and don’t believe there is an end – you 
cannot differentiate between one moment and another, since you cannot determine 
their distance from the beginning or the end. If you believe in the second coming 
of Christ, you can calculate the distance of a particular moment from the first and 
the second coming, but if there is no such promise, whatever it is, then it is like if 
you’re running on a treadmill: you are running, but you remain in the same place.  
 
When I came to America, there was the Obama campaign, with the posters 
“Change”, and “Yes we can”. I always told my students: changing is the only thing 
we can. There is change today, and change tomorrow. The only real change would 
be a change from change to no change – that is utopia. 
 
TL: But social institutions can change. Replacing the feudal order with a demo-
cratic system is an actual change, isn’t it? 
 
BG: Yes, that was a historical change. But after that, and if there is no longer a 
hierarchy, then you don’t have any change. The problem of our social institutions 
today is rather that they change all the time. You can never find the same person 
in the same place. I don’t think democracy has anything to do with it. What hap-
pened is that ever since the industrial revolution, there is constant technological 
development, and we as humans tried to accommodate to changing situations. 
Every day, all our effort is concentrated on how to survive this day under different 
conditions. I cannot send e-mails because my mail program is obsolete; I can’t 
install a new program, because my computer is obsolete; I cannot buy a new one, 
because I don’t have Internet connection, etc. I spend day after day just trying to 
accommodate to these changes. Today we are witnessing the disappearance of the 
division of labour: you have to do everything yourself on the Internet, become your 
own doctor, taxi driver, and so on. What our civilization is about is basically the 
sheer material survival of mankind. 
 
The protection of human beings is very closely related to the protection of art-
works. Actually, the museum was installed at the same time and by the same people 
who thought of human rights. Human rights are actually the rights of the artwork: 
there is this body that has to be protected, and so you cannot use it, you cannot 
mistreat it, etc. All you can do is look at it, and speak about it. And that is precisely 
what is established in the museum: you look at art, you speak about it, but you 
cannot use it. Human rights are basically art rights. 
 
Now it seems to me that human beings are more and more left to themselves. We 
feel like Mowgli, or Tarzan, so that we have to look for ourselves what is dangerous, 
how we can improve our chances, and so on. Children are raised this way, with a 
very cautious and frightened attitude. If I remember my own young years, I was 
absolutely not frightened, but today my own students are scared to death. They 
have the feeling that if they lose, they’ll simply perish; it is sheer fear for survival. 
They no longer believe in the social conditions for survival. It is an interesting 
period in human history. But there’s no place to think of innovation, only of sur-
vival. 
 
 
III. Innovation and acceleration 
 
TL: A more recent plea for societal innovation and progress has been acceleration-
ism, as explained in Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ much-discussed #Accelerate 
Manifesto from 2013. They argue that capitalism has become a source of stasis ra-
ther than of innovation. Rather than working against the accelerating powers of 
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capitalism – as in the different slow-movements, or romanticizing localism and 
authenticity – we should speed up even further, so as to let capitalism crash against 
its own limits and go beyond it. How do you consider this proposal, or how in 
general would you describe the relationship between acceleration and innovation? 
 
BG: There is no acceleration, there is just more pressure. Moreover, you are not 
the subject of this movement. The problem of accelerationism is the belief that 
you can appropriate this movement and steer it. That is impossible. Even our friend 
Deleuze didn’t believe that. He believed we can enjoy acceleration, but he didn’t 
believe that we could control it, or appropriate it. 
 
TL: In their recent book Inventing the Future. Postcapitalism and a World Without 
Work (2015), Srnicek and Williams further argue that left politics has abandoned 
the idea of progress and modernization, leaving them in the hands of neoliberalism, 
while retreating to a localized and romanticized ‘folk politics’, as they call it. In 
their view, the left should reclaim the future, and the category of the new is the 
instrument to do so. They write: ‘If the supplanting of capitalism is impossible 
from the standpoint of one or even many defensive stances, it is because any form 
of prospective politics must set out to construct the new.’ (75) How would you 
respond to this? 
 
BG: I think that the moment we are experiencing now creates illusions of this type 
in the minds of young people. They believe that they are something like living 
start-ups. It’s a new neoliberal illusion. Our whole development will lead to stag-
nation. First of all, the globe itself is a symbol of stagnation: it circulates, while 
progress is linear. Today we speak not about universalism, but about globalization. 
But globalization is circulation and that means that we already reached the point 
of stagnation. The stagnation is not obvious for most people, because there is still 
a middle class, with its traditional institutions: the universities, the museums, etc. 
But as soon as these collapse, the middle class will also collapse. I sometimes tell 
my students that every day they spent at the university makes them poorer, because 
the people who have money, from Madonna to Bill Gates, never went to school. 
So, we will come to a very traditional situation of poor and rich, and this will 
produce the return of left ideas. Because, as long as you think that you can indi-
vidually cross the bridge between poor and rich, as long as there is still a bridge to 
cross, you will always be neoliberal. You can think what you want, but you will try 
to do so. But if the gap is too wide, like in the 1920s and 1930s, like in Fritz Lang’s 
Metropolis, then the only answer will be left ideas. 
 
TL: What will these left ideas produce, then? A new middle class? 
 
BG: We will see, we don’t know that. I am like Marx: never predict what that 
revolution will produce. He was always against French utopianism. But I think it 
will produce a new Soviet Union. Not precisely in the same way, but to the extent 
that the Soviet Union was basically the administration of stagnation. In the con-
temporary competitive world, it was difficult to keep it. But if the whole world 
becomes stagnating, then the question of world revolution can come again, the 
question of international socialism can come again, the question of world admin-
istration and world state can come again, all the Hegelian/Marxist/Kojevian line 
will come again. Right now, it is suppressed by this running to nowhere. The 
feeling of that may be exciting, but it is a certain period of time, and it will not 
last very long. 
 
TL: So, if I understand you correctly, you say that the left doesn’t need new ideas, 
because these ideas are already there. 
 
BG: Yes. In many ways we are back in the nineteenth century, and that is the 
rhythm of the European culture: the seventeenth century was reactionary, the 
eighteenth century was progressive, the nineteenth reactionary, the twentieth cen-
tury progressive, etc. If you look at the reaction of the nineteenth century to the 
French Revolution, first of all, everybody believed that the Republican democratic 
regime collapsed because they could not succeed structurally, and secondly every-
body believed the revolutionaries were morally evil because they killed children and 
young women on the guillotine. Both this moralization and the disbelief in the 
capacity of survival were general throughout the nineteenth century, but at the end 
everybody was democratic. Now you know how history works, there’s nothing new: 
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now the Soviet Union is totalitarian, terrible repression, women and children 
killed, and it was impossible, it could not survive. But in 70 or 80 years it will be 
completely reversed. So, we should simply relax and wait, for in time we will be 
disappointed by neoliberal illusions and utopias, look at the reality of life, which is 
miserable, and then look at the models, not of the better life, but how to organize 
miserable life. 
 
TL: Like in the saying of Brecht, that communism isn’t the equal distribution of 
wealth, but of poverty. 
 
BG: Of course. And it is as bad as any other social system, but it has at least one 
advantage, that I understood when I went to the West. You really didn’t have Angst, 
this prominent insecurity, and this sheer fear of not surviving the next day. On this 
very basic level people felt themselves totally secure and protected. And I believe 
this desire for stability, protection, and security will emerge again. 
 
Today you see it on the right. Why is that? The West believes it has won the Cold 
War against socialism and communism. But who exactly are the winners? It is 
neoliberalism and religiously coloured nationalism. Now they are fighting each 
other. But they will try to find a compromise, because they have a common feature, 
and that is competition. Neoliberalism believes in the competition of everybody 
against everybody, and the other in the competition of one ethnic group against 
the other. Both hate universalism, and both hate the ideas of solidarity and coop-
eration. They honestly believe that what is best should be defined by competition, 
and if you don’t arrange a harsh competition you won’t know what is the best, or 
who is capable of winning. The problem is that, as I believe, man isn’t capable of 
anything at all. The problem of nationalism and neoliberalism, then, is still the 
illusion of humanism, that humans can be creative, competitive, determine their 
own lives, can be responsible for themselves, and so on. They believe there is this 
kind of potential in human beings to deal with and manage any burden, going 
through any difficulty and making it: the American Dream. But it’s all a huge lie, 
and the challenge is to see it as a huge lie that was only invented to terrorize people. 
To say to them: why are you poor, you have to make an effort, you have to struggle, 
you have to constantly improve and update yourself. Somehow, and at a certain 
point in time, we have to be relieved from this blackmail. 
 
When I was a child and responsive to these things, I was always fascinated by these 
Russian posters, saying: let us reach the level of the current day. This presupposed 
that we are somehow always behind. Stalin, who was a good thinker and much 
more honest than everybody else, said: when we really understand Marxism and 
Leninism, we should accept that our situation is always a bit ahead of our ability 
to reflect on it. So, our thinking is behind our real situation. And that is precisely 
what connects capitalism and socialism, this belief in the powers that are faster 
than we can think.  
 
 
IV. The future of the new 
 
TL: Let’s return once more to the concept of the new in relation to the art world. 
In the Dutch book of essays on your work, Dirk van Bastelaere argues that the 
concept ‘entropy’ you use in Logik der Sammlung (according to which the collection 
constantly extends and absorbs that which it is not) should – in line with your own 
economic jargon – be replaced by the concept ‘inflation’, which is less neutral. 
Inflation would then mean that the increase in artistic innovations (and hence the 
culturalization of profane domains) implies at the same time a decrease in value of 
these innovations. (Bastelaere et al. 2013, 85). Do you agree with that diagnosis? 
 
BG: If we follow our earlier line of thinking, that is if the whole system of selection 
and representation collapses, then the new will have no value at all. It only makes 
sense if you have the archives and institution – and the critique of institutions is 
part of it. Without the institutions, the critique of institutions obviously makes no 
sense. Art that leaves the museum [e.g. street art, land art, performance art, commu-
nity art, TL] always has to return to the museum in the shape of documentation. 
So, whatever you do outside of the museum, also in contemporary art, has cultural 
value only if it is afterwards represented in the museum in the form of documen-
tation. 
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TL: In an interview I did with Luc Boltanski (Celikates and Lijster 2015) he ar-
gued, following Isabelle Graw, that the economic valuation of art works can never 
persist without the aesthetic valuation by critics, curators, artists, etc. If the two 
merge this is also destructive for the economic valuation. Do you agree with this 
analysis, and should this reassure us that market forces could never take over the 
art world completely? 
 
BG: I think that art becomes more and more like a luxury product, like china or 
perfume. Everyone can make art, but not everybody makes a living from art. But if 
you don’t make a living from art, it doesn’t mean that you’re not an artist. If you 
speak about professional art, you speak about making a living from art. Then it 
becomes simply a segment of the general market, and it’s the same as Armani de-
sign and so on. If you look at creative districts in China, you see design, cutlery 
stores, fashion, art galleries, all together. But then it has nothing to do with general 
society. 
 
TL: Is that so different from seventeenth century Holland, when art was also a 
luxury product? 
 
BG: The institution of the museum, as you know, was created after the French 
Revolution. The revolutionaries took the objects of use from the aristocracy and 
instead of destroying them, they disenfranchised them and exhibited them, but 
forbid their use. It was a decision in between iconoclasm and iconophilia. What 
Duchamp later did was a repetition of this gesture – it is the same gesture.  
This museum is a public space. Privatization recreates the situation as it was before 
the French Revolution, but then we can no longer speak of public institutions and 
we lose historical consciousness. So the problem is not if Isabelle Graw or someone 
else finds some painting beautiful, according to a certain aesthetic theory. The 
question is: Is a certain artwork historically representative, so that it can be put in 
the museum? For a private collector, this question has no relevance, because it is 
his taste that matters, and not the archival importance. After writing Über das 
Neue, I was invited to Switzerland, where they organize schools for leading Euro-
pean collectors. I told them I considered these collections as installations and not 
as museums, because the installation is the assemblage of objects according to a 
certain taste. At the moment you privatize, you get involved in private passions and 
relationships that have nothing to do with an archive. 
 
I tend to think that the model I proposed is probably a model for secularized cul-
ture that started with the French Revolution and ended with the end of com-
munism. Now this system of culture in general collapses – it still survives of course, 
this process of collapsing takes very long, and maybe the archives survive in another 
way. The first libraries were private collections, the first art collections were in the 
pyramids, and they survived. So maybe they will survive in a certain way, in so far 
as they survive the current model. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1] Boris Groys (1992) Über das Neue. Versuch einer Kulturökonomie. München: Carl Hanser. Refer-
ences in this text are to the English translation published in 2014: On the new, transl. G.M. Gosh-
garian, London and New York: Verso. 
 
2] This brings Groys’ theory of artistic innovation close to Jacques Rancière’s idea that aesthetics and 
politics are both characterized by la partage du sensible, the redistribution of what can be seen, heard, 
etc. See Rancière (2010). 
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Black Transparency in the Era of Post-Truth 
Patricia de Vries 
 
On the left the Lake of Deep Conviction. 
Truth breaks from the bottom and bobs to the surface. 
Wisława Symborska – Utopia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of Metahaven (2016) Black Transparency: The Right to 
Know in the Age of Mass Surveillance. Berlin: Sternberg Press, 205 
pp. 
 
In 2016, Oxford Dictionaries announced ‘post-truth’ as the word of the year after 
it had witnessed a spike in its usage in the context of a politically charged year. Me-
tahaven’s Black Transparency: The Right to Know in the Age of Mass Surveillance 
(Sternberg Press, 2016) could be read as an elegy for this award-winning word, 
which allegedly describes our current predicament. Over the last decade, Metaha-
ven, an Amsterdam-based research and design studio staffed by Vinca Kruk and 
Daniel van der Velden and founded in 2007, has become an international brand, 
generating its own genre in design with a particular mix of politics with avant-
garde aesthetics and graphic design. This has led to multiple international exhibi-
tions, presentations and publications of essays and books. Black Transparency – part 
zine, part literature review, part essay – probes how transparency as a principle 
intersects with spin, political activism, design, architecture and internet (pop) cul-
ture. In the book, the authors reflect on the implications of “the geopolitical ar-
chitecture of “planetary-scale computation,”” a concept taken from Benjamin Brat-
ton with which Metahaven refers to the “overlaying of the world with digital 
networks” (3). The internet in this centralized structure, has become a geopolitical 
disruptive weapon (90). Metahaven grieves the loss of the early internet, and ex-
presses hope for a “relocalized internet governed by its citizens” (112). 
The politics at play in Black Transparency are a mixture of positions. A nostalgic 
approach to the internet, combined with a high premium on transparency. Add a 
dash of libertarian paranoia towards the establishment, sautéed with a ‘fix the in-
ternet’ attitude of the hacker culture. Parts of the book read like an ambivalent, 
and at times stammering, farewell letter to a lost love. The jilted party is the trans-
parency movement, more specifically, the whistleblowing platform WikiLeaks: 
“[w]hat once was an “intelligence agency of the people” gradually became transpar-
ency’s shipwreck” (48). Metahaven has been championing WikiLeaks since 2010, 
in part through a visual investigation of the politics and aesthetics of transparency. 
In 2011, they designed WikiLeaks merchandise: buttons, band-inspired T-shirts 
with file names leaked by WikiLeaks, and translucent silk scarves with ‘WikiLeaks’ 
printed on them. The profits were donated to WikiLeaks. Black Transparency in-
cludes images of the merchandise, as well as info-graphics mapping out the ascent 
of WikiLeaks onto the geopolitical stage, and the celebrity-cult that surrounded it 
at the height of its fame in 2013. 
 
At the core of Black Transparency lies the authors’ critique of the modern state: 
nominally democratic governments conceal their fundamental reliance on secrecy. 
Secrecy is spelled out as “an informational privilege enjoyed by those in power” (2). 
The state’s informational privilege has increased thanks to “preemptive electronic 
surveillance of potentially every global subject, […] expanding the state’s monopoly 
on violence into precognitive policing of all thought and action” (3). The state’s 
spying capabilities are aided by our fondness of everything “smart,” and our yearn-
ing to be seen. The modern surveillance state signifies a structural change in the 
governance of democratic societies, Metahaven contends (3). It “recedes into neo-
feudal rule by tech-overlords and extra-legal sovereigns” (57). The horseman of 
this neo-feudalism is the public-private nexus, a “Holy Alliance that binds old-
style arcana imperii to the latest cloud technology” (57).  
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Against this backdrop of “unprecedented online surveillance by governments” black 
transparency is a “frontal attack” on the autonomy of a state “that wants more 
control” (2,3). What makes black transparency ‘black’ is the method of disclosure; 
how information becomes available is “of decisive importance to its political im-
pact” (1). “[D]emocratic change” can be effected when the disclosure of infor-
mation is uninvited, unexpected, and seemingly spontaneous. The “involuntary 
transparency” of black transparency sides with the unpredictable and anonymous 
disclosures of organizations like WikiLeaks, and whistleblowers such as Edward 
Snowden and Chelsea Manning (xiii). It is designed to reveal “truths that are hid-
den under the cloak of state secrecy” (38). Black transparency reveals its secrets 
with the aim of embarrassing and destabilizing the security complex of the state 
(6), and does so “in defense of the public” (4). Black transparency reveals three 
things at once: the secret itself, the frantic panic of its keepers once the secret is 
released, and, thirdly, the spin around its disclosure (62). The ‘black’ in black trans-
parency further means “more or less, “in darkness” as opposed to “in the light,”” 
(4), with which they mean to remain hidden, unidentified, and opaque. All anti-
dotes to global surveillance go under shades of black, Metahaven argues (3). The 
examples given are: the Blackphone, Dark Wallet, cryptography, the Dark Web, 
and #BlackLivesMatter. In an age of mass surveillance, an allegiance to (encrypted) 
anonymity is seen as an act of resistance: anonymity for the powerless, transparency 
for the powerful. In the opening pages of Black Transparency Metahaven argues 
that “there is no transparency without enlightenment,” and “under transparency 
the state loses the informational privilege [secrets] that allows it to maintain itself” 
(xiv). However, already in the introduction of the book they foreshadow black 
transparency’s demise: “Symbolically, black transparency meets its end in Russia 
[…] where nothing is true and everything is possible” (6).  
 
Black Transparency has been a few years in the making – two of the six chapters 
have been published on e-flux in 2012. The book as a whole reflects how trans-
formative those years have been for Metahaven. The first chapters sing of a love of 
WikiLeaks, echo the – by now – worn-out slogans of the transparency movement, 
and the old Enlightenment meme that truth shall prevail. The last three chapters 
argue that we have become captives of cloud computation, surveilled by centralized 
corporations, and that spin and propaganda appears to be more powerful than 
truth. But before we get there, we need to read through a fairly long tribute to the 
transparency movement. In the chapter titled “There is no Organization, There is 
Only You”, Metahaven contends that “Information is Power” (27). “Knowledge is 
Power” (24). “Transparency is Absolute Power” (24). If we are to believe Metaha-
ven, transparency is designed to “confront liberal democracy with its hypocrisy” 
(31) and uncover the world’s injustices and conspiracies (26). It lays bare the “secret 
machinations of the powerful” (56). Transparency, they claim, holds power ac-
countable through “action driven by understanding” (37). Informing the public, as 
a means to “undercut the government” can cause “far-reaching forms of democratic 
change,” Metahaven suggests (2). These parts of the book may leave the reader 
desiring for a more tightly edited plea to this modernist Enlightenment value.  
 
As a counterpoint, there is a wealth of critical literature both on WikiLeaks and 
on the transparency movement that could have been engaged with. Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, for instance, questions the naïve assumption that knowledge in the form 
of exposure will motivate people into action. “It’s strange that a hermeneutics of 
suspicion would appear so trusting about the effects of exposure,” she writes (Sedg-
wick 2003, 138f). “[A]s though to make something visible as a problem were, if 
not a mere hop, skip, and jump away from getting it solved, at least self-evidently 
a step in that direction” (139). Mark Fenster makes a similar point. He critiques 
the cybernetic assumptions of the transparency movement in which “the state is 
defined by its “streams of information”” (Fenster 2015, 153). Disclosure is here 
understood as “the transmission of information from state to public, and assumes 
that transmission will banish public ignorance, magically transform public dis-
course, and allow the true public to appear and triumph” (152). In an article in 
New Republic, Lawrence Lessig is concerned with the ideological signature of trans-
parency. People’s responses to information are inseparable from their interests and 
desires, he asserts. “What we believe will be confirmed, again and again” (Lessig 
2009). Information is mediated, as Richard Grusin argues, and “mediation is itself 
immediate”, “life itself is a form of mediation” (Grusin 2015, 132). In Publicity’s 
Secret (2002) Jodi Dean claims that transparency and secrecy form a false dualism. 
She critiques the reduction of politics into revealing what is concealed – 
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considering that great miscarriages of justice happen in plain sight, in the realm of 
the hypervisible. Clare Birchall complicates the intractable relation between trans-
parency and secrecy. “[T]ransparency can have the same effects as secrecy, and se-
crecy can flourish in “transparent” realms” (7). Furthermore, Geert Lovink and 
Patrice Riemens argue in “Twelve Theses on WikiLeaks” that the black box strat-
egy of transparency activists, aiming to be opaque in order to force transparency 
upon others, amounts to “little more than Mad magazine’s Spy vs. Spy cartoons” 
(Lovink and Riemens 2010). The first chapters of Black Transparency might have 
felt less dated if it had addressed how Metahaven’s notion of ‘black transparency’ is 
situated in a wider body of knowledge. 
 
Power and knowledge do not form an automatic nexus that can be triggered by 
more information. The cybernetic notion that with the right information systems 
will adapt and change is unfortunately flawed. We often become caught up in ra-
tionalizations that only confirm what we think we know; we see what we believe. 
Bringing more information to the surface does not necessarily produce truth, let 
alone instigate structural transformation. Can political life be reduced to infor-
mation? Is it knowable, or, for that matter, inherently teleological? According to 
transparency advocates, with the right information you can make purposeful ad-
justments, even systemic changes, to our political realities. Disclosures decrease the 
ability of a regime to hold on to power. This, too, expresses a fear of contingency 
and losing control. Equally problematic is the quasi-missionary propensity to bring 
to light the dark secrets of government, inform the uninformed masses in order to 
make the world a better place. This conjures spirits of truth-bearing institutions 
imposed on societies. Instead of challenging their own will to know, or the kind 
of subjectivity transparency produces, Metahaven swaps one absolute for another, 
and, as this part of the book stands, comes close to propagating the very kind of 
practices they aim to discredit.  
 
The plot thickens in the final chapter of the book “When Pixels Become Territo-
ries”, in which black transparency finds its end. The chapter reflects on the image 
economy surrounding the 2014 war between Ukraine and Russia. Metahaven ar-
gues that the conflict was for an important part fought “on internet server farms” 
(155). The war was characterized by “alternative explanations,” (162) “energized, 
recreated, and post-produced through social media, image manipulation, fiction 
writing and role playing” (155). During the conflict, Russian workers at the St. 
Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) were paid to post thousands of 
pro-Russian comments on Western media articles about the war. In the summer 
of 2014, The Guardian reported of 40K comments a day on its Russian and Ukraine 
related articles. Some of the other unlikely foot soldiers in this proxy cyber-war 
were a Moscow-based design studio, a Vietnamese amateur illustrator, a WikiLeaks 
retweet of a conspiracy theory, some leaked documents, a nationalist anime 
YouTube music video chock-full of political spin, in addition to coverage on the 
are by a labyrinth of state-owned Russian media outlets. In this dazzling, premedi-
ated, networked mess, it is impossible to make sense of truth, Metahaven decries. 
Their inspirator, WikiLeaks, is “allied with a power that should be its target,” they 
lament (164). “Planetary-scale computation […] is transforming geopolitics in ways 
we are yet to understand,” Metahaven claims (155). “‘[T]he world in general never 
appeared as opaque as now,” they insist (6). Empowered by networks of planetary-
scale computation, “[f]antasy and reality, fiction and fact, are made equivalent” 
(164). Such a post-truth condition, in which “nothing is true,” is “immune to black 
transparency’s most fundamental critique of the state” (164). Black transparency 
has become “part of an order where fantasy and reality coexist” and cannot provide 
a way out of this conundrum (167).  
 
What we are left with is propaganda, Metahaven maintains. And indeed, meme-
wars, fake-news, alternative facts, ransomware, and conspiracy theories about for-
eign hackers proliferated during the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum, and further acceler-
ated during the 2016 US election. Our lives today are dependent on computational 
systems that are deeply connected, interconnected, embedded and integrated. The 
under-examined yet palpable capabilities and fragility of these networked systems 
have caused some to feel more vulnerable. Has the Enlightenment model of politics 
come to its logical end? Has the post-truth society outpaced the information age? 
Have the central mediators of authority of the twentieth century run aground?  
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Metahaven sets out a zealous set of stipulations and questions. Confronted with 
their own assumptions of certainty, stability and truth, Metahaven seems anxious 
to see whistleblowers and transparency activists end up in a knife-fight with ‘alter-
native facts’ and fake news ready to be believed and widely shared on media plat-
forms by their ideological cohorts. If spin and memes are more decisive than factual 
content, how can we make sense of truth? And who has the power of interpreta-
tion?, Metahaven asks in their cri de coeur.  
 
Perhaps we need to ask a different question. For many “minorities” – a tremendous 
misnomer, as minorities form a majority – the basic institutions of authority of the 
twentieth century failed to provide a common ground to begin with. They know 
what it means to be exposed to reactionary power politics – and for that matter to 
racism, classism, and sexism. For decades, feminists, postcolonial, queer and gender 
theorists, poets, and artists alike have been challenging the presumed universal 
subject of Enlightenment. For decades they have been deconstructing the power 
structures inherent to knowledge production. For decades they have questioned 
the androcentric, ethnocentric and ideological assumptions of what constitutes 
Truth in the first place. ““The modern liberal subject”: by now it seems, or ought 
to seem, anything but an obvious choice as the unique terminus ad quem” (Sedg-
wick 2003, 139). Instead of linearly opposing the power structures of Truth, instead 
of swapping one Truth for another (mine is better than yours), these thinkers have 
pointed to the historical contingency of all ‘facts’, and continue to defend com-
plexity, arguing for the need of new ontologies and epistemologies, and radically 
inclusive narratives. What is more, as Audre Lorde, who pulled no punches, argues 
in Sister Outsider (1984): “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house” (Lorde 1984, 112). It may temporarily beat the master at his own game, but 
it will “never bring about genuine change” (112). And if this makes you feel un-
comfortable, you are too attached to the master’s house, Lorde maintains (112).  
 
Black Transparency ends with an anecdote on Pussy Riot’s anti-Putin ‘Punk Prayer’ 
performance in a Moscow cathedral in 2012. Metahaven considers the Russian 
feminist punk band the logical successor of black transparency. Pussy Riot’s inter-
ventions “trigger responses that are themselves disclosures,” Metahaven contends 
(168). To what end?, we may ask. Post-truth is not remedied by disclosures, by 
generating more proof as alternatives to the alternative facts, nor by fighting prop-
aganda with propaganda, truths with counter-truths. Reality is irreducible to ‘facts.’ 
Are we willing and able to step out of the power structures that produce post-
truth, even if this means a loss of power? Are we willing to compromise (our) 
Truth? Compromise does not mean one cannot have (and fight for) strong convic-
tions. Compromise means increasing your ability to relate, and this entails taking 
into account your obligation to and interconnection with other people and things, 
known and unknown. 
 
Any counter-strategy that could attend to networked propaganda, the optimization 
of bias, trolls, meme-wars, echo chambers, and other machinations of power, would 
first have to make peace with the uncertain, the unfounded – without actual ex-
amples, without field guides, pointing to uncharted territory beyond rules. Perhaps 
we should ask: how to shift the focus, not to bring in the promise of greater trans-
parency or Truth, but to recognize blackness as an inherent condition of truth? 
How to position ourselves as open to other ways of seeing and knowing? To do the 
work of dismantling the master’s house means first admitting the loss of mastery.  
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Review of Nick Srnicek (2016) Platform Capitalism. Cambridge and 
Malden: Polity Press, 120 pp. 
  
When reflecting on the impact of digital technologies on capitalism, what exactly 
are we referring to when we use the term ‘capitalism’? Is it an economic system 
wedded to a particular mode of production – one rooted in private property, market 
competition, and the profit motive? Is it a juridico-moral constellation whose nor-
mative framework grounds and protects the competitive pursuit of property and 
profit? Or rather, is it in essence a political theory whose logic of “possessive indi-
vidualism” (Macpherson 1962) is internalized by subjects operating on the assump-
tion that the market will allow them to flourish in freedom? Such questions re-
garding the identity and scope of capitalism may seem to express a merely theoret-
ical concern, yet they do in fact shape the kinds of research that can be conducted, 
insofar as they delineate what (institutional) actors and processes can be included 
as legitimate objects of study. Although many critics would likely agree that capi-
talism is a dynamic and heterogeneous assemblage which incorporates all three 
aspects suggested above, the adjudication of their respective pertinence – and thus 
the extent to which each receives scrutiny – will undoubtedly be informed by dis-
ciplinary interests. Moreover, it is capitalism’s very heterogeneity and dynamism 
that complicates any attempt to grasp it as a monolithic whole, so as scholars we 
necessarily opt for particular approaches that foreclose others.  
 
One therefore cannot fault Nick Srnicek for providing an unapologetically econo-
mistic reading of the most recent transformations in capitalism’s longue durée, 
which have been propelled by the rising ubiquity of digital platforms ranging from 
Google, Facebook, and Amazon to Uber, Airbnb, and Deliveroo. In Platform Cap-
italism, Srnicek offers his readers a sharp, concise, and historically sensitive account 
of what is and isn’t new about companies that mobilize platforms both as a tech-
nological architecture and a business model for gaining a competitive advantage 
and to create novel forms of value. In doing so, he usefully counters much of the 
hype that has inevitably accumulated around the platform concept, yet – as I will 
argue below – his focus on platform companies as primarily economic actors also 
obscures a number of ways in which these companies, and platform capitalism more 
generally, are transforming societies on a global scale. Srnicek justifies his narrow 
approach in the book’s introduction, by distinguishing it from existing studies on 
the digital economy which, despite their numerous contributions, have neglected 
“economic issues around ownership and profitability” or have detached such issues 
from their history (Srnicek 2). In response, Platform Capitalism “aims to supple-
ment these other perspectives by giving an economic history of capitalism and dig-
ital technology, while recognizing the diversity of economic forms and the com-
petitive tensions inherent in the contemporary economy” (2-3). The three chapters 
that comprise Srnicek’s slender volume realize this aim by subsequently looking at 
the past, present, and future of platform capitalism. Ultimately, according to 
Srnicek, this conceptual approach “is important for how we think strategically and 
develop political tactics to transform society” (7), although his analysis unfortu-
nately stops short of developing such tactics in any detail. After considering the 
arguments put forward in each chapter, I will suggest that this omission can be 
partly attributed to the book’s lack of engagement with what exceeds the parame-
ters of its business-centric assessment. 
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Past 
 
Chapter 1, “The Long Downturn”, sets out to “historicize emerging technologies 
as an outcome of deeper capitalist tendencies” (7) by attending to three relatively 
recent events that presumably express such tendencies: the response to the eco-
nomic downturn of the 1970s; the expansion and subsequent implosion of the dot-
com bubble around the turn of the twenty-first century; and the aftermath of the 
2007-8 financial crisis. I write “presumably” here not so much to question Srnicek’s 
account as to highlight the point that it matters what story is being told about 
capitalism, for it determines how we apprehend and evaluate the agents driving its 
change. For Srnicek, capitalism is essentially marked by “generalized market de-
pendency” that ensures a “systemic imperative to reduce production costs in rela-
tion to prices” for goods and services, which requires the constant optimization of 
labor processes and productivity through technological innovation (11). This nar-
rative concerning capitalism’s core tendencies, which focuses on competition be-
tween firms while largely limiting the role of national governments to the creation 
of monetary policies that stimulate investments in private assets, will turn out to 
inform his later assessment of platform capitalism – for better and for worse.  
 
What I appreciated about Srnicek’s analysis in this chapter is his effort to show 
how capitalism as a mode of production crucially depends on both technological 
and financial support in its ceaseless quest for capital accumulation. The three mo-
ments he takes as exemplary expressions of capitalism’s will to power/profitability 
are connected by the fact that each represents a next phase in the ongoing restruc-
turing of the modern corporation into an agile business entity, whose contempo-
rary expression is the platform company. Such a business entity concentrates on 
high value-adding activities while divesting itself from “downstream” employment 
liabilities through technology-enabled outsourcing and subcontracting practices 
that remotely manage its fissured supply chains, (ostensibly reconfigured into so-
called “value ecosystems” in today’s platform economy).  
 
Moreover, this restructuring has been shaped by the increased role of financial 
markets and instruments, which in turn have been bolstered by deregulation and 
loose monetary policies. As Srnicek rightfully points out with respect to the spec-
tacular growth of venture and equity capital investment in tech companies during 
the 1990s, these policies did not only lay the groundwork for the digital economy 
but also precipitated the 2001 stock market crash as well as the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis. Yet he also ignores some important processes and actors, which produces 
some critical blind spots in his account.  
 
For instance, he does not pay attention to how financialization has affected business 
practices and objectives, especially in relation to human resource management. Alt-
hough he mentions the importance of shareholder value in corporate decision-
making, there is no discussion of how the proliferation of share repurchasing, or 
the increased role of financial service provision which shifts corporations’ core busi-
ness from producing goods/services to rent-seeking, have had deleterious conse-
quences for labor (Lazonick 2010; Thompson 2016). Furthermore, while Srnicek 
notes that unions during the 1980s “faced an all-out assault and were eventually 
broken” (17-18), he does not explain how this assault was the result of concerted 
government efforts. As Peck and Theodore (2012, 746) have noted, in the US these 
efforts “crystallized in the Reagan administration’s economic program, which not 
only authorized wide ranging welfare retrenchments, while taking the fight to or-
ganized labor in the form of antiunion stances and policies, but also articulated a 
normatively positive discourse of labor market ‘flexibility,’ while (directly and in-
directly) sanctioning the expansion of contingent labor practices.” In other words, 
national governments do more than create favorable monetary policy; they are ac-
tive (activist) agents in capitalism’s evolution, shaping the conditions for capital 
accumulation and labor organization. This is not just a matter of companies taking 
advantage of deregulation and doing what they must to cut costs and meet their 
bottom line, as Srnicek’s story implies. This is about neoliberal governance as a 
dynamic mode of intensive regulatory experimentation that reconfigures relations 
between business, finance, and labor while also reimagining the role of the state. 
Interestingly, Srnicek does not once refer to neoliberalism in this book, which may 
signal his distaste for the term or his reluctance to consider capitalism as a mutating 
political project – now increasingly concerned with governing by debt (Lazzarato 
2015) – rather than solely a mode of production. 
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Present 
 
Chapter 1 ends with a portrayal of “the present conjuncture” as defined by fiscal 
austerity, corporate tax evasion and cash glut triggering risky investments, and 
growing job and income insecurity (Srnicek, 34-35). This sets the scene for chapter 
2, “Platform Capitalism”, in which Srnicek focuses his narrative on the rise of plat-
forms as the new technology for extracting, processing, and analyzing data, which 
have become a central source of profit generation and competitive advantage in the 
digital economy. If this seems like a bit of a leap that’s because it is, as the chapter 
offers no discussion of how each of the last three recessions (1990-91, 2000-02, 
and 2007-09) was followed not only by a “jobless recovery” (Peck and Theodore 
2006), but also by a new stage in the development of networked information and 
communication technologies: the World Wide Web, the so-called “Web 2.0”, and 
pervasive mobile internet connectivity. Each stage featured experiments with new 
forms of capitalist value-creation and extraction in the face of waning economic 
growth, yet what ultimately ties these experiments together is their quest to or-
chestrate increasingly frictionless markets by optimizing the distribution of infor-
mation (or its proxy: data) as well as the management and prediction of human 
behavior (through data analytics). Each stage, then, can be understood as a partic-
ular yet cumulative articulation of behavioral economics with cybernetic reason. 
Srnicek does not address this development, however, and while he mentions the 
massive investments in internet infrastructure during the 1990s boom, I particu-
larly missed an appraisal of Tim O’Reilly’s (2005) influential “Web as Platform” 
idea, which both envisioned and reflected a reconfiguration of the web into a pro-
grammable, data-driven, and “social” architecture. Despite this oversight, Srnicek 
offers a useful description of platforms as a new kind of firm that owns and manages 
a computational infrastructure which intermediates between different user-groups 
and governs their interaction possibilities, while “displaying monopoly tendencies 
driven by network effects” (48; see also Bratton 2016: 41-51). The rest of the chap-
ter is dedicated to an overview of the emerging platform landscape, presenting and 
evaluating five platform types: advertising, cloud, industrial, product, and lean plat-
forms. 
 
Space constraints prevent me from attending to each in detail, so instead I will only 
address his argument concerning the latter type. His main criticism of lean plat-
forms such as Uber, Airbnb, and other “sharing economy” start-ups is that their 
business model is unsustainable and they do not add anything new to the digital 
economy. Whereas other platform types have amassed significant assets in the form 
of hardware and other fixed capital (think of Google’s server farms), allowing them 
to gain a competitive advantage and become profitable, lean platforms operate ac-
cording to what Srnicek calls a “hyper-outsourced model” that renders them de-
pendent on third parties – most notably cloud platforms like Amazon for compu-
ting and storage capacity, and users for household assets (Airbnb) as well as labor 
power (Uber) (76). While this assessment is proving to be increasingly accurate, as 
lean platforms are tentatively starting to invest in physical assets, I think it also 
neglects a novelty that is quite important. Peer-to-peer markets do not seem to 
concern Srnicek much, but they should, because beyond their potential to domi-
nate various industries, lean platforms are fundamentally transforming how people 
consume and produce goods/services. By allowing them to instantly access and 
monetize any potential asset, they diffuse market logics and entrepreneurial ration-
alities – i.e. the spirit of neoliberal capitalism – into new territories. Likewise, these 
platforms are altering working conditions and labor market norms across the board. 
While Srnicek is correct to argue that today’s gig economy is “effectively an accel-
eration of the long-term tendency towards more precarious employment, particu-
larly after 2008” (79), this does not mean that platform-mediated labor just entails 
more of the same. For example, temporary-staffing companies such as Randstad 
are now experimenting with digital platforms to expand and diversify their opera-
tions as global labor market intermediaries, increasingly moving toward a data-
intensive and zero-liability “workforce-as-a-service” model (Van Doorn 2017). 
Even though many lean platforms will undoubtedly be forced to fold in an ultra-
competitive field with decreasing VC investment, the more successful ones will 
consolidate and converge just like other types of platforms, meanwhile stimulating 
profound changes in how people work (think algorithmic management) and gen-
erate an income.  
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Future 
 
This brings me to the book’s final chapter, “Great Platform Wars”, in which 
Srnicek lays out what he views as platform capitalism’s primary tendencies and 
challenges in the (near) future. Here his narrow approach to capitalism as essen-
tially revolving around inter-firm – or “intracapitalist” (95) – competition is most 
pronounced, which results in some perceptive yet ultimately rather limited obser-
vations about the shape of what is to come. The tendencies he discusses, which are 
understood to be driven by platform companies’ innate proclivity to monopolize, 
include the expansion of data extraction and analytics into all spheres of live, the 
need to safeguard one’s strategic position within value ecosystems, the progressive 
enclosure of these ecosystems into “silos”, and the convergence of companies to-
ward similar markets. Subsequently, the identified challenges mainly deal with the 
obstacles different types of platforms are facing as they attempt to achieve profita-
bility in various industries, despite their competitive advantages. What I found 
most thought-provoking in this part of the book were Srnicek’s brief speculations 
on new business models which focus on rent-seeking in a “post-advertising envi-
ronment” where platforms are facilitating a shift from consumer ownership to ac-
cess. A possible corollary of this shift could be “a massive expansion of micro-
payments, as the IoT (Internet of Things) enables every good to be turned into a 
service that charges by the use: cars, computers, doors, refrigerators, toilets” (124). 
Whereas most analyses of the platform economy tend to assume the insatiability 
of the data-driven advertising industry, thereby assuming the durability of the 
“free” social media model and the partnership between platform companies, adver-
tisers, and data-brokers which sponsors this model, such a constellation cannot be 
expected to survive indefinitely. And when (not if) the data bubble finally bursts, 
powerful platform companies like Google and Facebook will need to radically alter 
their monetization strategies – a necessity that is not lost on these companies, both 
of which continue to diversify their portfolio. 
 
So is the era of “everything-as-a-service” upon us? Is this hyper-extractive and ul-
tra-contingent model the future of capitalism? How will this impact our lives as 
well as our livelihoods, and what can we do to resist or deter this future – if we’d 
be so inclined? In the last few pages Srnicek considers some alternatives, ranging 
from stricter regulation and platform cooperatives – which he quickly dismisses – 
to creating collectively-owned platforms whose services are offered as public utili-
ties. But these suggestions are little more than afterthoughts and, besides the ques-
tion of how platform coops are different from “platforms owned and controlled by 
the people” (128), it is entirely unclear how one would go about mobilizing “the 
state’s vast resources” to build “postcapitalist platforms” whose control over col-
lected data would nevertheless remain “independent of the surveillance state appa-
ratus” (ibid.). Moreover, this assumes a clear distinction between the imperatives 
of public institutions, such as (supra)national governments, and private (platform) 
companies, which has become increasingly untenable since the rise of neoliberal 
statecraft. One example is the European Union’s Digital Single Market strategy, 
which has embraced the “collaborative economy” as a site for economic growth and 
aims to facilitate platform-based market innovations across Europe. Platform cap-
italism is more than a new version of a legacy system based on competition and 
profitability; it is also an updated political rationality. Platform companies know 
this very well and are fully invested in shaping its outcomes, having moved from 
regulatory arbitrage – i.e. taking advantage of legal loopholes – toward regulatory 
capture and policy entrepreneurship on multiple levels of government. 
 
On a local level, meanwhile, we see the proliferation of self-proclaimed “Sharing 
Cities” experimenting with public-private partnerships in order to supplement and 
improve public services via private platforms. Such initiatives can be seen as a re-
sponse to the growing pressure on municipalities to take on more responsibilities 
while faced with waning resources, where platforms for peer-to-peer services like 
meal-sharing are filling gaps in public provisioning while also stimulating local 
entrepreneurship and social cohesion. This brings me to my final remark with re-
spect to Srnicek’s argument: beyond a mode of production capitalism is also, cru-
cially, a mode of social reproduction. This means that to understand the future of 
neoliberal capitalism mediated by platforms we will also have to examine how these 
technologies reconfigure what Nancy Fraser (2014) has called “Marx’s hidden 
abode”: the deeply gendered, classed, and racialized organization of care and 
maintenance work that has remained invisible in most economic analyses, due to 
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its largely informal nature, while it sustains labor power and capital accumulation. 
This would necessitate an expansion of Platform Capitalism’s parameters, acknowl-
edging the ways in which platforms, as new institutional forms, are pervading our 
everyday lives while reshaping relations – and further blurring lines – between the 
market, the state, and civil society. I believe that such a strategic move would allow 
us to develop more capacious political tactics than have thus far been offered. 
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Review of Ulrich Bröckling (2015) The Entrepreneurial Self: Fabri-
cating a New Type of Subject. London: Sage Publications, 256 pp. 
 
The newly translated habilitation thesis of Ulrich Bröckling, The Entrepreneurial 
Self, forms an impressive and commendable overview of the forces of subjectifica-
tion shaping entrepreneurial subjects of the neoliberal capitalist era into entrepre-
neurial selves. The subject, in this Foucauldian study, is no longer a transhistorical 
figure, but is itself constituted through power relations and modes of governing, 
moulding and taking advantage of it. Studying this subject, then, comes down to 
an examination of these creative fields of force. Analysing these fields of force, the 
study of the entrepreneurial self also tells a story about the nature of neoliberal 
capitalism. Neoliberalism seeks to universalise the principles of competition found 
in capitalist markets throughout society. It recognises, however, that such markets 
do not suddenly appear and run all by themselves. They need competitive subjects 
to complement them: entrepreneurial selves. 
 
Bröckling’s rich monograph is an exercise in the research field called ‘studies of 
governmentality’, following in the footsteps of figures such as Michel Foucault and 
Nikolas Rose. Governmentality – or the “conduct of conduct” – points to 
programmes and techniques that aim at changing, steering and guiding the behav-
iour of human beings. Governmentality does not mean fully controlling or deter-
mining the conduct of the subject, but structuring its field of possible action 
(Bröckling 2016, 8-9). It is this structuring that forms the object of Bröckling’s 
investigation. The resulting ‘genealogy of subjectification’ presented in this book 
is thus less a comprehensive description of what an entrepreneurial subject looks 
like, but, rather, an account of what forms of knowledge, methods, techniques and 
practices are mobilised to actively shape this subject (Bröckling 2016, xiii and 3).  
 
One of the defining characteristics of the Foucauldian ‘studies of governmentality’ 
is their extension of the notion of government, which now becomes ‘governmen-
tality’, beyond the locus of the state. For Foucault, power cannot be located in a 
clearly demarcated entity, exercising it in a top-down fashion. Rather, power is 
dispersed through lowly and contingent relations of force. In looking for the spe-
cific knowledge and social techniques constitutive of the entrepreneurial self, then, 
Bröckling does not simply analyse an authoritative philosophical treatise or the 
exercise of power by a centralised source. Instead, he traces a ‘convergence of lines’ 
from heterogeneous contexts and lowly cultural sources. In this way, Bröckling 
structures the book in three sections. First, he addresses the methodology of the 
Studies of Governmentality and begins to gather some evidence for the thesis that 
the neoliberal subject is hailed as an entrepreneurial self. Then, there are two parts: 
Bröckling first draws up the picture, or rather ‘rationality’, of the entrepreneurial 
self as it emanates from various theoretical sources. Then Bröckling focusses his 
attention on four “strategies and programmes” drawn from concrete practices, 
namely creativity, empowerment, quality and projects. 
 
Bröckling starts the book by delineating some of the contours of the entrepreneur-
ial self from self-help books, training manuals and management programs, which 
are examples of ‘social technologies’ aiming “to organize life around the entrepre-
neurial model of behaviour” (Bröckling 2016, 21). Concretely, Bröckling points to 
what the German sociologists Voß and Pongratz describe as the ‘entreployee’: a 
new type of labour in post-Fordist production. The entreployee is a labour force 
entrepreneur who is required to increase self-organisation, self-rationalisation and 
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self-monitoring as well as to autonomously economise their personhood. This so-
ciological notion coincides with demands made on neoliberal subjects in manage-
ment literature, such as Tom Peters’ and Robert H. Waterman’s bestseller (1982) 
In Search of Excellence and Gifford Pinchot’s (1985) Intrapreneuring. Much like 
the entreployee, the ‘intrapreneur’ (contraction of intra-corporate entrepreneur) is 
a figure that is not just described as but also praised for its readiness to take risks 
and its drive for innovation. Impressively, Bröckling situates categories like ‘entre-
ployee' and ‘intrapreneur’ in a far broader context of magazine articles, bestseller 
self-help books, Thatcherite ‘enterprise culture’, management literature, and the 
advent of the ‘new economy’ of post-Fordism.  
 
Beyond the sphere of management and organisation, Bröckling also observes in the 
self-help literature an ethical injunction to view one’s whole life as an enterprise, 
i.e. as “Me Inc”. In this case, the self is not merely hailed as an entrepreneur only 
at work, but always and everywhere. In the second part of the book, Bröckling goes 
into four widespread notions which have materialised in organisational culture, 
namely creativity, empowerment, quality management and the project. These are 
interesting topics, and Bröckling treats them in great detail and clarity. However, 
he fails to mention why he has specifically picked out these four rather than others, 
such as disruption or network. After all, these are also important buzzwords and 
expressions of the Californian Ideology in the management-scene of the infor-
mation age. As a result of this, his treatments of these topics feel more arbitrary 
and less convincing than the more conceptually oriented chapters of the first part. 
These early chapters, on the rationality of the entrepreneurial self, aim to show 
that these contemporary convergences upon some sort of entrepreneurial image of 
the subject are not coincidental. Rather, Bröckling demonstrates convincingly that 
the normative ideal of an entrepreneurial self forms part of the rationality of a 
family of economic theories grouped together under the label of neoliberalism. He 
does this by presenting the reader with an impressively clear and concise tour 
through a variety of theoretical currents in economics, notably ordoliberalism, hu-
man capital theory, and Von Hayek’s neoliberalism (later on, Bröckling also turns 
to contract theory and transaction economics). What these neoliberal theories or 
theorists all share, so argues Bröckling, are three fundamental convictions. First, 
neoliberalism argues for market mobilisation. That is, the market is viewed as the 
most efficient and just mechanism for resource allocation; the market mechanism 
should thus be universalised by instituting it in various social sectors. Secondly, 
neoliberalism deviates from classical liberalism in that it views not exchangeability 
but competition as the essence and main virtue of capitalist markets. Thirdly and 
finally, neoliberals maintain that neither markets nor competition come about nat-
urally, but must be actively instituted and sustained. Combining these three theses, 
we may say the political mission of neoliberalism consists in creating and managing 
the social conditions in which markets and competition are able to come about. In 
this way, the crux of Bröckling’s argument becomes clear: “If the thrust of neolib-
eral government is toward generalising competition, modelling society as a whole 
on the market, then it will ineluctably come to mould subjectivity on the figure of 
the entrepreneur” (Bröckling 2016, 60). 
 
Bröckling’s observation on the constellation of forces that mould the entrepre-
neurial subject, then, implies a wider claim on the basic structure of contemporary, 
neoliberal capitalism. It makes clear that the neoliberal dream of market universal-
isation does not merely mean the wish to institute markets in all the various spheres 
of society, for example through the privatisation of the public sector. It also means 
neoliberalism wishes to universalise the market from the public sphere of work to 
the private sphere of leisure. For the subject is not just an entrepreneur when 
he/she is sitting at his/her desk at the office, he/she is an entrepreneur of his/her 
entire life, “Me Inc”. Seen in this way, universalising the market through the gov-
erning technique of subjectification becomes a particularly effective way of inserting 
‘human capital’ into the economic system. This technique of subjectification is 
itself a major component of neoliberalism.  
 
The product of this technique of subjectification, the entrepreneurial self, is an 
essential element of neoliberal governmentality; it belongs to the ‘social conditions’ 
which must be instituted in order for neoliberal capitalism to function effectively. 
Accordingly, Bröckling calls the idea of the entrepreneurial self a ‘real fiction’, the 
kind of story which supplies “systems with the agents they need in order to operate” 
(Bröckling 2016, 11). As such, Bröckling’s image of the entrepreneurial self tells 
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us nothing about actually existing subjects, but, rather, more about the forces of 
subjectification as we find them in actually existing neoliberalism.  
 
It might, in this respect, seem strange that a book entitled The Entrepreneurial 
Self does not primarily deal with a self at all, but rather with its genealogical pro-
duction. Bröckling self-consciously refrains from claiming anything about the ef-
fectiveness of the power structures which govern the subject, i.e. from claiming 
that subjects in fact have become entrepreneurial selves. This means, first, that he 
does not claim that subjects in today’s world behave like entrepreneurial subjects 
and, second, that he does not attempt to say that subjects experience the lifeworld 
as governed by the call to act like an entrepreneur. One can laud Bröckling’s self-
restraint here, but one may also wonder whether he does not make it too easy for 
himself by ignoring the question of to what extent the notion of an entrepreneurial 
self resonates with the intuitions of those who live and act in contemporary capi-
talism. Could he not at least have referred to the kind of studies which have at-
tempted to make the sociological, rather than the genealogical, claim about ne-
oliberal subjects, such as Richard Sennett’s The Corrosion of Character? Moreover, 
does the plausibility of Bröckling’s claims not rest on the fact that the force field 
of entrepreneurialism resonates with our actual experience? What makes Bröck-
ling’s account intuitive is not just the presence of his theses in ‘high’ theory and 
‘lowly’ management programmes, but also in the actual effects of this complex of 
prescriptions on the behaviour and experience of neoliberal subjects.  
 
Having said that, let us look at what, according to Bröckling, constitutes an entre-
preneurial subject more specifically. To this end, Bröckling distinguishes four func-
tions of the entrepreneur as a macroeconomic category. These functions are re-
spectively: the entrepreneur as speculator, innovator, risk-bearer and coordinator.  
First, the notion of the entrepreneur as speculator is put forward in reference to 
economists Von Mises and Kirzner, who both stress that human beings are not just 
utility calculators, but also possess alertness to opportunities such as arbitrage, a 
price difference in the same commodities in different markets. The defining feature 
of the entrepreneur here, then, is her spontaneous alertness to such opportunities 
of speculation. Secondly, with the entrepreneur as innovator, Bröckling points to 
the works of Schumpeter, and his conception of the creative destroyer. Here the 
entrepreneur is a figure who exhibits leadership and establishes new combinations 
in production and distribution. As opposed to the rationalising and imitative man-
ager, she is the instigator of novelty and difference in opposition to routine and 
staleness. Thirdly, the entrepreneur can be seen, as in the account of Frank H. 
Knight, as a risk-bearer. Knight here points to a fundamental uncertainty with 
respect to human action and knowledge. Rational action cannot be calculated with 
a straightforward utility function, but is stricken by a fundamental contingency. 
The entrepreneur, in opposition to the wage labourer and manager, bears this con-
tingency in order to enjoy profit, and in this way she also assumes responsibility. 
Fourthly and finally, the entrepreneur fulfils the function of the coordinator. Her 
judgements and decisions regarding resource allocation and coordination attempt 
to be more efficient than, and therefore different from, business as usual, in which 
inefficiency is always the rule. In this way, the entrepreneur as coordinator is an 
agent of change. 
 
Now, according to Bröckling, what unifies these separate, but not entirely unre-
lated, accounts of what the entrepreneurial function is, is that it is centred around 
such values as the new and the unknown rather than around the old and the 
known: “The theories we have analysed above all distinguish the entrepreneurial 
function from that of the calculating, instrumentalist, rationalist manager” (Bröck-
ling 2016, 75). This proclaimed shift from the rationalist clerk to the innovative 
entrepreneur fits neatly with a commonplace description of present-day capitalist 
modernity as having moved from a conception of the capitalist subject as a We-
berian-Marxian cog in the machine to an artistic, creative and autonomous post-
’69 subject. It fits in with the proclaimed shift, in other words, from the old to the 
‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello), or from solid to liquid moder-
nity (Zygmunt Bauman), organised to disorganised modernity (Lash and Urry), or 
industrial to reflexive modernity (Ulrich Beck). For Bröckling, the terms of ne-
oliberal governmentality are marked by this shift from rationalist clerk to the en-
trepreneurial self.  
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